Traditional risk communication emphasizes the probability of possible outcomes but neglects other crucial dimensions of risks. We propose a taxonomy of risk information and illustrate how simulated experience can convey overlooked aspects. We conclude with a research agenda to advance the theory and practice of risk communication across domains.

Language learning is a multi-threaded, multi-mechanism process. It is multi-threaded in that it emerges as a byproduct of addressing multiple goals while engaging in social interactions. It is multi-mechanism in that children integrate multiple information sources to infer what is meant and what to say next. These information sources include contextual and social cues, as well as cognitive mechanisms. Focusing on early word learning, this article reviews information sources, how children might sensitively adapt to them, and how we can model their integration using Bayesian inference over multiple probability distributions. We argue that, to advance our understanding of language learning, we must jointly study how children learn from multiple information sources across diverse developmental settings.

Children with autism often struggle to tune in to voices, missing important cues for social connection and language learning. What underlies this diminished engagement? Neuroimaging evidence implicates disrupted connectivity between voice-selective temporal regions and brain networks supporting reward, salience, and social cognition, leading to a new neural model of vocal insensitivity in autism.

Traditionally, emotions have been viewed as intrapersonal experiences, but recent perspectives emphasize their interpersonal nature. Yet research on interpersonal emotional processes is scattered across subfields and lacks a unifying framework. We propose a taxonomy that structures the different methodological ways through which dyadic emotional processes can be and have been empirically studied. Reviewing recent work, we apply this taxonomy to identify well-studied versus neglected areas and clarify gaps between empirical work and theory. Our review highlights two key insights: to advance theory, empirical research should (i) consider context and (ii) move beyond simple bivariate approaches. Laying the methodological groundwork, the taxonomy provides a first step toward unifying the literature and fostering cumulative progress in understanding interpersonal emotional processes.

In their letter [1], Zeman et al. raise the intriguing suggestion that visual imagery (which we argued should be understood as graphical rendering [2]) has a central role in social cognition. Specifically, they point to an association between aphantasia and deficits in autobiographical memory [3,4] and lower empathy to verbal descriptions of distressing events [5]. To be clear upfront, we agree with Zeman et al.’s bottom line that visual imagery might have social implications, and that this idea deserves thought and exploration.

‘Theory of mind’ (ToM) is classically investigated with ‘static’ inference tasks, which miss the dynamic nature of social interactions. In a recent article, Buergi, Aydogan, and colleagues combined computational modeling and neuroimaging to study the adaptive nature of mentalization (i.e., the ability to infer the continuous change of others’ thoughts and intentions).

Inspired by an analogy with ‘game engines’, the software modules that support animations and games, Balaban and Ullman propose that there is a deep-seated distinction between ‘physical simulation’ and ‘graphical rendering’ in the brain, broadly mapping onto the dorsal and ventral streams of visual processing [1]. The developmental pathway giving rise to in silico game engines is very different from the evolutionary history of the human brain, constrained by evolutionary forces. Nevertheless, the analogy is illuminating.

In their recent article [1], Scholte and de Haan argue, contrary to the classical view, that the visual cortex is not organized into separate modules to process individual features (e.g., color in V4 and motion in V5/MT). In the absence of such a modular organization, they argue, the problem of binding separate features together in coherent object representations (the binding problem) does not arise. A recent commentary by Roelfsema and Serre [2] has already argued that the case against modularity is not as strong as claimed by Scholte and de Haan and highlighted empirical evidence for binding mechanisms both in the visual cortex and artificial neural networks.

Brain–computer interface (BCI) research has achieved remarkable technical progress but remains limited in scope, typically relying on motor and visual cortex signals in limited patient populations. We propose a paradigm shift in BCI design rooted in ideomotor theory, which conceptualizes voluntary action as driven by internally represented sensory outcomes. This underused framework offers a principled basis for next-generation BCIs that align closely with the brain’s natural intentional and action-planning architecture. We suggest a more intuitive, generalizable, and scalable path by reorienting BCIs around the ‘what for’ of action—user goals and anticipated effects. This shift is timely and feasible, enabled by advances in neural recording and artificial intelligence–based decoding of sensory representations. It may help resolve challenges of usability and generalizability in BCI design.

While fear memories tend to generalize, extinction learning is more context-dependent. Recent results from representational similarity analyses indicate that neural representations of extinction contexts are more distinct than context representations during fear acquisition. This suggests that they resemble episodic memories, with possible consequences for prevailing taxonomies of memory systems.

