The digital battlefield is evolving at lightning speed, and Russia’s notorious espionage group, APT28, has taken cyber threats to a whole new level. Reports confirm that the group, active since the mid-2000s and linked to the Russian GRU, is now using an AI-driven malware called LAMEHUG. This sophisticated tool is designed for stealthy credential theft and long-term intelligence gathering, with NATO, Ukraine, and other Western allies squarely in its crosshairs.

APT28 is one of the most tracked state-linked intrusion sets because its activity often aligns with major geopolitical events and long-running espionage

Russian state-sponsored group APT28 has targeted energy research, defense collaboration, and government communication entities.

APT28 targets energy, nuclear, and policy staff in Turkey, Europe, North Macedonia, and Uzbekistan with credential-harvesting attacks.

Russian-linked APT28 ran credential-harvesting attacks in 2025 using fake Microsoft, Google, and VPN login pages, PDF lures, and legitimate web servic

A sophisticated credential-harvesting operation conducted by BlueDelta, a Russian state-sponsored threat group linked to the GRU's Main Directorate.

APT28 was seen impersonating popular webmail and VPN services, including Microsoft OWA, Google, and Sophos VPN portals. The post Russia’s APT28 Targeting Energy Research, Defense Collaboration Entities appeared first on SecurityWeek.

Russian GRU-linked threat group BlueDelta (APT28/Fancy Bear) is evolving its credential-harvesting tactics, using spear-phishing and disposable infrastructure to target energy, defense, and policy organizations.

Active since 2004, APT28’s sustained campaign for the past year focused on credential harvesting.

ロシアのAPT28、エネルギー研究機関や防衛協力機関を攻撃｜スウェーデン当局、ロシアへのスパイ容疑で元軍事ITコンサルタントを拘束

The Russian state-sponsored threat group APT28 has been observed targeting entities involved in energy research and defense collaboration. According to reports from SecurityWeek, the attackers are impersonating popular webmail and VPN services, including Microsoft Outlook Web Access (OWA), Google, and Sophos VPN portals, to conduct their operations. While specific technical details such as exploited vulnerabilities or indicators of compromise are not disclosed in the available information, the focus on strategic sectors underscores the group's continued interest in high-value targets. This campaign highlights the persistent threat posed by advanced persistent threat (APT) groups leveraging trusted services to bypass security controls. Organizations in the energy and defense sectors are advised to enhance their monitoring capabilities and scrutinize unusual activity associated with webmail and VPN access. The lack of detailed technical information in the summary emphasizes the need for organizations to remain vigilant and employ robust detection mechanisms to identify potential malicious activity.

Russia-linked cyberespionage group APT28 targets energy, nuclear, and policy staff in Turkey, Europe, North Macedonia, and Uzbekistan with credential-harvesting attacks. Between February and September 2025, Recorded Future’s Insikt Group observed Russia-linked group APT28 (aka UAC-0001, Fancy Bear, Pawn Storm, Sofacy Group, Sednit, BlueDelta, and STRONTIUM) running credential-harvesting campaigns. Targets included Turkish energy and nuclear agency staff, European think tank personnel, and organizations […]

APT28 was seen impersonating popular webmail and VPN services, including Microsoft OWA, Google, and Sophos VPN portals.

APT28 targets energy, nuclear, and policy staff in Turkey, Europe, North Macedonia, and Uzbekistan with credential-harvesting attacks.

APT28 was seen impersonating popular webmail and VPN services, including Microsoft OWA, Google, and Sophos VPN portals.

Russian-linked APT28 ran credential-harvesting attacks in 2025 using fake Microsoft, Google, and VPN login pages, PDF lures, and legitimate web servic

