Neil Thomas 牛犇
@neilthomas123.bsky.social
Fellow on Chinese Politics at Asia Society Policy Institute’s Center for China Analysis. Australian in DC. Views are my own.
So what kind of deal does Xi want with Trump?
Shortly after their summit, I went to a conference in NYC where half the room thought there'd be a "comprehensive" US-China trade deal by 2028
I was shocked
Xi wants a truce to buy time and build leverage, not a grand bargain
9/
Shortly after their summit, I went to a conference in NYC where half the room thought there'd be a "comprehensive" US-China trade deal by 2028
I was shocked
Xi wants a truce to buy time and build leverage, not a grand bargain
9/
November 5, 2025 at 5:25 PM
So what kind of deal does Xi want with Trump?
Shortly after their summit, I went to a conference in NYC where half the room thought there'd be a "comprehensive" US-China trade deal by 2028
I was shocked
Xi wants a truce to buy time and build leverage, not a grand bargain
9/
Shortly after their summit, I went to a conference in NYC where half the room thought there'd be a "comprehensive" US-China trade deal by 2028
I was shocked
Xi wants a truce to buy time and build leverage, not a grand bargain
9/
Key to Xi’s domestic agenda and US dealmaking is his political power
The plenum reaffirmed his control despite record purges and further centralization
E.g., share of cadre comments on plenum drafts then incorporated into final docs fell from 35.5% in 2010 to 21.4% in 2025
8/
The plenum reaffirmed his control despite record purges and further centralization
E.g., share of cadre comments on plenum drafts then incorporated into final docs fell from 35.5% in 2010 to 21.4% in 2025
8/
November 5, 2025 at 5:25 PM
Key to Xi’s domestic agenda and US dealmaking is his political power
The plenum reaffirmed his control despite record purges and further centralization
E.g., share of cadre comments on plenum drafts then incorporated into final docs fell from 35.5% in 2010 to 21.4% in 2025
8/
The plenum reaffirmed his control despite record purges and further centralization
E.g., share of cadre comments on plenum drafts then incorporated into final docs fell from 35.5% in 2010 to 21.4% in 2025
8/
Xi himself is concerned about overproduction and ruinous price wars
But the plenum offered few convincing answers (yet) for how to curb such "involution"
For Xi, the US is a cautionary tale of deindustrialization, so China's economy "must not shift from real to virtual"
7/
But the plenum offered few convincing answers (yet) for how to curb such "involution"
For Xi, the US is a cautionary tale of deindustrialization, so China's economy "must not shift from real to virtual"
7/
November 5, 2025 at 5:25 PM
Xi himself is concerned about overproduction and ruinous price wars
But the plenum offered few convincing answers (yet) for how to curb such "involution"
For Xi, the US is a cautionary tale of deindustrialization, so China's economy "must not shift from real to virtual"
7/
But the plenum offered few convincing answers (yet) for how to curb such "involution"
For Xi, the US is a cautionary tale of deindustrialization, so China's economy "must not shift from real to virtual"
7/
China will remain a high-capacity economy that puts producers over consumers
Tensions with other industrial economies—especially in Europe and North America—will intensify
China wants to dominate supply chains for future tech like it does now for EVs, batteries & solar
6/
Tensions with other industrial economies—especially in Europe and North America—will intensify
China wants to dominate supply chains for future tech like it does now for EVs, batteries & solar
6/
November 5, 2025 at 5:25 PM
China will remain a high-capacity economy that puts producers over consumers
Tensions with other industrial economies—especially in Europe and North America—will intensify
China wants to dominate supply chains for future tech like it does now for EVs, batteries & solar
6/
Tensions with other industrial economies—especially in Europe and North America—will intensify
China wants to dominate supply chains for future tech like it does now for EVs, batteries & solar
6/
Xi's top goals for the five-year plan for 2026-2030 are "building a modernized industrial system" and "self-strengthening in science and tech"
He wants to ensure China can never again be coerced or contained by the US
With "extraordinary measures" to develop key core tech
5/
He wants to ensure China can never again be coerced or contained by the US
With "extraordinary measures" to develop key core tech
5/
November 5, 2025 at 5:25 PM
Xi's top goals for the five-year plan for 2026-2030 are "building a modernized industrial system" and "self-strengthening in science and tech"
He wants to ensure China can never again be coerced or contained by the US
With "extraordinary measures" to develop key core tech
5/
He wants to ensure China can never again be coerced or contained by the US
With "extraordinary measures" to develop key core tech
5/
Beijing sees a connect between its recent Fourth Plenum on the five-year plan and Trump-Xi
"Major-power relations shape the international situation ... which profoundly influences domestic development"
The summit was a bid to secure strategic breathing room for Xi's agenda
4/
"Major-power relations shape the international situation ... which profoundly influences domestic development"
The summit was a bid to secure strategic breathing room for Xi's agenda
4/
November 5, 2025 at 5:25 PM
Beijing sees a connect between its recent Fourth Plenum on the five-year plan and Trump-Xi
"Major-power relations shape the international situation ... which profoundly influences domestic development"
The summit was a bid to secure strategic breathing room for Xi's agenda
4/
"Major-power relations shape the international situation ... which profoundly influences domestic development"
The summit was a bid to secure strategic breathing room for Xi's agenda
4/
But Xi still sees Trump as an agent of chaos and is preparing for a more turbulent world
April 2: 34% tariff on China
April 8: 84%
April 9: 125%
April 10: Beijing holds a "special meeting" to adjust its five-year planning in light of "changes in the external situation"...
