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frankkuhn.bsky.social
Frank Kuhn
@frankkuhn.bsky.social
1.3K followers 990 following 470 posts
Doctoral Researcher @PRIF.org | Coordinator @cntrarmscontrol.org | Nuclear Scholar @poni.csis.org | Nuclear Weapons | Arms Control | Nuclear Deterrence | Cold War History | Military Technology and Strategy | Opinions my own
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frankkuhn.bsky.social
“It is not likely to be an accident that unprecedented progress in arms control occurred at the same time that the Soviet system first liberalized and then disintegrated.”

Jervis, Robert. “Arms Control, Stability, and Causes of War.” Political Science Quarterly 108, no. 2 (1993): 239–53.
The belief that the main cause of war is aggressive states is often linked to the claim that aggressiveness is correlated with, if not caused by, domestic repression. Although for years dismissed if not ridiculed by many arms controllers, this argument receives more than a little support from recent events. It is not likely to be an accident that unprecedented progress in arms control occurred at the same time that the Soviet system first liberalized and then disintegrated. Obstacles which were enormous when Leonid Brezhnev and his predecessors were in power have vanished with Mikhail Gorbachev and the subsequent revolution. This is not to say that all dangers have passed, or that nothing would have been possible without extensive changes within the Soviet Union and its successors, but it does appear that the success of arms control has been driven less by technological breakthroughs, intellectual ingenuity, and shifts in the balance of power than by internal changes which reconstructed the Soviet and post-Soviet polity.
November 10, 2025 at 12:29 PM
frankkuhn.bsky.social
Good Morning Berlin! 🌅
November 6, 2025 at 8:02 AM
frankkuhn.bsky.social
“The notion of stability, in short, is tossed around casually and with great frequency in public consideration of and debate over arms control, however irrelevant it may be to the actual practice of arms control.”
“The notion of stability, in short, is tossed around casually and with great frequency in public consideration of and debate over arms control, however irrelevant it may be to the actual practice of arms control.”
October 23, 2025 at 11:51 AM
frankkuhn.bsky.social
The Erbeskopf is the highest point in the Hunsrück mountain range. On top of the mountain, there is a radar facility for airspace surveillance operated by the German Armed Forces. Until the end of the Cold War, facility was operated by the U.S. Army, controlling the airspace in Central Europe.
October 17, 2025 at 7:53 AM
frankkuhn.bsky.social
NSC staffer William Cockell to National Security Advisor Poindexter in 1986: “JSTPS [Joint Strategic Targeting Planning Staff] will find a use for every warhead and still complain there aren’t enough. Whether the two SSBNs fill a ‘real world’ requirement is another question, however.”
NSC staffer William Cockell to National Security Advisor Poindexter in 1986: “JSTPS [Joint Strategic Targeting Planning Staff] will find a use for every warhead and still complain there aren’t enough. Whether the two SSBNs fill a ‘real world’ requirement is another question, however.”
September 25, 2025 at 8:56 AM
frankkuhn.bsky.social
Commuting is awful.
Cycling into sunrise
September 23, 2025 at 6:55 AM
frankkuhn.bsky.social
The Fulunässoldaten statue in Sälen (Dalarna County, Sweden 🇸🇪) remembers all the soldiers who protected the border to Nazi-occupied Norway during World War II. Further north, the remains of the largest Swedish defense installation from World War II are still visible.
Fulunässoldaten statue Fulunässoldaten statue Dragon's teeth in Dalarna, Sweden Dragon's teeth in Dalarna, Sweden
August 9, 2025 at 3:39 PM
frankkuhn.bsky.social
For many, the conclusion that neither domestic nor international law is likely to keep the president from single-handedly making a decision as consequential as going to war with Iran may well be a disturbing one. It’s also difficult to square with the intent of the framers, who clearly sought to restrain the United States from engaging in foreign wars too readily. But this legal reality—that “one person decides,” as Jack Goldsmith once described it—is the one Americans have been living within for much of the past century.
June 22, 2025 at 10:01 PM
frankkuhn.bsky.social
Woher kommt eigentlich immer diese Fixierung auf den Ausdruck “aktive Kriegspartei” in der deutschen Debatte – ein Begriff, der in der Haager Landkriegsordnung nicht definiert und weder in den Genfer Konventionen noch einem anderen völkerrechtlichen Vertrag geregelt ist?
Startseite von ZEIT Online: “Die USA haben iranische Atomanlagen bombardiert und sind damit zu einer aktiven Kriegspartei im Nahen Osten geworden. Ein hochriskanter Schritt – auch für Donald Trump”
June 22, 2025 at 9:09 AM
frankkuhn.bsky.social
“Benefiting from extensive preparations during the competition period, forward positioned Army fires and air defense forces immediately begin neutralizing the enemy’s long-range anti-access and area denial systems[...] during the transition to armed conflict.” 4/4

