Frank Kuhn
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frankkuhn.bsky.social
Frank Kuhn
@frankkuhn.bsky.social
1.4K followers 990 following 550 posts

Doctoral Researcher @PRIF.org // former Nuclear Scholar @poni.csis.org and Project Coordinator @cntrarmscontrol.org // Nuclear Deterrence and Arms Control // Cold War History // Military Technology, Operations and Strategy // Opinions my own // .. more

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frankkuhn.bsky.social
Frank Kuhn @frankkuhn.bsky.social · 3d
But it is safe to assume that somebody will have looked into the issue over the past years, especially after the SPC report was published, no?

I don't dispute your assessment, just because it‘s complex doesn‘t mean and cannot and will not be done.

frankkuhn.bsky.social
Frank Kuhn @frankkuhn.bsky.social · 3d
Could be related?
Exclusive | China’s Top General Accused of Giving Nuclear Secrets to U.S.
Bribery allegations have also been leveled against Gen. Zhang Youxia, whose downfall carries implications for the country’s military readiness.
www.wsj.com

frankkuhn.bsky.social
Frank Kuhn @frankkuhn.bsky.social · 3d
With New START expired, the United States is likely to reopen the deactivated launch tubes on it‘s Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) starting March 1, allowing each SSBN to carry an additional four Trident D5 submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

Money has already been appropriated.
H.R.1 - An act to provide for reconciliation pursuant to title II of H. Con. Res. 14: $62,000,000 to convert Ohio-class submarine tubes to accept additional missiles, not to be obligated before March 1, 2026;

frankkuhn.bsky.social
Frank Kuhn @frankkuhn.bsky.social · 3d
“One such yield-producing nuclear test was conducted by China on June 22, 2020.”

frankkuhn.bsky.social
Frank Kuhn @frankkuhn.bsky.social · 3d
“The PLA sought to conceal these tests, using decoupling to evade seismic monitoring and hide activities that violate test ban commitments.”

frankkuhn.bsky.social
Frank Kuhn @frankkuhn.bsky.social · 3d
“Today, I can reveal: The U.S. government is aware that China has conducted nuclear explosive tests—including preparations for tests with yields in the hundreds of tons.”

frankkuhn.bsky.social
Frank Kuhn @frankkuhn.bsky.social · 3d
“This includes expanding forces, diversifying capabilities, fielding new theater-ranged nuclear forces, and adapting our extended deterrence posture as needed.”

frankkuhn.bsky.social
Frank Kuhn @frankkuhn.bsky.social · 3d
“Militarily, the expiration of New START enables the U.S. to act. We will complete ongoing nuclear modernization programs initiated while New START was in force.”

”The U.S. retains non-deployed nuclear capacity, ready to address emerging security threats if directed by the President.”

frankkuhn.bsky.social
Frank Kuhn @frankkuhn.bsky.social · 3d
“No longer constrained by the political-military circumstances of 2010 and the treaty they yielded, the U.S. can now take steps consistent with our national security and defense strategies—strengthening deterrence for the American people and our allies.”

frankkuhn.bsky.social
Frank Kuhn @frankkuhn.bsky.social · 3d
At the Conference on Disarmament today, U.S. Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security (T) Thomas Di Nanno hinted at the expansion of the U.S. nuclear arsenal and accused China of conducting a low-yield nuclear test in 2020.
LIVE: US arms control official delivers disarmament statement in Geneva
YouTube video by Reuters
www.youtube.com

frankkuhn.bsky.social
Frank Kuhn @frankkuhn.bsky.social · 4d
“The ‘One Big Beautiful Bill’ — Mr. Trump’s signature domestic legislation — includes the schedule for the Ohio submarine nuclear upgrades, saying the obligated funds should not be spent before March 1 — that is, a little more than three weeks after New START expires.”
Nuclear Arms Control Era Comes to End Amid Global Rush for New Weapons
www.nytimes.com

frankkuhn.bsky.social
Frank Kuhn @frankkuhn.bsky.social · 5d
Wobei es doch ein bisschen komplizierter ist, wenn die Counting Rules geändert werden und Tempo 130 dann nur noch Tempo 100 ist.

🔗 doi.org/10.1080/1352...

