Jacob Edenhofer
jacobedenhofer.bsky.social
Jacob Edenhofer
@jacobedenhofer.bsky.social
BA, PPE @warwickuni / MPhil, Comparative Government @UniofOxford / DPhil student in Politics @NuffieldCollege & @Politics_Oxford
Link to my blog “Often wrong, but sometimes useful”: https://jacobedenhofer.substack.com/
Reposted by Jacob Edenhofer
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January 3, 2026 at 3:09 PM
I should also have mentioned this paper by @noamgidron.bsky.social et al. osf.io/preprints/so...
January 3, 2026 at 5:50 PM
Three cheers for the theory of diversionary war?
January 3, 2026 at 2:41 PM
Reposted by Jacob Edenhofer
Very informative thread summarising some of the existing literature on whether there is a demand side to democratic backsliding. ⤵️
By way of preparing for teaching and making sense of current events, I spent today trying to synthesise the demand-side literature on democratic backsliding (see figure below). The starting point of most of this literature is simple: Do voters punish politicians who violate democratic norms, or do
January 3, 2026 at 9:09 AM
Reposted by Jacob Edenhofer
Great thread about the demand-side for non-democracy. Jacob unpacks a lot here and provides useful literature. Gather, folks!
By way of preparing for teaching and making sense of current events, I spent today trying to synthesise the demand-side literature on democratic backsliding (see figure below). The starting point of most of this literature is simple: Do voters punish politicians who violate democratic norms, or do
January 3, 2026 at 8:57 AM
Reposted by Jacob Edenhofer
(rightly or wrongly) believe others don't share their views/beliefs. This channel suggests that studying ppl's second-order beliefs and preferences about backsliding is a promising avenue for future research.Finally, I'd be remiss not to draw your attention to this
annualreviews.org/content/jour...
January 2, 2026 at 9:22 PM
Reposted by Jacob Edenhofer
In summary, the recent demand-side literature has principally elucidated two failure modes: interpretive disagreement and the prevalence of conditional democrats. As far as I can tell, less attention -- especially in empirical work -- has been paid to the other two modes. On the one hand, there's
January 2, 2026 at 9:22 PM
Reposted by Jacob Edenhofer
These are the classic “conditional democrats” a la Graham & Svolik. Voters rade off democracy against substantive outcomes, such as taxes, redistribution, immigration, security. See below for a recent study.
4. Even when voters recognise a violation, expect
cambridge.org/core/journal...
January 2, 2026 at 9:22 PM
Reposted by Jacob Edenhofer
populists to change institutions in ways that make them work better for them. The second type of consequence relates to policy. These voters are willing to tolerate damage to democratic institutions when doing so improves policy outcomes (e.g. by putting a co-partisan in office).
January 2, 2026 at 9:22 PM
Reposted by Jacob Edenhofer
the only road to correcting institutions involves a bit of backsliding. The latter, by contrast, expect neither substantial institutional damage nor representational improvement. They derive mainly expressive benefits from doing minor instit. damage; they behave 'like' hooligans without believing
January 2, 2026 at 9:22 PM
Reposted by Jacob Edenhofer
demand side. Within this branch, I'd distinguish between two types of voters: majoritarian, populist democrats and democratic hooligans / performative authoritarians. The former expect institutional change to improve dynamic representation, i.e. to improve the average policy outcome for them and
January 2, 2026 at 9:22 PM
Reposted by Jacob Edenhofer
are perceived as strong, violations may be discounted as unlikely to succeed. This belief can sustain tolerance even among voters who value democracy and recognise violations as such.
Paradoxically, confidence in institutional strength give rise to insouciance on the
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers....
January 2, 2026 at 9:22 PM
Reposted by Jacob Edenhofer
levels: institutional and policy. As for institutional ramifications, citizens likely differ in their beliefs about institutional strength, i.e. the strength of courts, the independence of the bureaucracy, the integrity of elections, etc. If institutions academic.oup.com/restud/artic...
January 2, 2026 at 9:22 PM
Reposted by Jacob Edenhofer
the evolution of voters' reference points (cf. Grillo and
@carloprato.bsky.social). When backsliding is gradual, these points may become ever more permissive. By "moderating" ever so slightly following each transgression, autocratically-minded incumbents onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1...
January 2, 2026 at 9:22 PM
Reposted by Jacob Edenhofer
disagreement among citizens. There is also an endogenous version of this argument, which revolves around motivated reasoning. As suggested below, people may simply choose to adjust their conception of democracy so that it aligns with their material self-interest
www.cambridge.org/core/journal...
January 2, 2026 at 9:22 PM
Reposted by Jacob Edenhofer
or partisan identities. As an aside: see this nice @apsrjournal.bsky.social paper by Little,
@keithschnak.bsky.social, and @ianrturner.bsky.social for a nuanced treatment of the connection between MR and accountability. Yet another version of this argument focuses on cambridge.org/core/journal...
January 2, 2026 at 9:22 PM
By way of preparing for teaching and making sense of current events, I spent today trying to synthesise the demand-side literature on democratic backsliding (see figure below). The starting point of most of this literature is simple: Do voters punish politicians who violate democratic norms, or do
January 2, 2026 at 9:22 PM
Are there any models of motivated reasoning that shed light on its limits too, i.e. when individuals stop rationalising and start tethering their beliefs more closely to the truth again?
January 2, 2026 at 11:19 AM
What are your principal sources of hope for the new year?
January 1, 2026 at 11:29 AM
Reposted by Jacob Edenhofer
2. Calvacanti, Tiago, Zeina Hasna, and Cezar Santos. 2025. ‘Climate Change Mitigation Policies: Aggregate and Distributional Effects’. Economic Journal. 135(668): 1341–87.
academic-oup-com.ezproxy-prd.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/ej/article/1...
December 30, 2025 at 3:20 PM
Reposted by Jacob Edenhofer
16. Kapfhammer, Felix. ‘The Economic Consequences of Effective Carbon Taxes’. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics. www-aeaweb-org.ezproxy-prd.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/articles?id=...
December 30, 2025 at 3:20 PM
Reposted by Jacob Edenhofer
6. Edenhofer, Ottmar, Max Franks, Friedemann Gruner,
@mkalkuhl.bsky.social, and Kai Lessmann. 2025. ‘The Economics of Carbon Dioxide Removal’. Annual Review of Resource Economics 17(Volume 17, 2025): 301–21.
www-annualreviews-org.ezproxy-prd.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/content/jour...
December 30, 2025 at 3:20 PM
Reposted by Jacob Edenhofer
3. Bauer, Adam M,@hallegatte.bsky.social, and Florent McIsaac. 2025. ‘Optimal Allocation of Abatement Effort Under Political Constraints: The Economic Cost of Delaying Sectoral and Economy-Wide Climate Policies’. Environmental and Resource Economics 88(12): 3431–71.
link.springer.com/article/10.1...
December 30, 2025 at 3:20 PM
Reposted by Jacob Edenhofer
👏🏼
Here are my favourite 2025 papers on climate policy/politics (listed in no particular order).
1. Ascari, Guido, Andrea Colciago, Timo Haber, and Stefan Wöhrmüller. 2025. ‘Inequality along the European Green Transition’. Economic Journal.
doi.org/10.1093/ej/u...
December 30, 2025 at 3:24 PM