Lars Erik Berntzen
@leberntzen.bsky.social
Associate Professor, Department of Government, University of Bergen | activism, norms, political violence
Reposted by Lars Erik Berntzen
🚨 New paper with Maria Grasso on generational shifts in political values. Despite talk of rising age polarisation, we show that gaps in attitudes are stable or even narrowing. Economic attitudes move in cycles, while social values have become more liberal – mainly due to generational replacement.
Political Socialisation in the UK: Describing Generational Changes of Values - International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society
A growing bulk of research examines intergenerational shifts in attitudes and the extent to which they are attributable to new cohorts of voters being socialised under different socioeconomic and cult...
link.springer.com
November 13, 2025 at 10:29 AM
🚨 New paper with Maria Grasso on generational shifts in political values. Despite talk of rising age polarisation, we show that gaps in attitudes are stable or even narrowing. Economic attitudes move in cycles, while social values have become more liberal – mainly due to generational replacement.
Reposted by Lars Erik Berntzen
New research explores why openness/intellect stands apart from other personality traits. It turns out this trait may be less universal across cultures and rarely targeted for change.
Read more in #PSPR: ow.ly/UGlJ50XqLqS
Read more in #PSPR: ow.ly/UGlJ50XqLqS
November 13, 2025 at 9:59 PM
New research explores why openness/intellect stands apart from other personality traits. It turns out this trait may be less universal across cultures and rarely targeted for change.
Read more in #PSPR: ow.ly/UGlJ50XqLqS
Read more in #PSPR: ow.ly/UGlJ50XqLqS
Reposted by Lars Erik Berntzen
Our @apsrjournal.bsky.social article is now in print! We develop a theory to explain why the public doesn't become more prosocial toward LGBTQ+ people after illegitimate anti-LGBTQ+ violence and provide causal, externally valid, evidence for the theory across 4 studies doi.org/10.1017/S000...
November 13, 2025 at 4:59 PM
Our @apsrjournal.bsky.social article is now in print! We develop a theory to explain why the public doesn't become more prosocial toward LGBTQ+ people after illegitimate anti-LGBTQ+ violence and provide causal, externally valid, evidence for the theory across 4 studies doi.org/10.1017/S000...
Reposted by Lars Erik Berntzen
Three preregistered experiments with prolific participants (N = 2,254) found no evidence for experimenter demand effects
osf.io/preprints/ps...
osf.io/preprints/ps...
November 12, 2025 at 1:20 PM
Three preregistered experiments with prolific participants (N = 2,254) found no evidence for experimenter demand effects
osf.io/preprints/ps...
osf.io/preprints/ps...
Reposted by Lars Erik Berntzen
Share widely with your students in Switzerland 🇨🇭thinking about a PhD @eui-eu.bsky.social
𝗢𝗻𝗹𝗶𝗻𝗲 𝗘𝗨𝗜 𝗣𝗵𝗗 𝗣𝗿𝗲𝗽 𝗧𝗮𝗹𝗸 🇨🇭
21 Nov 2025 | 2:30pm CET
@alissasiara.bsky.social introduces the program & life at EUI, I share my experience, and we answer your questions.
👉 Register: www.eui.eu/events?id=58...
𝗢𝗻𝗹𝗶𝗻𝗲 𝗘𝗨𝗜 𝗣𝗵𝗗 𝗣𝗿𝗲𝗽 𝗧𝗮𝗹𝗸 🇨🇭
21 Nov 2025 | 2:30pm CET
@alissasiara.bsky.social introduces the program & life at EUI, I share my experience, and we answer your questions.
👉 Register: www.eui.eu/events?id=58...
PhD Prep Talk: Switzerland
Meet an EUI Researcher and alumnus from your country!
www.eui.eu
November 5, 2025 at 12:14 PM
Share widely with your students in Switzerland 🇨🇭thinking about a PhD @eui-eu.bsky.social
𝗢𝗻𝗹𝗶𝗻𝗲 𝗘𝗨𝗜 𝗣𝗵𝗗 𝗣𝗿𝗲𝗽 𝗧𝗮𝗹𝗸 🇨🇭
21 Nov 2025 | 2:30pm CET
@alissasiara.bsky.social introduces the program & life at EUI, I share my experience, and we answer your questions.