3/
April 2: 34% tariff on China
April 8: 84%
April 9: 125%
April 10: Beijing holds a "special meeting" to adjust its five-year planning in light of "changes in the external situation"...
3/
November 5, 2025 at 5:25 PM
But Xi still sees Trump as an agent of chaos and is preparing for a more turbulent world
April 2: 34% tariff on China
April 8: 84%
April 9: 125%
April 10: Beijing holds a "special meeting" to adjust its five-year planning in light of "changes in the external situation"...
3/
April 2: 34% tariff on China
April 8: 84%
April 9: 125%
April 10: Beijing holds a "special meeting" to adjust its five-year planning in light of "changes in the external situation"...
3/
Probably not by the numbers—China's nominal GDP was only 64% of the US last year
But perhaps yes in substance—industrial might, tech self-reliance, and export controls helped Xi stare down US pressure this year
Chinese scholars are praising Mao's "strategic foresight"
2/
But perhaps yes in substance—industrial might, tech self-reliance, and export controls helped Xi stare down US pressure this year
Chinese scholars are praising Mao's "strategic foresight"
2/
November 5, 2025 at 5:25 PM
Probably not by the numbers—China's nominal GDP was only 64% of the US last year
But perhaps yes in substance—industrial might, tech self-reliance, and export controls helped Xi stare down US pressure this year
Chinese scholars are praising Mao's "strategic foresight"
2/
But perhaps yes in substance—industrial might, tech self-reliance, and export controls helped Xi stare down US pressure this year
Chinese scholars are praising Mao's "strategic foresight"
2/
Mao Zedong said China would eclipse the US by 2030
In 1955: "Our goal is to catch up with and surpass the US … it will take at least 50 years, perhaps 75, which is 15 five-year plans"
Xi just outlined China's 15th five-year plan. Can he prove Mao right?
Latest for @asiapolicy.asiasociety.org
1/
In 1955: "Our goal is to catch up with and surpass the US … it will take at least 50 years, perhaps 75, which is 15 five-year plans"
Xi just outlined China's 15th five-year plan. Can he prove Mao right?
Latest for @asiapolicy.asiasociety.org
1/
November 5, 2025 at 5:25 PM
Mao Zedong said China would eclipse the US by 2030
In 1955: "Our goal is to catch up with and surpass the US … it will take at least 50 years, perhaps 75, which is 15 five-year plans"
Xi just outlined China's 15th five-year plan. Can he prove Mao right?
Latest for @asiapolicy.asiasociety.org
1/
In 1955: "Our goal is to catch up with and surpass the US … it will take at least 50 years, perhaps 75, which is 15 five-year plans"
Xi just outlined China's 15th five-year plan. Can he prove Mao right?
Latest for @asiapolicy.asiasociety.org
1/
Where is Xi Jinping steering China’s economy?
How are U.S.-China relations shaping his choices?
Why so much turmoil in Beijing?
Join @asiapolicy.asiasociety.org for an Oct 29 webinar on the Fourth Plenum w/Michael Hirson, Chris Johnson, Dan Wang & Guoguang Wu
asiasociety.org/policy-insti...
How are U.S.-China relations shaping his choices?
Why so much turmoil in Beijing?
Join @asiapolicy.asiasociety.org for an Oct 29 webinar on the Fourth Plenum w/Michael Hirson, Chris Johnson, Dan Wang & Guoguang Wu
asiasociety.org/policy-insti...
October 22, 2025 at 1:37 PM
Where is Xi Jinping steering China’s economy?
How are U.S.-China relations shaping his choices?
Why so much turmoil in Beijing?