www.army.mil/article/2437...
c. Neutralize enemy-long-range systems. Benefiting from extensive preparations during the competition period, forward positioned Army fires and air defense forces immediately begin neutralizing the enemy’s long-range anti-access and area denial systems (ballistic and cruise missiles, long-range IADS) during the transition to armed conflict. (1) The field army and corps employ long-range fires elements and integrate joint and combined capabilities to neutralize the enemy’s long-range systems. Fires formations at those echelons provide responsive cross-domain fires to the Joint Force Commander into the Close, Deep Maneuver, and Operational Deep Fires Areas. In combination with other multi-domain capabilities, these fires begin to neutralize the enemy’s integrated air defense and long-range fires systems. They accomplish this by receiving targeting information for high-priority enemy long-range systems from space- and high-altitude-based surveillance or low-observable air platforms, and striking those high-payoff targets within minutes (paragraphs 3-7.d and 3-7.e provide a more detailed description of how the enemy’s long-range systems are identified and attacked)
June 17, 2025 at 12:13 PM
frankkuhn.bsky.social
“The Joint Force utilizes the active engagement in competition to enable the penetration of strategic and operational stand-off by immediately neutralizing the enemy’s long-range systems [...].” 3/

www.army.mil/article/2437...
The Joint Force utilizes the active engagement in competition to enable the penetration of strategic and operational stand-off by immediately neutralizing the enemy’s long-range systems, contesting enemy maneuver forces in all domains, the EMS, and the information environment, and conducting strategic and operational maneuver.
June 17, 2025 at 12:13 PM
frankkuhn.bsky.social
“In the event of armed conflict, Army forces immediately penetrate enemy anti-access and area denial systems by neutralizing enemy long-range systems, contesting enemy maneuver forces, and maneuvering from strategic and operational distances.” 2/

www.army.mil/article/2437...
n the event of armed conflict, Army forces immediately penetrate enemy anti-access and area denial systems by neutralizing enemy long-range systems, contesting enemy maneuver forces, and maneuvering from strategic and operational distances. Multi-domain formations converge capabilities with the Joint Force and partners to rapidly strike the enemy’s long-range systems. Forward presence forces immediately contest an enemy attack in multiple domains. Forward presence forces also preserve lines of communications by degrading enemy long-range surveillance and reconnaissance and by employing a mixture of deception, dispersion, and protection. The appropriate balance of capabilities across the Total Force provides cohesive, fully capable forward presence forces and expeditionary capabilities able to deploy within strategically relevant time periods.
June 17, 2025 at 12:13 PM
frankkuhn.bsky.social
According to Purchasing Power Estimates 💵, the United States 🇺🇸 also does not spend more than any other nuclear power combined 🤑. Rather, U.S. 🇺🇸 spending is only slightly more than the nuclear weapons spending of its two adversaries China 🇨🇳 and Russia 🇷🇺 combined. 10/
A donut chart titled "Nuclear Weapons Spending in 2024 (in Billion USD PPP)" shows the percentage share of nuclear spending by country. The chart includes flags next to each label. The United States occupies the largest portion with 38.5%, followed by Russia at 17.7%, China at 16.6%, the United Kingdom at 8.3%, India at 7.3%, France at 6.1%, Pakistan at 3.2%, Israel at 0.7%, and North Korea (not labeled in the visible portion, but implied). Each segment is color-coded, and the chart emphasizes the U.S. dominance in nuclear weapons spending relative to other countries.
June 14, 2025 at 9:28 PM
frankkuhn.bsky.social
This chart shows ICAN’s numbers on global nuclear weapons spending in 2024 converted to PPP. As you can see, the United States 🇺🇸 still spends the most, but China’s 🇨🇳 and Russia’s 🇷🇺 spending is markedly higher.