👉 Register: www.eui.eu/events?id=58...
𝗢𝗻𝗹𝗶𝗻𝗲 𝗘𝗨𝗜 𝗣𝗵𝗗 𝗣𝗿𝗲𝗽 𝗧𝗮𝗹𝗸 🇨🇭
21 Nov 2025 | 2:30pm CET
@alissasiara.bsky.social introduces the program & life at EUI, I share my experience, and we answer your questions.
👉 Register: www.eui.eu/events?id=58...
Reposted by Lars Erik Berntzen
How common do you think something is? When asked to judge proportions, people's estimates can be drawn towards their prior expectations of what the 'typical' value is. The result can be an overestimate of low proportions, and an underestimate of high ones... link.springer.com/article/10.3...
November 5, 2025 at 11:28 AM
How common do you think something is? When asked to judge proportions, people's estimates can be drawn towards their prior expectations of what the 'typical' value is. The result can be an overestimate of low proportions, and an underestimate of high ones... link.springer.com/article/10.3...
Reposted by Lars Erik Berntzen
If you know anyone considering doing a PhD in political science or sociology, encourage them to apply to the EUI PhD program and join the institute's landmark 50th cohort of PhD researchers in the SPS Department! Applications from Central and Eastern Europe are particularly welcome!
🚨 Applications Now Open for the EUI PhD Programmes 2026-2027!
📊 Economics |⚖️ Law |📘 History | 🏛 Political and Social Sciences
Join the EUI's 50th PhD cohort!
Apply by 15 January 2026 (14:00 CET) for the academic journey of a lifetime! 👉: eui.eu/phd
#EUIPhD #PhDOpportunity
📊 Economics |⚖️ Law |📘 History | 🏛 Political and Social Sciences
Join the EUI's 50th PhD cohort!
Apply by 15 January 2026 (14:00 CET) for the academic journey of a lifetime! 👉: eui.eu/phd
#EUIPhD #PhDOpportunity
November 4, 2025 at 10:27 AM
If you know anyone considering doing a PhD in political science or sociology, encourage them to apply to the EUI PhD program and join the institute's landmark 50th cohort of PhD researchers in the SPS Department! Applications from Central and Eastern Europe are particularly welcome!
Reposted by Lars Erik Berntzen
New article on “The Relational Dynamics of Violence Escalation and Inhibition During Far-Right Protest Waves” by Joel Busher, Julia Ebner, Zsófia Hacsek, Gareth Harris and myself in the latest issue of “American Behavioral Scientist”:
The Relational Dynamics of Violence Escalation and Inhibition During Far-Right Protest Waves - Joel Busher, Julia Ebner, Zsófia Hacsek, Gareth Harris, Graham Macklin, 2025
This article examines how interactions between far-right protestors, counter-protestors and other actors, including the police, lead towards and away from viole...
journals.sagepub.com
November 2, 2025 at 7:17 AM
New article on “The Relational Dynamics of Violence Escalation and Inhibition During Far-Right Protest Waves” by Joel Busher, Julia Ebner, Zsófia Hacsek, Gareth Harris and myself in the latest issue of “American Behavioral Scientist”:
Reposted by Lars Erik Berntzen
Twitter/X is a story on its own:
🔴 While users have become more Republican
💥 POSTING has completely transformed: it has moved nearly ❗50 percentage points❗ from Democrat-dominated to slightly Republican-leaning.
🔴 While users have become more Republican
💥 POSTING has completely transformed: it has moved nearly ❗50 percentage points❗ from Democrat-dominated to slightly Republican-leaning.
October 30, 2025 at 8:09 AM
Twitter/X is a story on its own:
🔴 While users have become more Republican
💥 POSTING has completely transformed: it has moved nearly ❗50 percentage points❗ from Democrat-dominated to slightly Republican-leaning.