Join @asiapolicy.asiasociety.org for an Oct 29 webinar on the Fourth Plenum w/Michael Hirson, Chris Johnson, Dan Wang & Guoguang Wu
asiasociety.org/policy-insti...
How are U.S.-China relations shaping his choices?
Why so much turmoil in Beijing?
Join @asiapolicy.asiasociety.org for an Oct 29 webinar on the Fourth Plenum w/Michael Hirson, Chris Johnson, Dan Wang & Guoguang Wu
asiasociety.org/policy-insti...
NEW @asiasociety.org volume on China in 2025
"The coming year will prove pivotal in testing Beijing’s resilience and adaptability"
—Is Xi's position secure?
—Can China's economy recover?
—How will Trump affect foreign policy?
—Much more!
Highlights of each chapter below...
1/14
"The coming year will prove pivotal in testing Beijing’s resilience and adaptability"
—Is Xi's position secure?
—Can China's economy recover?
—How will Trump affect foreign policy?
—Much more!
Highlights of each chapter below...
1/14
December 10, 2024 at 5:02 PM
NEW @asiasociety.org volume on China in 2025
"The coming year will prove pivotal in testing Beijing’s resilience and adaptability"
—Is Xi's position secure?
—Can China's economy recover?
—How will Trump affect foreign policy?
—Much more!
Highlights of each chapter below...
1/14
"The coming year will prove pivotal in testing Beijing’s resilience and adaptability"
—Is Xi's position secure?
—Can China's economy recover?
—How will Trump affect foreign policy?
—Much more!
Highlights of each chapter below...
1/14
What to watch out for in China next year?
Asia Society Policy Institute's Center for China Analysis is launching our annual report in New York on Tuesday, with Kevin Rudd giving a keynote address.
Friends in New York: there are a few spots left, please message me if interested!
Asia Society Policy Institute's Center for China Analysis is launching our annual report in New York on Tuesday, with Kevin Rudd giving a keynote address.
Friends in New York: there are a few spots left, please message me if interested!
December 6, 2024 at 4:58 PM
What to watch out for in China next year?
Asia Society Policy Institute's Center for China Analysis is launching our annual report in New York on Tuesday, with Kevin Rudd giving a keynote address.
Friends in New York: there are a few spots left, please message me if interested!
Asia Society Policy Institute's Center for China Analysis is launching our annual report in New York on Tuesday, with Kevin Rudd giving a keynote address.
Friends in New York: there are a few spots left, please message me if interested!
Another finding is that public opinion research on China has been growing globally
The chart below shows how the number of national surveys asking views of China has increased along with China's rising international profile
This product brings them all together
19/20
The chart below shows how the number of national surveys asking views of China has increased along with China's rising international profile
This product brings them all together
19/20
December 5, 2024 at 3:54 PM
Another finding is that public opinion research on China has been growing globally
The chart below shows how the number of national surveys asking views of China has increased along with China's rising international profile
This product brings them all together
19/20
The chart below shows how the number of national surveys asking views of China has increased along with China's rising international profile
This product brings them all together
19/20
Finally, Latin America has traditionally held very positive views of China
But since Covid, there has been a big drop in sentiment, especially in Argentina and Brazil, although average LatAm favorability remains positive
2007: +32
2012: +41
2017: +33
2022: +6
2024: +11
18/20
But since Covid, there has been a big drop in sentiment, especially in Argentina and Brazil, although average LatAm favorability remains positive
2007: +32
2012: +41
2017: +33
2022: +6
2024: +11
18/20
December 5, 2024 at 3:54 PM
Finally, Latin America has traditionally held very positive views of China
But since Covid, there has been a big drop in sentiment, especially in Argentina and Brazil, although average LatAm favorability remains positive
2007: +32
2012: +41
2017: +33
2022: +6
2024: +11
18/20
But since Covid, there has been a big drop in sentiment, especially in Argentina and Brazil, although average LatAm favorability remains positive
2007: +32
2012: +41
2017: +33
2022: +6
2024: +11
18/20
China is also viewed relatively favorably in the Middle East and North Africa
Less so than in Sub-Saharan Africa but a slight bump in favorability recently compared to 10-15 years ago
2007: +18
2012: +5
2017: +5
2022: +9
2024: +9
17/20
Less so than in Sub-Saharan Africa but a slight bump in favorability recently compared to 10-15 years ago
2007: +18
