Yes it's supposed to be done by the end of March 2026 commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-bri...

DWP do make it clear in their statistical bulletin that the composition of UC claimants is changing through managed migration, but it would be helpful if they also published charts of people claiming UC or equivalent legacy benefits! bsky.app/profile/loui...

So, while there has been a rise in people claiming incapacity benefits in the last few years, the uptick in the increase beginning in 2024 does appear to be a result of the start of previous ESA recipients being migrated to UC.

This means that the claimants most likely to be working were mostly migrated to UC at the beginning of the programme in 2023, and the claimants most likely to be not working due to health reasons were migrated towards the end

In part, these trends are driven by people moving from legacy benefits to UC through managed migration. This has been done by cohorts of claimants of different legacy benefits, starting with Tax Credits only in 2023, moving to different combinations last year, and finishing this year with ESA only

I completely forgot this happened until watching the traitors the other day and had to check with my friend that he remembered it and I didn't hallucinate it.

The price tag for all three - around £7bn in total - would be significant for a government facing fiscal pressures at the Budget. But this package shouldn't be thought of as radical; it is simply reversing cuts made since 2013 and restoring the link between need and entitlement in the benefit system

The status quo would leave this Government on track for the worst performance on child poverty of any Labour Government in 60 years. Fully scrapping the 2-child limit is essential to get child poverty falling, but they would need to go further to guarantee success against uncertain forecasts.

The Government faces difficult fiscal choices this Autumn, but there is also political jeopardy in failing to take bold action on child poverty.

These 3 reforms together would be a powerful programme to reduce child poverty over the Parliament. We estimate they would drive down child poverty rates from 31% in 2024-25 to 29.5% in 2029-30, equivalent to 660,000 fewer children in poverty in 2029-30 than would be the case absent of any action

In the research, we model the impact of two additional reforms that would place significant downward pressure on child poverty rates, and would renew the link between benefit entitlement and need: scrapping the benefit cap and relinking the LHA to 30th percentile rents

And the Child Poverty Strategy should not stop there. Without further action, we project child poverty rates will creep up close to 2024-25 levels by 2029-30 even with full repeal of the 2-child limit, leaving the Government with just 0.4 ppts of ‘child poverty headroom’ against a 2024-25 baseline

Fundamentally, all the partial repeal options are inconsistent with the Government’s manifesto and subsequent promises to develop "an ambitious child poverty strategy”. The 2-child limit must be repealed in full to give the Child Poverty Strategy any chance of success.

A lower 3rd+ child element is arguably most logical half measure given potential economies of scale, but research contests the cost of a child falls considerably for 3rd children onward + the value of the standard child element has been seriously squeezed – it’s now £309pa (8%) lower than in 2013

And there are other problems with these options too: the creation of sharp cliff edges (exempting those in work only); the continued disconnect between need and entitlement (exempting those in work and a 3-child limit) and retention of the troubling non-consensual conception exemption (ditto).

However, our projections show all of these partial-repeal alternatives would leave child poverty rates higher at the end of the forecast period than at the beginning (just under 32 per cent compared to just under 31 per cent in 2024-25)

That price tag is significant, so it’s unsurprising there are rumours the Government is considering only partial reform of the two-child limit, such as moving to a 3-child limit, introducing a lower child element for 3rd+ children, or exempting affected families that are in work.