🔴 While users have become more Republican
💥 POSTING has completely transformed: it has moved nearly ❗50 percentage points❗ from Democrat-dominated to slightly Republican-leaning.
Reposted by Lars Erik Berntzen
Most young men in Britain, despite popular commentary, are *not* flocking to Reform UK.
Just under 1/3 women would vote for Reform
Just over 1/3 would vote for Reform.
We *cannot* reject the null of gender gap homogeneity across cohorts.
Just under 1/3 women would vote for Reform
Just over 1/3 would vote for Reform.
We *cannot* reject the null of gender gap homogeneity across cohorts.
October 30, 2025 at 9:42 AM
Most young men in Britain, despite popular commentary, are *not* flocking to Reform UK.
Just under 1/3 women would vote for Reform
Just over 1/3 would vote for Reform.
We *cannot* reject the null of gender gap homogeneity across cohorts.
Just under 1/3 women would vote for Reform
Just over 1/3 would vote for Reform.
We *cannot* reject the null of gender gap homogeneity across cohorts.
Reposted by Lars Erik Berntzen
Posting is correlated with affective polarization:
😡 The most partisan users — those who love their party and despise the other — are more likely to post about politics
🥊 The result? A loud angry minority dominates online politics, which itself can drive polarization (see doi.org/10.1073/pnas...)
😡 The most partisan users — those who love their party and despise the other — are more likely to post about politics
🥊 The result? A loud angry minority dominates online politics, which itself can drive polarization (see doi.org/10.1073/pnas...)
October 30, 2025 at 8:09 AM
Posting is correlated with affective polarization:
😡 The most partisan users — those who love their party and despise the other — are more likely to post about politics
🥊 The result? A loud angry minority dominates online politics, which itself can drive polarization (see doi.org/10.1073/pnas...)
😡 The most partisan users — those who love their party and despise the other — are more likely to post about politics
🥊 The result? A loud angry minority dominates online politics, which itself can drive polarization (see doi.org/10.1073/pnas...)
Reposted by Lars Erik Berntzen
🚨 🆕 analysis w/ @turnbulldugarte.com: most British young men reject the far right @ukandeu.bsky.social Despite media claims, 71% of young men & 75% of young women say they’d never vote Reform UK. The gender gap exists, but it’s steady across ages—not youth-driven.
🔗 ukandeu.ac.uk/most-british...
🔗 ukandeu.ac.uk/most-british...
Most British young men reject the far right - UK in a changing Europe
Emilia Belknap and Stuart Turnbull-Dugarte explain their analysis on the demographics of Reform UK voters in the UK. They argue that while the dominant narrative is that young men are the most likely ...
ukandeu.ac.uk
October 30, 2025 at 10:53 AM
🚨 🆕 analysis w/ @turnbulldugarte.com: most British young men reject the far right @ukandeu.bsky.social Despite media claims, 71% of young men & 75% of young women say they’d never vote Reform UK. The gender gap exists, but it’s steady across ages—not youth-driven.
🔗 ukandeu.ac.uk/most-british...
🔗 ukandeu.ac.uk/most-british...
Reposted by Lars Erik Berntzen
New chapter on affective polarization and support for political violence (open access): www.elgaronline.com/edcollchap-o...
August 11, 2025 at 1:59 PM
New chapter on affective polarization and support for political violence (open access): www.elgaronline.com/edcollchap-o...
Reposted by Lars Erik Berntzen
Main takeaways: (1) Affective polarization predicts higher support for political violence at extreme levels; (2) its main effect may be expanding opportunity structures for a small subset willing to act violently. US & Brazil show highest risk.
August 11, 2025 at 2:07 PM
Main takeaways: (1) Affective polarization predicts higher support for political violence at extreme levels; (2) its main effect may be expanding opportunity structures for a small subset willing to act violently. US & Brazil show highest risk.
