www.cambridge.org/core/journal...

Our findings shed light on how anticorruption breakthroughs are often undone—and how the design of judicial institutions may facilitate political accommodation.

📄 Read the full paper: www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1...
@bridgegap-eu.bsky.social @cnpq-oficial.bsky.social

The effect of the gap in judicial independence is especially strong in:
✔️ Democracies
✔️ Periods of executive or legislative turnover
✔️ Proportional representation systems, where elite bargaining is more common

Key finding:

The greater the gap in judicial independence between high and low courts, the more likely convictions are to be reversed.

Using global data (1946–2022), we track:
🔹 All convictions of former heads of government
🔹 Whether those convictions were overturned
🔹 Their institutional and political context

When high courts are closer to political elites, they can undo the work of more independent lower courts—shielding former leaders after conviction and enabling political accommodation. We call this the institutional fail-safe hypothesis.

Parabéns e muito obrigado pela inestimável contribuição de vocês ao debate público no RS.

Really insightful.

I wrote a related piece on party and campaign financing in Brazil for @transparenciainternacional.org.br which might be relevant to your work.

transparenciainternacional.org.br/posts/o-que-...

The relationship between the level of democracy and corruption in the context of populism 👇

High-Profile Corruption Convictions,Government Reactions,and Public Approval: A Comparative Analysis Across Levels of Democracy

Manoel Gehrke, Feng Yang
30 April '25

onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/...

Ótimo artigo. Super interessantes os detalhes que apontas sobre as complementaridades entre os partidos.

This study contributes to active debates on the consequences of prosecuting politicians for corruption, particularly their connections to populism and the personalization of politics. 4/4