Reposted by Frank Kühn

lukasmengelkamp.bsky.social
Lukas Mengelkamp @lukasmengelkamp.bsky.social · 5d
Da ich die Gleichsetzung in diversen Artikeln und Kommentaren zum Ende von New START gelesen habe: Abrüstung und Rüstungskontrolle sind nicht das Gleiche. Quantitative Begrenzungen haben sogar die Angewohnheit ein "qualitatives Wettrüsten" - also Verbesserung der Waffensysteme - zu befördern. (1/2)

frankkuhn.bsky.social
Frank Kuhn @frankkuhn.bsky.social · 6d
However, the US nuclear enterprise is not currently postured for producing more plutonium pits for more warheads, and I think neither is Russia‘s. The only country that is likely able to “race” and build more warheads is China. 3/3
Fact Sheet: U.S. Plutonium Pit Production - Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation
Updated November 20, 2024 Plutonium pits are a critical component of all U.S. nuclear weapons. The pit acts as a trigger: on detonation, the plutonium sets off a small nuclear reaction, creating a lar...
armscontrolcenter.org

Reposted by James Cameron

frankkuhn.bsky.social
Frank Kuhn @frankkuhn.bsky.social · 6d
Ironically, this a result of New START, which very deliberately limited Russian breakout capacity while allowing the US more breathing space. Just as with other strategic arms control treaties, the Americans did competitive arms control really well here. 2/
The Promises of Prague versus Nuclear Realities: From Bush to Obama
Contrasting the nuclear guidance documents and public statements of the George W. Bush and Barack Obama administrations reveals significant differences in American nuclear policy, but also surpris...
doi.org

Reposted by James Cameron

frankkuhn.bsky.social
Frank Kuhn @frankkuhn.bsky.social · 6d
Very true. The demise of New START is a symptom, not a cause.

Regarding the risk of “arms racing,” which I don't like as an analytical term: Neither the United States nor Russia actually have much capacity to “race” beyond uploading reserve warheads. And the US can upload more than Russia. 1/
The long view: Strategic arms control after the New START Treaty
The Nuclear Notebook is researched and written by Hans M. Kristensen, director of the Nuclear Information Project with the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), and Matt Korda, a senior research...
www.tandfonline.com

Reposted by Frank Kühn

jjjcameron.bsky.social
James Cameron @jjjcameron.bsky.social · 6d
My own very niche academic opinion: the expiry of New START won't spark a new arms race in and of itself. But its end is indicative of a deteriorating security environment that will involve some arms racing and more importantly a significantly heightened risk of a major war.

Reposted by Frank Kühn

ermu.bsky.social
Henning Ernst Mueller @ermu.bsky.social · 7d
An Studierende und Lehrende, die überlegen, in welcher Weise sie KI einsetzen bzw. den sinnvollen Einsatz lehren sollen: Die geisteswissenschaftlichen Jobs, die es in der KI-Zukunft noch geben wird, werden solche sein, in denen Menschen KI-Ergebnisse überprüfen. 1/...

frankkuhn.bsky.social
Frank Kuhn @frankkuhn.bsky.social · 8d
Also important to note that Russia “suspended” implementation of the treaty almost three years ago, so there are no longer any notifications and data-exchanges, as the article correctly notes. Inspections were halted during COVID, so many of the important treaty elements ceased to exist years ago.
bleddb.bsky.social Bleddyn Bowen @bleddb.bsky.social · 8d
Article is of course better than the headline - most nuclear weapon states aren’t in this and the CTBT and PTBT are still in play (yet have important holdouts). End of an era in US-Russia and European nuclear weapons management, but hardly a big change in nuclear arms for other parts of the world.
A world without nuclear arms control begins on Thursday
New Start treaty, which expires this week, capped the number of missiles and warheads in US and Russian arsenals
www.ft.com

Reposted by Frank Kühn

bleddb.bsky.social
Bleddyn Bowen @bleddb.bsky.social · 8d
Article is of course better than the headline - most nuclear weapon states aren’t in this and the CTBT and PTBT are still in play (yet have important holdouts). End of an era in US-Russia and European nuclear weapons management, but hardly a big change in nuclear arms for other parts of the world.
A world without nuclear arms control begins on Thursday
New Start treaty, which expires this week, capped the number of missiles and warheads in US and Russian arsenals
www.ft.com

Reposted by Frank Kühn

ingwarpero.bsky.social
Ingwar Perowanowitsch @ingwarpero.bsky.social · 9d
Im Jahr 2014 bekommt die französische Hauptstadt Paris mit Anne Hidalgo zum ersten Mal in ihrer Geschichte eine Frau als Bürgermeisterin. 12 Jahre später sieht die Stadt so aus (1/8)

frankkuhn.bsky.social
Frank Kuhn @frankkuhn.bsky.social · 10d
What does this mean? I don‘t know. A conflict with China could be very different. But it is always worth revisiting previous assumptions and whether they‘ve held up. 4/4

frankkuhn.bsky.social
Frank Kuhn @frankkuhn.bsky.social · 10d
The Joint Operational Access Concept, published in 2012, similarly concluded that “unopposed operational access will be much less likely in the future, as potential enemies [...] will resource and adopt antiaccess strategies against U.S. forces.”