  One of Russia's most prolific cyber espionage groups has operated largely in the shadows for more than two decades, quietly shaping the global threat landscape by carrying out persistent and highly targeted digital intrusions using techniques that have been used for many years.  In the community of cybersecurity, the group is referred to as APT28 and is believed to be linked to the 85th Main Special Service Center of the GRU, a Russian military intelligence agency. This group has operated continuously since at least 2004, utilizing aliases such as Fancy Bear, Sofacy, Sednit, STRONTIUM, and Pawn Storm in addition to the alias above.  There has been a marked evolution in APT28's operational playbook over the last few months, and the threat intelligence reports point to refinements in tactics, techniques, and procedures that have enhanced stealth and impact, complicating detection and response efforts in detecting and responding to APT28.  Among the most pressing concerns is the expansion of strategic targeting beyond traditional government and defense organizations to include critical infrastructure and private companies. As a result, national security, economic stability, and institutional resilience are all at increased risk.  This activity reflects a wider alignment with the Russian Cyber Warfare doctrine, which includes espionage-driven operations that are intended not only to gather sensitive intelligence but also to undermine adversaries' capabilities, reinforcing cyber operations as a tool for geopolitical influence and escalation, and reinforcing their significance for geopolitical influence.  Known to most people as Fancy Bear, and officially tracked as APT28, the group of threat actors that are connected to the Russian Federation's Main Directorate of the General Staff, has long been viewed as one of the most consequential advanced persistent threats that emerged in the middle of the 2010s.  There were a number of operations that took place during that period, ranging from sustained cyber warfare against Ukraine to high-profile interference in American and European elections, as well as disruptive activities tied to international sporting events. These operations had an impact on public and policy discourse around cybersecurity, and state-sponsored cyber operations.  In the midst of these headline-grabbing incidents, APT28’s parallel campaigns against Western media outlets and government institutions often receded from attention, but as a whole, they cemented APT28’s position as a defining force in the development of modern cyber espionage. It would be fair to say that the group's recent activity has been somewhat less dramatic, but equally deliberate.  Currently, most operations are conducted by using spear phishing techniques aimed at governments and strategic companies, reflecting a shift away from louder, more traditional intrusion tactics in favor of quieter ones.  A study by Recorded Future suggests that BlueDelta was conducting targeted credential harvesting campaigns against a selected group of organizations across multiple regions during February - September 2025. It was primarily a combination of convincingly crafted phishing pages and readily accessible infrastructure, rather than custom tools, that was used in these targeted credential harvesting campaigns.  As the cybersecurity firm determined based on their analysis, the campaigns observed between February and September 2025 were targeted to a relatively small number of victims but had clearly defined targets and were built around carefully crafted phishing infrastructures that resembled widely used enterprise services to the greatest extent possible. A counterfeit login page modeled after Microsoft Outlook Web Access, Google account portals and Sophos VPN interfaces was deployed by the attackers, with a method of redirection that forwarded victims directly to legitimate sites after credentials had been submitted. The intentional handoffs reduced the probability of users suspecting the activity and made it more likely to blend in with their regular browsing habits.  As part of its phishing operations, a wide variety of readily available third-party services, including Webhook[.]site, InfinityFree, Byet Internet Services, and ngrok, were used to spread spoofed pages, collect stolen credentials, and redirect traffic to servers that were possessed by the hackers.  Furthermore, the threat actors used genuine PDF documents to embed their lures into their messages. These included a publication from the Gulf Research Center on the Iran-Israel conflict released in June 2025, as well as a policy briefing released by the climate think tank ECCO in July 2025 concerning a Mediterranean pact.  As the infection chain is outlined above, several instances have occurred in which phishing emails contained shortened links that briefly displayed legitimate documents before redirecting users to a fake Microsoft OWA login page, where hidden HTML elements and JavaScript functions transmitted credentials to attacker-controlled endpoints, before redirecting the users back to the original PDF document.  There have been a number of additional campaigns identified during the same timeframe, including a fake Sophos VPN password reset page used to target a think tank of the European Union in June 2025, a wave of attacks that were carried out in September 2025 and which exploited false password expiration alerts to compromise military and technology organizations in North Macedonia and Uzbekistan, and a similar attack in April 2025 in which the credentials were exfiltrated using a fake Google password reset page.  Fancy Bear has recently been associated with methodical phishing-driven intrusions, in which emails have been tailored to specific targets and written in the native language of the target to increase credibility and engagement. In documented cases, the recipients were initially directed to genuine PDF documents sourced from reputable organizations, which were carefully chosen based on their alignment with the intended victims' professional interests.  The attacker used a genuine climate policy publication from a Middle Eastern think tank to trick renewable energy researchers in Türkiye into logging in using fake login pages resembling services like Sophos VPN, Google, and Microsoft Outlook. Upon entering credentials, users were automatically redirected to the legitimate service's real login page, so a second authentication attempt was often prompted, which in this situation can easily be brushed aside as just a routine technical error.  The operators did not rely on custom malware or proprietary infrastructure to keep track of or detect the attacks, but rather, they relied on commonly available hosting and networking services, which reduced overhead, but also complicated the process of attribution and detection. With the credentials obtained as a result of these campaigns, access to email platforms and virtual private networks would have provided a foothold to collect intelligence, move laterally, and perform subsequent operations against targets with higher value.  Although the techniques used in such a state-backed advanced persistent threat are not technically innovative, analysts note that the simplicity appears to be intentional on the part of the perpetrators.  A calculated shift towards persistent, scalability, and operational deniability over overt technical sophistication, which was achieved through the use of disposable infrastructure, commercial VPN services, and widely available platforms, minimized forensic traces and shortened the life cycle of their attack infrastructure, as well as the shift toward scalability and operational deniability.  Considering the findings of the latest research as a whole, it seems to be confirming an underlying shift in how state-backed threat actors are pursuing long-term intelligence objectives in a world that is becoming more and more crowded and very well protected.  In addition to multi-faceted tactics, such as those associated with APT28 emphasize the enduring value of social engineering, trusted content, and low-cost infrastructure as ways to exploit a network as long as they are applied with precision and patience, rather than focusing on technical novelty or destructive effects.  It should be noted that this activity serves as a reminder to government agencies, policy institutions, and organizations working in sensitive sectors that the first point of exposure to cyber-attacks is not traditionally advanced malware, but rather common daily tasks like email usage and remote authentication. In order to strengthen security defenses, it is essential to bear in mind that credentials must be maintained correctly, multifactor authentication should be implemented, login activity should be continuously monitored and regular security awareness training needs to be tailored to regional and linguistic conditions.  The persistence of these operations at a strategic level illustrates how cyber espionage can be viewed as a normalized tool by governments. It is one that is based on endurance and plausible deniability rather than visibility.  With geopolitical tensions continuing to shape the threat landscape, it is becoming increasingly important to close the subtle gaps that quietly enable the use of spectacular attacks in order to remain resilient to them.