We don’t always know when we’re asleep or awake. This can affect how rested we feel

Nature Human Behaviour - Correction for multiple comparisons should be ubiquitous

Mind blanking (MB) is a mental state of seemingly no reportable thought content. The question of how we can entertain no thoughts while awake is challenging for the study of spontaneous thinking. By c...

Stereotypes of age-related gender bias are socially distorted, as evidenced by the age gap in the representations of women and men across various media and algorithms, despite no systematic age differ...

It is our biggest blind spot, a bizarre experience that befalls us every day, and can’t be explained by our need for rest

A recent publication in Nature (Cogitate et al. 2025) aimed at enriching the progressive build-up of a valid theory of conscious processing using valuable

Autism and attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) are among the most common neurodivergent neurotypes worldwide. Epidemiological evidence sho…

This study offers a novel approach for benchmarking complex cognitive behavior in artificial systems. Almost universally, Large Language Models (LLMs) perform best on tasks which may be included in th...

npj Parkinson's Disease - Sleep stage mixing is associated with poor prognosis in early Parkinson’s disease

Abstract. It is well known that in interdisciplinary consciousness studies there are various competing hypotheses about the neural correlate(s) of consciou

Abstract. It is well known that in interdisciplinary consciousness studies there are various competing hypotheses about the neural correlate(s) of consciou

Our understanding of the neural basis of consciousness is mostly restricted to large-scale brain activity patterns as measured by methods such as functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and magneto/electro-encephalography (M/EEG). In contrast, we lack even basic understanding of circuit-level mechanisms supporting consciousness – particularly in humans – despite the fundamental role that such mechanisms likely play in instantiating larger-scale brain activity patterns supporting conscious states and contents. Here, we review what progress has been made on circuit-level theories of consciousness (e.g., apical amplification theory, dendritic integration theory) and argue that such theories can be tested in humans using recently developed, state-of-the-art methods. Doing so will further facilitate translation of consciousness science into clinical settings and strengthen the bridge between circuit- and network-level theories of consciousness.