Jacob Edenhofer
@jacobedenhofer.bsky.social
BA, PPE @warwickuni / MPhil, Comparative Government @UniofOxford / DPhil student in Politics @NuffieldCollege & @Politics_Oxford
Link to my blog “Often wrong, but sometimes useful”: https://jacobedenhofer.substack.com/
Link to my blog “Often wrong, but sometimes useful”: https://jacobedenhofer.substack.com/
Makes me happy and sad in almost equal measure!
November 10, 2025 at 10:31 PM
Makes me happy and sad in almost equal measure!
Reposted by Jacob Edenhofer
These differences naturally also affect the supply side of scandals.
When individual accountability is high, politicians expect personal sanction and therefore avoid large, coordinated, or easily traceable wrongdoing; most scandals concern private lapses. When accountability is diffuse, expected
When individual accountability is high, politicians expect personal sanction and therefore avoid large, coordinated, or easily traceable wrongdoing; most scandals concern private lapses. When accountability is diffuse, expected
November 10, 2025 at 6:02 PM
These differences naturally also affect the supply side of scandals.
When individual accountability is high, politicians expect personal sanction and therefore avoid large, coordinated, or easily traceable wrongdoing; most scandals concern private lapses. When accountability is diffuse, expected
When individual accountability is high, politicians expect personal sanction and therefore avoid large, coordinated, or easily traceable wrongdoing; most scandals concern private lapses. When accountability is diffuse, expected
Reposted by Jacob Edenhofer
in comparative politics points out that
democracies differ in how easily citizens can infer responsibility for policy decisions/outcomes. In systems with high clarity of responsibility—Westminster or presidential ones—power (see this by @ganghof.bsky.social)
onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1...
democracies differ in how easily citizens can infer responsibility for policy decisions/outcomes. In systems with high clarity of responsibility—Westminster or presidential ones—power (see this by @ganghof.bsky.social)
onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1...
Four Visions of Democracy: Powell's Elections as Instruments of Democracy and beyond
The article critically reviews the conceptual ideas of G. Bingham Powell's Elections as Instruments of Democracy and explores ways to develop them further. Powell's conceptual alternative to the West....
onlinelibrary.wiley.com
November 10, 2025 at 6:02 PM
in comparative politics points out that
democracies differ in how easily citizens can infer responsibility for policy decisions/outcomes. In systems with high clarity of responsibility—Westminster or presidential ones—power (see this by @ganghof.bsky.social)
onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1...
democracies differ in how easily citizens can infer responsibility for policy decisions/outcomes. In systems with high clarity of responsibility—Westminster or presidential ones—power (see this by @ganghof.bsky.social)
onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1...
Reposted by Jacob Edenhofer
tanasco was new to me, and wow that book is expensive
November 10, 2025 at 4:33 PM
tanasco was new to me, and wow that book is expensive
Lovely -- thank you! Will check it out!
November 10, 2025 at 9:24 PM
Lovely -- thank you! Will check it out!
Reposted by Jacob Edenhofer
so well put
November 10, 2025 at 8:18 PM
so well put
with responsibility diffusion.
All of the above is really not more than speculation. I'd be interested to your critical thoughts.
All of the above is really not more than speculation. I'd be interested to your critical thoughts.
November 10, 2025 at 6:02 PM
with responsibility diffusion.
All of the above is really not more than speculation. I'd be interested to your critical thoughts.
All of the above is really not more than speculation. I'd be interested to your critical thoughts.
occur less frequently but when they do they have greater effects on trust in mainstream political actors and institutions.
Formally: the elasticity of trust to scandal exposure is a decreasing function of tje clarity of accountability, while the expected severity conditional on occurrence rises
Formally: the elasticity of trust to scandal exposure is a decreasing function of tje clarity of accountability, while the expected severity conditional on occurrence rises
November 10, 2025 at 6:02 PM
occur less frequently but when they do they have greater effects on trust in mainstream political actors and institutions.
Formally: the elasticity of trust to scandal exposure is a decreasing function of tje clarity of accountability, while the expected severity conditional on occurrence rises
Formally: the elasticity of trust to scandal exposure is a decreasing function of tje clarity of accountability, while the expected severity conditional on occurrence rises
personal costs are lower, so collusive and widespread corruption can build up more easily and persist longer.
Sq, in high-clarity systems, the equilibrium probability of scandal occurrence is higher but each event has a small, rapidly decaying effect on trust. In low-clarity systems, scandals
Sq, in high-clarity systems, the equilibrium probability of scandal occurrence is higher but each event has a small, rapidly decaying effect on trust. In low-clarity systems, scandals
November 10, 2025 at 6:02 PM
personal costs are lower, so collusive and widespread corruption can build up more easily and persist longer.
Sq, in high-clarity systems, the equilibrium probability of scandal occurrence is higher but each event has a small, rapidly decaying effect on trust. In low-clarity systems, scandals
Sq, in high-clarity systems, the equilibrium probability of scandal occurrence is higher but each event has a small, rapidly decaying effect on trust. In low-clarity systems, scandals
These differences naturally also affect the supply side of scandals.
