Jan Stropek
@honzastropek.bsky.social
War in Ukraine and related geopolitics
Es kommt eine neue Welle vom Pesimismus genauso wie es war bei Avdiivka oder Bachmut. Die Leute sehen nicht wie stark sich der Zustand Russlands inzwischen verschlechter hat.
November 3, 2025 at 7:04 AM
Es kommt eine neue Welle vom Pesimismus genauso wie es war bei Avdiivka oder Bachmut. Die Leute sehen nicht wie stark sich der Zustand Russlands inzwischen verschlechter hat.
To all the "UA manpower shortage" doomers out there:
October 31, 2025 at 7:10 AM
To all the "UA manpower shortage" doomers out there:
I'd say there is another trend they need to consider and this trend is an argument for even rising the interest rate, surely not lowering it. The banks aren't profitable enough to rise interest rates on saving accounts on their own.
October 24, 2025 at 4:57 AM
I'd say there is another trend they need to consider and this trend is an argument for even rising the interest rate, surely not lowering it. The banks aren't profitable enough to rise interest rates on saving accounts on their own.
Swedish Defense Minister Pål Jonson confirms to Iltalehti that Sweden and Ukraine are negotiating on the sale of Gripen E fighters.
The Gripens have plenty of advantages for Ukraine, e.g. compatibility with Meteor and Taurus missiles and ability to use shorter and narrower runways (or streets).
The Gripens have plenty of advantages for Ukraine, e.g. compatibility with Meteor and Taurus missiles and ability to use shorter and narrower runways (or streets).
October 22, 2025 at 10:59 AM
Swedish Defense Minister Pål Jonson confirms to Iltalehti that Sweden and Ukraine are negotiating on the sale of Gripen E fighters.
The Gripens have plenty of advantages for Ukraine, e.g. compatibility with Meteor and Taurus missiles and ability to use shorter and narrower runways (or streets).
The Gripens have plenty of advantages for Ukraine, e.g. compatibility with Meteor and Taurus missiles and ability to use shorter and narrower runways (or streets).
Trump and his cronies still don't get this very basic principle I tried to formulate last fall, when such messages massively emerged. Any compromise would be viable first than when both sides would be too exhausted and in the same time comparably exhausted - which is highly improbable.
October 20, 2025 at 10:43 AM
Trump and his cronies still don't get this very basic principle I tried to formulate last fall, when such messages massively emerged. Any compromise would be viable first than when both sides would be too exhausted and in the same time comparably exhausted - which is highly improbable.
Alle Propheten und fast alle Leute in der Trump-Administration ignorrieren einen grundsätzlichen Prinzip, welches ich vor einem Jahr versuchte zu formulieren. Damals im Herst haben sich viele Stimmen gezeigt, dass Ukraine unbedingt verhandeln muss.
October 19, 2025 at 3:21 PM
Alle Propheten und fast alle Leute in der Trump-Administration ignorrieren einen grundsätzlichen Prinzip, welches ich vor einem Jahr versuchte zu formulieren. Damals im Herst haben sich viele Stimmen gezeigt, dass Ukraine unbedingt verhandeln muss.
Oh, it was your graph.
October 15, 2025 at 7:14 AM
Oh, it was your graph.
It sounds like a pulse jet, is it maybe the KROOK-1 (see bellow) or something similar?
October 7, 2025 at 7:27 PM
It sounds like a pulse jet, is it maybe the KROOK-1 (see bellow) or something similar?
There is a non zero probability, that the Neptune launcher can be modified for launching Tomahawk, maybe it was intentional. What we sadly don't know is the inner diameter of the launching tube. Tomahawk has 53cm. Neptune has something very close (between 50-55cm) but I can't find the real value.
October 7, 2025 at 8:05 AM
There is a non zero probability, that the Neptune launcher can be modified for launching Tomahawk, maybe it was intentional. What we sadly don't know is the inner diameter of the launching tube. Tomahawk has 53cm. Neptune has something very close (between 50-55cm) but I can't find the real value.
I see 2/3 decline in new corporate lending, huge change of trend corelating with last December jump in bonds placements. From my POV new lending in 2024 was mostly for military industrial complex and even if all 2025 would go there, then there would be a sharp decline. Did you read my explanation?
