By Explaining History It is December 18, 2025. As we approach the end of another year, it feels less like a simple turning of the calendar and more like the closing of a historical epoch. In this week’s podcast, I argued that 2025 will be remembered as the year the "Long 20th Century" finally ended. For 50 years, the Anglo-American world has been in a slow, managed decline.

The collapse of the Third Republic in June 1940 was a political decision, not just a military outcome. Divided between "Resisters" led by Paul Reynaud, who wished to continue the war from North Africa, and "Armistice" advocates led by Marshal Pétain, the government ultimately chose to seek terms with Germany. This choice was driven by a military leadership that feared internal social disorder more than occupation and a conservative elite who viewed the defeat as an opportunity for an authoritarian "National Revolution." The resignation of Reynaud and the National Assembly’s vote to grant Pétain full powers marked the legal end of the Republic and the beginning of the collaborationist Vichy regime.

The German breakthrough in the Ardennes in May 1940 was not a result of a lack of intelligence, but a catastrophic failure of analysis driven by cognitive dissonance. French military doctrine deemed the Ardennes "impassable" for tanks, leading the High Command to dismiss ample evidence—including aerial reconnaissance and warnings from Swiss intelligence—that the Germans were massing there. Trapped by "confirmation bias," General Gamelin interpreted German moves as feints, focusing his attention on the diversionary attack in Belgium. This intellectual rigidity allowed the Wehrmacht to execute a high-risk logistical gamble, pushing huge armored columns through narrow roads unopposed, turning a geographical barrier into a strategic surprise that broke the back of the French defense. Image: Attribution: Bundesarchiv, Bild 146-1978-062-24 / CC-BY-SA 3.0

The collapse of the Anglo-French alliance in 1940 was a bitter "divorce" fueled by strategic divergence and mutual suspicion. As the military situation deteriorated, Britain refused to commit its air reserves to the lost battle in France, prioritizing island defense. The evacuation of Dunkirk, viewed as a miracle in Britain, was seen in France as a betrayal where the British army escaped while the French rearguard was sacrificed. This animosity exploded with the British attack on the French fleet at Mers-el-Kébir, killing nearly 1,300 French sailors. This act solidified the legitimacy of the Vichy regime, allowing Pétain to portray Britain as a hostile power and justifying collaboration with Germany as a defensive necessity.

The collapse of the Anglo-French alliance in 1940 was a bitter "divorce" fueled by strategic divergence and mutual suspicion. As the military situation deteriorated, Britain refused to commit its air reserves to the lost battle in France, prioritizing island defense. The evacuation of Dunkirk, viewed as a miracle in Britain, was seen in France as a betrayal where the British army escaped while the French rearguard was sacrificed. This animosity exploded with the British attack on the French fleet at Mers-el-Kébir, killing nearly 1,300 French sailors. This act solidified the legitimacy of the Vichy regime, allowing Pétain to portray Britain as a hostile power and justifying collaboration with Germany as a defensive necessity.

In this week’s podcast, I attempted to synthesize the current moment, drawing on the analysis of commentators like Robert Reich and looking at the deeper structural forces at play. We are witnessing a low-level civil war across the West, but it isn't the traditional battle between socialism and capitalism. Instead, it is a conflict between two factions of capital itself.

The mass flight of 8–10 million civilians known as L’Exode (The Exodus) was a decisive factor in the Fall of France in 1940. Triggered by memories of 1914 atrocities and Luftwaffe terror bombing, the panic clogged the road networks, paralyzing Allied troop movements and logistics. The German army ruthlessly weaponized the crisis, using refugees as human shields and obstacles to prevent French counter-attacks. The simultaneous flight of civil authorities (mayors, police) created an administrative vacuum, shattering the social contract. This humanitarian catastrophe broke the government’s will to fight, fueling the demand for an armistice and paving the way for the authoritarian "order" of the Vichy regime.

The collapse of the French Army in 1940 was an intellectual failure born of doctrinal asymmetry. Traumatized by the slaughter of WWI, the French High Command adopted La Bataille Conduite ("Methodical Battle"), a highly centralized doctrine prioritizing firepower and rigid timetables to minimize casualties. In contrast, the Wehrmacht utilized the Prussian tradition of Auftragstaktik ("Mission Command"), which empowered subordinates to make rapid, independent decisions. Hampered by a distrust of radios and the dispersal of tanks, the French command cycle was overwhelmed by the tempo of German operations. The result was a cognitive paralysis where French orders consistently arrived too late to influence the battle, leading to the disintegration of a materially superior force.

The post-war claim that France’s defeat in 1940 was caused by a lack of weapons and the Popular Front’s "40-hour week" is a historical myth concocted by the Vichy regime. Statistical analysis reveals that the French army actually possessed a numerical superiority in heavy artillery and tanks (such as the superior Char B1 bis) and had achieved parity in aircraft production by May 1940. The true causes of the industrial failure were the deflationary austerity of the early 1930s, the chaotic management of nationalization in the aviation sector, and a catastrophic logistical system that failed to distribute existing reserves to the front. The defeat was an organizational collapse, not a failure of production capacity. Image courtesy of kitchener.lord - license details:

History is often shaped not just by material conditions, but by how leaders interpret those conditions. In the late 1920s, Joseph Stalin looked at the Soviet countryside and saw an enemy that wasn't there. In this week’s podcast, I explored the roots of the Soviet famine and collectivization, focusing on the critical period of 1928-1929. Using Robert Conquest’s classic study…

History is often shaped not just by material conditions, but by how leaders interpret those conditions. In the late 1920s, Joseph Stalin looked at the Soviet countryside and saw an enemy that wasn't there. In this week’s podcast, I explored the roots of the Soviet famine and collectivization, focusing on the critical period of 1928-1929. Using Robert Conquest’s classic study…

The post-war claim that France’s defeat in 1940 was caused by a lack of weapons and the Popular Front’s "40-hour week" is a historical myth concocted by the Vichy regime. Statistical analysis reveals that the French army actually possessed a numerical superiority in heavy artillery and tanks (such as the superior Char B1 bis) and had achieved parity in aircraft production by May 1940. The true causes of the industrial failure were the deflationary austerity of the early 1930s, the chaotic management of nationalization in the aviation sector, and a catastrophic logistical system that failed to distribute existing reserves to the front. The defeat was an organizational collapse, not a failure of production capacity. Image courtesy of kitchener.lord - license details:

The collapse of the French Army in 1940 was an intellectual failure born of doctrinal asymmetry. Traumatized by the slaughter of WWI, the French High Command adopted La Bataille Conduite ("Methodical Battle"), a highly centralized doctrine prioritizing firepower and rigid timetables to minimize casualties. In contrast, the Wehrmacht utilized the Prussian tradition of Auftragstaktik ("Mission Command"), which empowered subordinates to make rapid, independent decisions. Hampered by a distrust of radios and the dispersal of tanks, the French command cycle was overwhelmed by the tempo of German operations. The result was a cognitive paralysis where French orders consistently arrived too late to influence the battle, leading to the disintegration of a materially superior force.

The regime’s latest racist fury is tied to the Right’s much broader attempt to redefine citizenship and national identity in service of an exclusionary white nationalist

Taxation is often discussed in dry, technocratic terms. It is the price we pay for civilization, the mechanism that funds our hospitals, schools, and roads. However, in the current political climat…

Taxation is often discussed in dry, technocratic terms. It is the price we pay for civilization, the mechanism that funds our hospitals, schools, and roads. However, in the current political climat…