The Reward Positivity (RewP) is an electroencephalogram (EEG) feature that emerges following performance feedback and is commonly understood to index both positive and negative reward-prediction error (RPE+ and RPE−, respectively) signals. In contrast to this dominant perspective, we argue that the RewP is an independent EEG feature that selectively responds to positive RPE and is superimposed on a common background signal. We further propose that the RewP signals a goal prediction error: it is elicited by abstract signals instead of by hedonic 'rewards'. This goal prediction error appears to be produced by a critic-like architecture that is associated with the actor–critic framework in reinforcement learning. This perspective emphasizes the role of the RewP in goal attainment and cognitive control as opposed to being a simple indicator of reward receipt.

Deep neural networks (DNNs) once showed increasing alignment with primate perception as they improved on vision benchmarks, raising hopes that advances in artificial intelligence (AI) would naturally yield better models of biological vision. However, we present accumulating evidence that this alignment is now plateauing – and in some cases worsening – as DNNs scale to human or even superhuman accuracy. This divergence between artificial and biological perception may reflect the acquisition of visual strategies distinct from those of primates, and these findings challenge the view that advances in AI will naturally translate to progress in neuroscience. We argue that vision science must chart its own course, developing algorithms grounded in biological visual systems rather than optimizing for internet data.

Climate anxiety has both positive and negative potential. It can spur action or hinder it, while taxing mental health. The key lies in balance: a Goldilocks zone wherein anxiety motivates without overwhelming. Cognitive processes, including threat and coping appraisals and future-oriented thinking, may help sustain this adaptive equilibrium.

Progress in the scientific study of consciousness has been impeded by several fundamental controversies. One pertains to a major divide between theories: sensory versus cognitive. Here, we argue that the key to resolving this controversy is to reevaluate the conceptual distinction proposed by Block in 1995 between phenomenal consciousness (P) and access consciousness (A). We propose that P and A should not be understood as two different types of consciousness, but as two necessary conditions for consciousness. We illustrate how this conceptual shift enables us to make substantial progress in answering several unresolved questions, such as the neural mechanisms and functions of consciousness, and the relationship between consciousness and attention. Our proposal motivates a selective unification across these different classes of theories.

Executive functions (EFs) develop dramatically across childhood and predict important outcomes, including academic achievement. These links are often attributed to individual differences in EF capacities. However, individual difference accounts underemphasize contextual influences on EF. We propose a complementary perspective, the adaptive habits framework, which emphasizes how contextual factors support or hinder EF engagement in children. Contexts that support repeated EF engagement establish habits for engaging EF in similar contexts and in similar ways. Such habits, in turn, reduce the effort associated with engaging EF and thus increase the likelihood of deciding to engage EF in the future. We interpret empirical findings through the lens of adaptive habits, discuss the implications of this framework, and propose novel research approaches and interventions to support EF in children.

Several cognitive functions of sleep, including a role in supporting memory consolidation, are conserved across the evolution of animal species. As outlined here, studies of insect behavior and neural...

Insects navigate by integrating a geocentric velocity vector, allowing them to track their position relative to a distant nest. Recent advances reveal in detail the key neural mechanisms supporting th...

Understanding the mechanistic basis of human cognition is likely to benefit from investigating how it emerged through evolution. We propose that identifying and investigating fundamental brain functions, or cognitive primitives, common between humans and ‘lower’ animals, such as insects, will reveal conserved cellular and molecular operations underlying cognition.

Many animal choices are economic, requiring the evaluation of costs and benefits. However, as in humans and other vertebrates, the behaviour of insects often deviates from economic rationality due to the cognitive and perceptual biases that underly their decision-making, distorting the perceived value of options.

Brain and body are fundamentally intertwined. A recent study from Cazettes et al. reveals how latent decision variables in the mouse brain can be read out from facial expressions. This shows how covert cognitive computations ‘leak’ into the periphery, and opens new opportunities for tracking cognitive processes through bodily measurements.

Skin temperature and the ability to perceive warm and cold thermal stimuli (i.e., thermoception) are fundamental to human survival, influencing both our evolutionary history and early individual development. Interestingly, recent research has also started to uncover the role of these thermosensory signals in cognition. Such signals may contribute to the construction of our bodily self-awareness, and specifically the sense of body ownership, which is defined as the feeling that the body and its parts belong to us. This review examines how thermosensory signals travel from the skin to the brain and their impact on body ownership in both healthy and clinical populations. Furthermore, we propose mechanisms that may underlie this interaction and highlight potential clinical and societal applications.