Total spending: $147.45 billion 💰 8/
A horizontal bar chart titled "Nuclear Weapons Spending in 2024 (in Billion USD PPP)" displays spending by nine countries, each labeled with its flag and name. The bars are red and show the following spending values (from top to bottom): China (24.51), France (8.96), India (10.83), Israel (1.10), North Korea (2.10), Pakistan (4.78), Russia (26.13), United Kingdom (12.24), and United States (56.80). The United States has the longest bar, indicating the highest spending, followed by Russia and China.
June 14, 2025 at 9:28 PM
frankkuhn.bsky.social
Some history on START I verification provisions. ⌛

“Seven times a year, either party may request the other to display in the open road-mobile launchers, rail mobile launchers and heavy bombers at bases specified by the inspecting Party.” 📃🛰️ 8/

1997-2001.state.gov/global/arms/...
Presidents George H. W. Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev sign START, 31 July 1991
June 3, 2025 at 1:27 PM
frankkuhn.bsky.social
Same for the B-21 Raider. The U.S. Air Force is already “testing various prototype shelters to identify the most effective and affordable designs that could be used across all three B-21 Main Operating Bases, the depot, and even at forward operating locations.” 6/

www.af.mil/News/Article...
Construction of a B-21 Raider Environmental Protection Shelter prototype is completed at Ellsworth Air Force Base, S.D., Feb. 26, 2021
June 3, 2025 at 1:27 PM
frankkuhn.bsky.social
The U.S. Air Force even has transportable shelter systems to deploy the B-2 overseas. Each shelter spreads about two football fields and can be transported in 29 C-130 hercules flights. You can see one of these shelters below at Diego Garcia. 🏝️ 5/

www.mcasiwakuni.marines.mil/Iwakuni-News...
U.S. Naval and U.K. senior leaders assigned to Naval Support Facility Diego Garcia, pose with senior leaders from the 393rd Expeditionary Bomb Squadron in front of a B-2 Spirit Stealth Bomber at NSF Diego Garcia, Aug. 28, 2020. The 393rd EBS held a distinguished visitors day for host and tenant units across NSF Diego Garcia to inform them of the B-2 Spirit's capabilities and U.S. Strategic Command's Bomber Task Force deployments. U.S. Strategic Command routinely conducts BTF operations across the globe to demonstrate U.S. commitment to a free and open Into-Pacific. (U.S. Air Force photo by Tech. Sgt. Heather Salazar)
June 3, 2025 at 1:27 PM
frankkuhn.bsky.social
Hier noch das direkte Zitat von Colin Kahl zur veränderten Analyse der Intelligence Community im Herbst 2022. Aus dieser wird deutlich: Es war keine über den Daumen gepeilte Einschätzung (“je erfolgreicher die Ukraine, desto größer das Risiko”), sondern es gab deutliche Anhaltspunkte.
I'm just not going to speak to the underlying intelligence. I'll just say that throughout the war, the Biden administration was pretty clear that they did not see fundamental changes in the posturing of Russia's strategic nuclear arsenal. Their tactical nuclear weapons are a different matter. They, and hypothetically, you can do things that are harder to see in preparation that can be concealed within conventional moves. All I will say is, without speaking to the underlying intelligence, that we had lots of ways in the analytic community to discern just chatter with things that were more real. And there was, I'll just say, there was something that made the intelligence community jump from 5% to 50%. And it probably wasn't just some folks talking on the phone.
June 2, 2025 at 7:43 AM
frankkuhn.bsky.social
Colin Kahl, der damalige Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, hat das auf der Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference etwas ausgeführt. Der Auslöser wäre aus US-Sicht ein Zusammenbruch (!) der russischen Streitkräfte in der Ukraine gewesen. 2/
You'll recall that the Ukrainians made a rapid series of successes in the northern part of the country in a place called Kharkiv, where the Russian army imploded in a way that nobody expected to include the Russians, and that induced a degree of panic, especially, among the Russian leadership, that a similar circumstance could happen in the south, which would create, if the Russian army imploded in the south, it could open up the ability of the Ukrainians to drive on Crimea, which is Ukraine, unless you're Vladimir Putin and then you think of it as Russian holy land. It's just as much Russia as St. Petersburg in Putin's mindset. And it would also mean, essentially, the implosion of the Russian army. And we know from Putin's later statements during the Prigozhin mutiny that he had in his brain this kind of scenario of a 1917 moment where the Russian military collapses and it leads to the collapse of the regime. So again, you don't have to agree with the assessment, but it's inside his head. So there appeared to be this moment that if Russian forces in the south collapsed like they collapsed in the north, that the Russians would be, desperate times beat desperate measures, and that they might resort to the battlefield use of nuclear weapons. And again, I'm not gonna speak to the sources of that intelligence, I'll just say that given that the intelligence community knew a lot about Russian military plans and intentions and actions, you had to take that 50-50 coin flip scenario seriously
June 2, 2025 at 7:32 AM
frankkuhn.bsky.social
In World War I, African American soldiers who fought as combat troops were placed under command of the French army due to discriminatory racial segregation policies.