2012: +5
2017: +5
2022: +9
2024: +9
17/20
December 5, 2024 at 3:54 PM
China is also viewed relatively favorably in the Middle East and North Africa
Less so than in Sub-Saharan Africa but a slight bump in favorability recently compared to 10-15 years ago
2007: +18
2012: +5
2017: +5
2022: +9
2024: +9
17/20
Less so than in Sub-Saharan Africa but a slight bump in favorability recently compared to 10-15 years ago
2007: +18
2012: +5
2017: +5
2022: +9
2024: +9
17/20
Where China really shines is Sub-Saharan Africa
Consistently high net-positive favorability ratings for the last two decades
Slight dip in the average as China became a bigger economic player, but still very popular
2007: +54
2012: +56
2017: +40
2022: +38
2024: +39
16/20
Consistently high net-positive favorability ratings for the last two decades
Slight dip in the average as China became a bigger economic player, but still very popular
2007: +54
2012: +56
2017: +40
2022: +38
2024: +39
16/20
December 5, 2024 at 3:54 PM
Where China really shines is Sub-Saharan Africa
Consistently high net-positive favorability ratings for the last two decades
Slight dip in the average as China became a bigger economic player, but still very popular
2007: +54
2012: +56
2017: +40
2022: +38
2024: +39
16/20
Consistently high net-positive favorability ratings for the last two decades
Slight dip in the average as China became a bigger economic player, but still very popular
2007: +54
2012: +56
2017: +40
2022: +38
2024: +39
16/20
Here is a chart of opinion polls on China in India
Indian respondents hold increasingly negative views of China, especially since the deadly border clash in 2020
15/20
Indian respondents hold increasingly negative views of China, especially since the deadly border clash in 2020
15/20
December 5, 2024 at 3:54 PM
Here is a chart of opinion polls on China in India
Indian respondents hold increasingly negative views of China, especially since the deadly border clash in 2020
15/20
Indian respondents hold increasingly negative views of China, especially since the deadly border clash in 2020
15/20
South Asia is a mixed bag. Big change is plummeting favorability in India.
To generalize, since 2020, many negative polls from India, many positive polls from PK/BAN/SL
Huge region by population but small number of countries, so "region"-level data not so informative
14/20
To generalize, since 2020, many negative polls from India, many positive polls from PK/BAN/SL
Huge region by population but small number of countries, so "region"-level data not so informative
14/20
December 5, 2024 at 3:54 PM
South Asia is a mixed bag. Big change is plummeting favorability in India.
To generalize, since 2020, many negative polls from India, many positive polls from PK/BAN/SL
Huge region by population but small number of countries, so "region"-level data not so informative
14/20
To generalize, since 2020, many negative polls from India, many positive polls from PK/BAN/SL
Huge region by population but small number of countries, so "region"-level data not so informative
14/20
Central Asia is also quite friendly towards China
China has made concerted diplomatic efforts and economic investments in the region
Though polling is relatively sparse and there aren't many countries in the sample
2005: +24
2018: +50
2020: +6
2022: +41
13/20
China has made concerted diplomatic efforts and economic investments in the region
Though polling is relatively sparse and there aren't many countries in the sample
2005: +24
2018: +50
2020: +6
2022: +41
13/20
December 5, 2024 at 3:54 PM
Central Asia is also quite friendly towards China
China has made concerted diplomatic efforts and economic investments in the region
Though polling is relatively sparse and there aren't many countries in the sample
2005: +24
2018: +50
2020: +6
2022: +41
13/20
China has made concerted diplomatic efforts and economic investments in the region
Though polling is relatively sparse and there aren't many countries in the sample
2005: +24
2018: +50
2020: +6
2022: +41
13/20
Southeast Asia is much more well-disposed to China
Majorities in most ASEAN countries express positive sentiment, although by much lower margins recently, perhaps due to rising South China Sea tensions
2007: +39
2012: +44
2017: +3
2022: +22
2024: +9
12/20
Majorities in most ASEAN countries express positive sentiment, although by much lower margins recently, perhaps due to rising South China Sea tensions
2007: +39
2012: +44
2017: +3
2022: +22
2024: +9
12/20
December 5, 2024 at 3:54 PM
Southeast Asia is much more well-disposed to China
Majorities in most ASEAN countries express positive sentiment, although by much lower margins recently, perhaps due to rising South China Sea tensions
2007: +39
2012: +44
2017: +3
2022: +22
2024: +9
12/20