Reposted by Lars Erik Berntzen
"The Conservatives propose to deport about 5 per cent of the UK’s legal population"
"the Conservative party increasingly holds positions that are further from mainstream British public opinion than Reform"
"the Conservative party increasingly holds positions that are further from mainstream British public opinion than Reform"
Hadn’t, in truth, really absorbed the scale of what the Conservatives are proposing on ILR and immigration more broadly until this week’s Sunday Times interviews. Some thoughts on that in today’s note:
Tory deportation plan would upend Britain
Proposing such a radical bill with little public support is a gift to Nigel Farage
www.ft.com
October 24, 2025 at 9:07 AM
"The Conservatives propose to deport about 5 per cent of the UK’s legal population"
"the Conservative party increasingly holds positions that are further from mainstream British public opinion than Reform"
"the Conservative party increasingly holds positions that are further from mainstream British public opinion than Reform"
Reposted by Lars Erik Berntzen
Now out in Party Politics 🎉
Our study (@jbpilet.bsky.social)suggests that when a mainstream right-wing party signals willingness to rule with the radical right, support for the radical right rises — while the mainstream gains nothing.
👉 A legitimisation effect.
journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10....
Our study (@jbpilet.bsky.social)suggests that when a mainstream right-wing party signals willingness to rule with the radical right, support for the radical right rises — while the mainstream gains nothing.
👉 A legitimisation effect.
journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10....
October 24, 2025 at 7:38 AM
Now out in Party Politics 🎉
Our study (@jbpilet.bsky.social)suggests that when a mainstream right-wing party signals willingness to rule with the radical right, support for the radical right rises — while the mainstream gains nothing.
👉 A legitimisation effect.
journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10....
Our study (@jbpilet.bsky.social)suggests that when a mainstream right-wing party signals willingness to rule with the radical right, support for the radical right rises — while the mainstream gains nothing.
👉 A legitimisation effect.
journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10....
Reposted by Lars Erik Berntzen
Ezra Klein's suggestion that Dems can win in red states with pro-life candidates is entirely consistent with his theory of the case as to why Democrats are underperforming. But, as @jessicavalenti.bsky.social lays out so clearly here, this is an obvious, objectively nonsensical suggestion. Quick 🧵.
In 2022, Kansas voters *overwhelmingly* defeated an anti-abortion ballot measure.
Ohio voters passed an abortion rights amendment in 2023.
And Missouri? You guessed it! Voters passed Amendment 3 this past November.
So no, we don't need 'pro-life Democrats' to win.
Ohio voters passed an abortion rights amendment in 2023.
And Missouri? You guessed it! Voters passed Amendment 3 this past November.
So no, we don't need 'pro-life Democrats' to win.
September 24, 2025 at 7:07 PM
Ezra Klein's suggestion that Dems can win in red states with pro-life candidates is entirely consistent with his theory of the case as to why Democrats are underperforming. But, as @jessicavalenti.bsky.social lays out so clearly here, this is an obvious, objectively nonsensical suggestion. Quick 🧵.
Reposted by Lars Erik Berntzen
Sadly, there's a lot to be said for Marina Hyde's analysis here. www.theguardian.com/commentisfre...
October 22, 2025 at 7:19 AM
Sadly, there's a lot to be said for Marina Hyde's analysis here. www.theguardian.com/commentisfre...
Reposted by Lars Erik Berntzen
Social media users adopt the toxic behaviors of ingroup members
An analysis of 7 million tweets from over 700,000 accounts finds that exposures to toxic behavior by ingroup members is the primary driver of contagious toxicity online academic.oup.com/jcmc/article...
An analysis of 7 million tweets from over 700,000 accounts finds that exposures to toxic behavior by ingroup members is the primary driver of contagious toxicity online academic.oup.com/jcmc/article...
October 22, 2025 at 1:16 PM
Social media users adopt the toxic behaviors of ingroup members
An analysis of 7 million tweets from over 700,000 accounts finds that exposures to toxic behavior by ingroup members is the primary driver of contagious toxicity online academic.oup.com/jcmc/article...