📄 www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/D... 3/
Joint Operational Access Concept: This paper asserts that such unopposed operational access will be much less likely in the future, as potential enemies, exploiting weapons and other systems that are increasingly effective against an advancing enemy, will resource and adopt antiaccess strategies against U.S. forces

frankkuhn.bsky.social
Frank Kuhn @frankkuhn.bsky.social · 10d
For example, see this CSBA study by Andrew Krepinevich, Barry Watts and Robert Work from 2003.

“Second, there is ample reason to anticipate that future adversaries [...] will seek asymmetric ways of opposing the movement of US military forces into their region.”

📄 csbaonline.org/research/pub... 2/
CSBA Study "Meeting the Anti-Access and Area-Denial Challenge"

frankkuhn.bsky.social
Frank Kuhn @frankkuhn.bsky.social · 10d
It‘s somewhat ironic that, over the last few decades, the US has assumed that it will no longer be able to deploy military forces uncontested into future operational areas due to enemy A2/AD capabilities. Yet, it continues to forward-deploy military forces without opposition, as it always has. 🧵 1/
Trump’s armada: the US military force assembled against Iran
Build-up of American military power comes as US president weighs strikes
giftarticle.ft.com

frankkuhn.bsky.social
Frank Kuhn @frankkuhn.bsky.social · 12d
The elements the sources were referring to may relate to the unlock codes.

Bruce Blair: “Bill Clinton and [...] William Perry quietly rolled back pre-delegation in the early post-Cold War years [...] although they did not retrieve and consolidate the distributed codes in military custody.”
Loose cannons: The president and US nuclear posture
The US president’s unfettered authority to order the use of nuclear weapons and an unstable US nuclear posture create a compound existential risk.
thebulletin.org

frankkuhn.bsky.social
Frank Kuhn @frankkuhn.bsky.social · 12d
The @nsarchive.bsky.social published Eisenhower‘s instruction in 2001, but the document remained partly classified “on the grounds that some of the text relates to war plans currently in effect.”

Were there any policy changes post-2001? It seems nobody really touched the issue since then.
First Declassification of Eisenhower's Instructions to Commanders Predelegating Nuclear Weapons Use, 1959-1960
First Declassification of Eisenhower's Instructions to Commanders Predelegating Nuclear Weapons Use, 1959-1960
nsarchive2.gwu.edu

frankkuhn.bsky.social
Frank Kuhn @frankkuhn.bsky.social · 12d
Interesting reports suggesting predelegation may still exist today.

“A senior National Security Council official in the Clinton administration said [...] that the White House would not comment on the pre-delegation issue. Other sources said some elements of pre-delegation still exist today, [...].”
MILITARY GOT AUTHORITY TO USE NUCLEAR ARMS IN 1957
www.washingtonpost.com

Reposted by Frank Kühn

lukasmengelkamp.bsky.social
Lukas Mengelkamp @lukasmengelkamp.bsky.social · 13d
The division of labour in deterrence implied in the new US National Defence Strategy (NDS) could put NATO to the test. @frankkuhn.bsky.social and I draw attention to this in a commentary for Table.Media. (1/4)
table.media/en/security/...
New US defense strategy could become a crucial test for NATO
There is no way around stronger defense integration for Europe, write Frank Kuhn and Lukas Mengelkamp. This is because the United States’ new defense strategy poses a dilemma for Europeans. Difficult ...
table.media

Reposted by Frank Kühn

lukasmengelkamp.bsky.social
Lukas Mengelkamp @lukasmengelkamp.bsky.social · 13d
Die in der neuen National Defense Strategy (NDS) der USA implizierte Arbeitsteilung bei der Abschreckung könnte für die NATO zur Zerreißprobe werden. Darauf machen @frankkuhn.bsky.social und ich in einem Kommentar für Table.Media aufmerksam. (1/4)
table.media/security/tab...
Neue US-Verteidigungsstrategie könnte zur Zerreißprobe für die Nato werden
An einer stärkeren Verteidigungsintegration führe für Europa kein Weg vorbei, schreiben Frank Kuhn und Lukas Mengelkamp. Denn mit der neuen Verteidigungsstrategie stellen die USA die Europäer vor ein ...
table.media