When individual accountability is high, politicians expect personal sanction and therefore avoid large, coordinated, or easily traceable wrongdoing; most scandals concern private lapses. When accountability is diffuse, expected
When individual accountability is high, politicians expect personal sanction and therefore avoid large, coordinated, or easily traceable wrongdoing; most scandals concern private lapses. When accountability is diffuse, expected
November 10, 2025 at 6:02 PM
These differences naturally also affect the supply side of scandals.
When individual accountability is high, politicians expect personal sanction and therefore avoid large, coordinated, or easily traceable wrongdoing; most scandals concern private lapses. When accountability is diffuse, expected
When individual accountability is high, politicians expect personal sanction and therefore avoid large, coordinated, or easily traceable wrongdoing; most scandals concern private lapses. When accountability is diffuse, expected
by voters as symptoms of systemic rot.
Trust erodes across the board. This also opens up room for populists to claim that they are only untainted actors. In this way, the same type of scandal can more easily morph into a systemtic trust crisis in countries with low clarity of responsibility.
Trust erodes across the board. This also opens up room for populists to claim that they are only untainted actors. In this way, the same type of scandal can more easily morph into a systemtic trust crisis in countries with low clarity of responsibility.
November 10, 2025 at 6:02 PM
by voters as symptoms of systemic rot.
Trust erodes across the board. This also opens up room for populists to claim that they are only untainted actors. In this way, the same type of scandal can more easily morph into a systemtic trust crisis in countries with low clarity of responsibility.
Trust erodes across the board. This also opens up room for populists to claim that they are only untainted actors. In this way, the same type of scandal can more easily morph into a systemtic trust crisis in countries with low clarity of responsibility.
democracies, power is shared and responsibility diffuse. When a scandal hits and its nature is sufficiently complex, blame can’t be straightforwardly allocated. Voters conclude that everyone is implicated (Covid vaccines/masks in Germany). In such settings, scandals are more readily interpreted
November 10, 2025 at 6:02 PM
democracies, power is shared and responsibility diffuse. When a scandal hits and its nature is sufficiently complex, blame can’t be straightforwardly allocated. Voters conclude that everyone is implicated (Covid vaccines/masks in Germany). In such settings, scandals are more readily interpreted
is concentrated, making it easy to attribute decisions. In these systems, I would argue that scandals are (more) "individualised". The offender resigns, the party apologises, and voters move on. Each scandal reaffirms that wrongdoing can be sanctioned reasonably effectively. In consensus
November 10, 2025 at 6:02 PM
is concentrated, making it easy to attribute decisions. In these systems, I would argue that scandals are (more) "individualised". The offender resigns, the party apologises, and voters move on. Each scandal reaffirms that wrongdoing can be sanctioned reasonably effectively. In consensus
in comparative politics points out that
democracies differ in how easily citizens can infer responsibility for policy decisions/outcomes. In systems with high clarity of responsibility—Westminster or presidential ones—power (see this by @ganghof.bsky.social)
onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1...
democracies differ in how easily citizens can infer responsibility for policy decisions/outcomes. In systems with high clarity of responsibility—Westminster or presidential ones—power (see this by @ganghof.bsky.social)
onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1...
Four Visions of Democracy: Powell's Elections as Instruments of Democracy and beyond
The article critically reviews the conceptual ideas of G. Bingham Powell's Elections as Instruments of Democracy and explores ways to develop them further. Powell's conceptual alternative to the West....
onlinelibrary.wiley.com
November 10, 2025 at 6:02 PM
in comparative politics points out that
democracies differ in how easily citizens can infer responsibility for policy decisions/outcomes. In systems with high clarity of responsibility—Westminster or presidential ones—power (see this by @ganghof.bsky.social)
onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1...
democracies differ in how easily citizens can infer responsibility for policy decisions/outcomes. In systems with high clarity of responsibility—Westminster or presidential ones—power (see this by @ganghof.bsky.social)
onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1...
congestion -> less local air pollution).
3. Makes sense -- I guess a lot depends on design (potentailly a short-term concern, but over long term less so). But it should also increase the labour supply of women and make it easier to work 'greedy' jobs (Goldin) -> conducive to closing the g. wage gap
3. Makes sense -- I guess a lot depends on design (potentailly a short-term concern, but over long term less so). But it should also increase the labour supply of women and make it easier to work 'greedy' jobs (Goldin) -> conducive to closing the g. wage gap
November 10, 2025 at 2:34 PM
congestion -> less local air pollution).
3. Makes sense -- I guess a lot depends on design (potentailly a short-term concern, but over long term less so). But it should also increase the labour supply of women and make it easier to work 'greedy' jobs (Goldin) -> conducive to closing the g. wage gap
3. Makes sense -- I guess a lot depends on design (potentailly a short-term concern, but over long term less so). But it should also increase the labour supply of women and make it easier to work 'greedy' jobs (Goldin) -> conducive to closing the g. wage gap