An analysis of 7 million tweets from over 700,000 accounts finds that exposures to toxic behavior by ingroup members is the primary driver of contagious toxicity online academic.oup.com/jcmc/article...
Reposted by Lars Erik Berntzen
📢 New publication! 📢
Why do ordinary citizens participate in election violence in democracies?
Kathleen Klaus and @meganturnbull.bsky.social argue that such violence is often jointly produced by elites and citizens, enabled by threat-based narratives and social networks that legitimize violence.
Why do ordinary citizens participate in election violence in democracies?
Kathleen Klaus and @meganturnbull.bsky.social argue that such violence is often jointly produced by elites and citizens, enabled by threat-based narratives and social networks that legitimize violence.
September 29, 2025 at 8:33 AM
📢 New publication! 📢
Why do ordinary citizens participate in election violence in democracies?
Kathleen Klaus and @meganturnbull.bsky.social argue that such violence is often jointly produced by elites and citizens, enabled by threat-based narratives and social networks that legitimize violence.
Why do ordinary citizens participate in election violence in democracies?
Kathleen Klaus and @meganturnbull.bsky.social argue that such violence is often jointly produced by elites and citizens, enabled by threat-based narratives and social networks that legitimize violence.
Reposted by Lars Erik Berntzen
So many echoes from this article for US politics....
September 27, 2025 at 4:43 PM
So many echoes from this article for US politics....
Reposted by Lars Erik Berntzen
🚨New preprint🚨
osf.io/preprints/ps...
In a sample of ~2 billion comments, social media discourse becomes more negative over time
Archival and experimental findings suggest this is a byproduct of people trying to differentiate themselves
Led by @hongkai1.bsky.social in his 1st year (!) of his PhD
osf.io/preprints/ps...
In a sample of ~2 billion comments, social media discourse becomes more negative over time
Archival and experimental findings suggest this is a byproduct of people trying to differentiate themselves
Led by @hongkai1.bsky.social in his 1st year (!) of his PhD
September 26, 2025 at 8:30 PM
🚨New preprint🚨
osf.io/preprints/ps...
In a sample of ~2 billion comments, social media discourse becomes more negative over time
Archival and experimental findings suggest this is a byproduct of people trying to differentiate themselves
Led by @hongkai1.bsky.social in his 1st year (!) of his PhD
osf.io/preprints/ps...
In a sample of ~2 billion comments, social media discourse becomes more negative over time
Archival and experimental findings suggest this is a byproduct of people trying to differentiate themselves
Led by @hongkai1.bsky.social in his 1st year (!) of his PhD
Reposted by Lars Erik Berntzen
Against my better instincts, I have written some notes on how human probability judgements work and what you should expect from surveys that ask people to guess what proportion of the population is transgender. I hope never to speak of this matter again
Some notes on probability judgement – Notes from a data witch
For the love of fuck, literally nobody thinks that 20% of the population is transgender. Please stop sharing that ridiculous YouGov statistic
blog.djnavarro.net
September 21, 2025 at 3:38 PM
Against my better instincts, I have written some notes on how human probability judgements work and what you should expect from surveys that ask people to guess what proportion of the population is transgender. I hope never to speak of this matter again
Reposted by Lars Erik Berntzen
✨Very happy to see my paper "Attitudinal ambivalence toward multiculturalism" out on @jeppjournal.bsky.social !
www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10....
1/8 🧵
www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10....
1/8 🧵
August 21, 2025 at 12:37 PM
✨Very happy to see my paper "Attitudinal ambivalence toward multiculturalism" out on @jeppjournal.bsky.social !
www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10....
1/8 🧵
www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10....
1/8 🧵
Reposted by Lars Erik Berntzen
We often hear from reviewers: "what about demand effects?" So we developed a method to eliminate them. Something weird happened during testing: We couldn’t detect demand effects in the first place! (1/8)
September 15, 2025 at 5:19 PM
We often hear from reviewers: "what about demand effects?" So we developed a method to eliminate them. Something weird happened during testing: We couldn’t detect demand effects in the first place! (1/8)