This included the 369th infantry regiment, which would later receive the Croix de Guerre – the highest French military honour.
African Americans in World War I The 369th Infantry regiment Slavery in America The National Museum of African American History and Culture
May 26, 2025 at 5:12 PM
frankkuhn.bsky.social
The Bundeswehr Military History Museum in Dresden – worth a visit.
Bundeswehr Military History Museum Artillery Fired Atomic Projectile in the Bundeswehr Military History Museum Witness report of mine victim in the Bundeswehr Military History Museum Torpedos and bicycles in the Bundeswehr Military History Museum
May 17, 2025 at 5:11 PM
frankkuhn.bsky.social
”For political reasons, Bonn (along with everyone else) had flaccidly used the argument that INF were a response to the SS-20 threat when in reality German military planners thought INF were a unique NATO need irrespective of Soviet nuclear
forces.“
West Germany was instrumental in advocating a long-range land-based missile capability in the late 1970s to achieve a force posture compatible with its preference on the nuclear deterrent continuum. Responsi ble government officials knew that INF arms control was working at cross-purposes with the secret evolution of doctrine. Defence Ministry planners believed that cruise and Pershing II were the optimum means for implementing the doctrinal requirements codified in the new nuclear guidelines passed only in October 1986. Bonn's problem was that the government had never made a strong public case for the real doctrinal reasons they believed INF necessary." For political reasons, Bonn (along with everyone else) had flaccidly used the argument that INF were a response to the SS-20 threat when in reality German military planners thought INF were a unique NATO need irrespective of Soviet nuclear forces. Yet the internal government INF debates involved more than the requirements of deterrence. More fundamental was a reappraisal of Soviet intentions and the appropriate Western response to Gorbachev's 'new political thinking' then underway in Moscow. Tension between the CDU/ CSU and their liberal FDP colleagues over arms control policy reflected divergent perceptions of Soviet policies and intentions. Many conservatives remained sceptical of Soviet intentions. Foreign Minister Genscher disagreed strongly, and set out his views in an important speech: The right and absolutely imperative policy for the West today, I believe, is to take Mr. Gorbachev and his 'new policy' literally, with all that this implies. Let us not sit back idly and wait for him to deliver. Let us rather try to influence, expedite and shape developments from our end. Let us take Mr. Gorbachev seriously. Let us take him at his word.'3 Genscher wanted to 'shape and develop' new policies, more ambitious than traditional NATO orthodoxy. Genscher's motives were also highly political; he hoped to capitalize on g…
May 13, 2025 at 6:42 AM
frankkuhn.bsky.social
Link16 ist auch nicht mein Expertisegebiet, offensichtlich werden die Keys für die Verschlüsselung aber zentral von den USA beziehungsweise der NSA verwaltet.

www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/D...
March 6, 2025 at 6:09 PM
frankkuhn.bsky.social
Schließlich wird behauptet, Hyperschallraketen seien ballistischen Raketen überlegen. Das ist aber gerade nicht der Fall und hier ist die Fachdiskussion doch schon etwas weiter. Ballistische Raketen bieten vergleichbare Fähigkeiten bei geringeren Kosten: www.cbo.gov/publication/... 15/
Hyperschallwafen sind elementare Bestandteile eines neuen strategischen Verteidigungsportfolios. Durch ihre Kombination aus Manövrierfähigkeit und extremer Geschwindigkeit können sie bestehende Abwehrsysteme überwinden und sind deshalb ballistischen Raketen überlegen.
March 6, 2025 at 3:18 PM
frankkuhn.bsky.social
Interessant ist auch die Forderung, als Ergänzung zur F-35A europäische Kampfflugzeuge für den Einsatz US-amerikanischer B61-12 Atombomben zertifizieren zu lassen. Das wurde tatsächlich vor sechs Jahren in Erwägung gezogen und aus guten Gründen verworfen. 13/
Die bisherige Teilhabe Deutschlands am nuklearen Programm der Nato muss bestehen bleiben, in der Hofnung, dass die USA zur NATO und zum Schutz Europas auch künftig stehen. Allerdings sollte zügig geprüft werden, ob nicht in Ergänzung zu F35 auch europäische Kampfugzeuge in der Nachfolge des Tornados die Voraussetzungen zur entsprechenden Zertifzierung erfüllen können
March 6, 2025 at 3:18 PM