Majorities in most ASEAN countries express positive sentiment, although by much lower margins recently, perhaps due to rising South China Sea tensions
2007: +39
2012: +44
2017: +3
2022: +22
2024: +9
12/20
Northeast Asia has always been skeptical of China
Taiwan, Japan, ROK and Mongolia are all right next to the PRC and the first two have territorial disputes
Recent positive surveys are only from Hong Kong
2007: -28
2012: -39
2017: -49
2022: -51
2024: -37
11/20
Taiwan, Japan, ROK and Mongolia are all right next to the PRC and the first two have territorial disputes
Recent positive surveys are only from Hong Kong
2007: -28
2012: -39
2017: -49
2022: -51
2024: -37
11/20
December 5, 2024 at 3:54 PM
Northeast Asia has always been skeptical of China
Taiwan, Japan, ROK and Mongolia are all right next to the PRC and the first two have territorial disputes
Recent positive surveys are only from Hong Kong
2007: -28
2012: -39
2017: -49
2022: -51
2024: -37
11/20
Taiwan, Japan, ROK and Mongolia are all right next to the PRC and the first two have territorial disputes
Recent positive surveys are only from Hong Kong
2007: -28
2012: -39
2017: -49
2022: -51
2024: -37
11/20
Another huge downward trend in Oceania
But data is sparse and the results are dominated by Australia and New Zealand, where views on China have soured in recent years
Recent positive surveys from Samoa and Vanuatu
2007: +34
2011: +34
2017: +17
2022: -39
2024: -40
10/20
But data is sparse and the results are dominated by Australia and New Zealand, where views on China have soured in recent years
Recent positive surveys from Samoa and Vanuatu
2007: +34
2011: +34
2017: +17
2022: -39
2024: -40
10/20
December 5, 2024 at 3:54 PM
Another huge downward trend in Oceania
But data is sparse and the results are dominated by Australia and New Zealand, where views on China have soured in recent years
Recent positive surveys from Samoa and Vanuatu
2007: +34
2011: +34
2017: +17
2022: -39
2024: -40
10/20
But data is sparse and the results are dominated by Australia and New Zealand, where views on China have soured in recent years
Recent positive surveys from Samoa and Vanuatu
2007: +34
2011: +34
2017: +17
2022: -39
2024: -40
10/20
This chart shows opinion polls on China in the US
Negative shift obvious as US-China ties worsened in recent years, but +8 net favorability poll as late as 2018
(Site lets you generate this chart for 161 countries; hover over dots for individual survey details)
9/20
Negative shift obvious as US-China ties worsened in recent years, but +8 net favorability poll as late as 2018
(Site lets you generate this chart for 161 countries; hover over dots for individual survey details)
9/20
December 5, 2024 at 3:54 PM
This chart shows opinion polls on China in the US
Negative shift obvious as US-China ties worsened in recent years, but +8 net favorability poll as late as 2018
(Site lets you generate this chart for 161 countries; hover over dots for individual survey details)
9/20
Negative shift obvious as US-China ties worsened in recent years, but +8 net favorability poll as late as 2018
(Site lets you generate this chart for 161 countries; hover over dots for individual survey details)
9/20
North America has also seen a steep drop
Driven mainly by big reversals in the USA and Canada
Positive (red) dots mainly from surveys in the Caribbean
2007: +10
2012: +20
2017: +7
2022: -25
2024: -24
8/20
Driven mainly by big reversals in the USA and Canada
Positive (red) dots mainly from surveys in the Caribbean
2007: +10
2012: +20
2017: +7
2022: -25
2024: -24
8/20
December 5, 2024 at 3:54 PM
North America has also seen a steep drop
Driven mainly by big reversals in the USA and Canada
Positive (red) dots mainly from surveys in the Caribbean
2007: +10
2012: +20
2017: +7
2022: -25
2024: -24
8/20
Driven mainly by big reversals in the USA and Canada
Positive (red) dots mainly from surveys in the Caribbean
2007: +10
2012: +20
2017: +7
2022: -25
2024: -24
8/20
The Global Public Opinion on China product aggregates worldwide polling and allows us to track changes over time by region and by country
Europe has seen the biggest drop, seemingly due to Covid and China-Russia
2007: +3
2012: -4
2017: -2
2020: -30
2022: -32
2024: -28
7/20
Europe has seen the biggest drop, seemingly due to Covid and China-Russia
2007: +3
2012: -4
2017: -2
2020: -30
2022: -32
2024: -28
7/20
December 5, 2024 at 3:54 PM
The Global Public Opinion on China product aggregates worldwide polling and allows us to track changes over time by region and by country
Europe has seen the biggest drop, seemingly due to Covid and China-Russia
2007: +3
2012: -4
2017: -2
2020: -30
2022: -32
2024: -28
7/20
Europe has seen the biggest drop, seemingly due to Covid and China-Russia
2007: +3
2012: -4
2017: -2
2020: -30
2022: -32
2024: -28
7/20