September 30, 2025 at 11:09 AM
I see 2/3 decline in new corporate lending, huge change of trend corelating with last December jump in bonds placements. From my POV new lending in 2024 was mostly for military industrial complex and even if all 2025 would go there, then there would be a sharp decline. Did you read my explanation?
Hi Janis, I'd be really grateful for your feedback now, when the provided data confirm my claim. Thank you in advance.
September 30, 2025 at 9:25 AM
Hi Janis, I'd be really grateful for your feedback now, when the provided data confirm my claim. Thank you in advance.
I got fresh data from russian central bank which do match (are even a bit worse) with my prediction for 2025
September 29, 2025 at 7:34 PM
I got fresh data from russian central bank which do match (are even a bit worse) with my prediction for 2025
O, it's even directly in your link, great - the sharp decline started already in November 2024 and the total amount seems to pretty much align with my extrapolation for 2025
September 29, 2025 at 7:07 PM
O, it's even directly in your link, great - the sharp decline started already in November 2024 and the total amount seems to pretty much align with my extrapolation for 2025
Summary:
The single biggest russian issue for financing the war in 2025 is the sharp decline in corporate lending, which directly affects the military-industrial complex
Budget 2026 (next post) follows the trend and means less money for the industrial complex and even directly for RuAF too.
The single biggest russian issue for financing the war in 2025 is the sharp decline in corporate lending, which directly affects the military-industrial complex
Budget 2026 (next post) follows the trend and means less money for the industrial complex and even directly for RuAF too.
September 28, 2025 at 6:13 AM
Summary:
The single biggest russian issue for financing the war in 2025 is the sharp decline in corporate lending, which directly affects the military-industrial complex
Budget 2026 (next post) follows the trend and means less money for the industrial complex and even directly for RuAF too.
The single biggest russian issue for financing the war in 2025 is the sharp decline in corporate lending, which directly affects the military-industrial complex
Budget 2026 (next post) follows the trend and means less money for the industrial complex and even directly for RuAF too.
There is information about 12.6 Trillions for 2026 in the draft budget
September 28, 2025 at 5:55 AM
There is information about 12.6 Trillions for 2026 in the draft budget
There is one important point in russian financing of the war, which directly affects the military-industrial complex, and all these people are missing it. The extremely sharp decline in corporate lending...
September 28, 2025 at 5:50 AM
There is one important point in russian financing of the war, which directly affects the military-industrial complex, and all these people are missing it. The extremely sharp decline in corporate lending...
On russian 2025 and 2026 budget - they already know they are fucked.
September 27, 2025 at 9:36 AM
On russian 2025 and 2026 budget - they already know they are fucked.
What would you tell me, if I tell you that russian investments into military production capacities and research&development decreased sharply and these lack of money is "at work" already for at least 3/4 of a year? i can't see any channel reporting this. Even w/o exact numbers, the trend is given.
September 25, 2025 at 1:33 PM
What would you tell me, if I tell you that russian investments into military production capacities and research&development decreased sharply and these lack of money is "at work" already for at least 3/4 of a year? i can't see any channel reporting this. Even w/o exact numbers, the trend is given.
Hi Prune, it perfectly matches with my latest analysis, it's great to see such a direct confirmation that there is less money for the russian military-industrial complex. If you have time, check it please, it describes how economy directly influences the war of attrition.
September 23, 2025 at 6:00 PM
Hi Prune, it perfectly matches with my latest analysis, it's great to see such a direct confirmation that there is less money for the russian military-industrial complex. If you have time, check it please, it describes how economy directly influences the war of attrition.
To explain the graph of russian military investments decline. It's sadly pretty long, but I'd say it's worth reading.
September 21, 2025 at 9:27 AM
To explain the graph of russian military investments decline. It's sadly pretty long, but I'd say it's worth reading.
Is this trend of russian military investments the most important thing for a war of attrition? I'd probably say so...
September 20, 2025 at 10:17 PM
Is this trend of russian military investments the most important thing for a war of attrition? I'd probably say so...
If we divert AD from deliveries to Ukraine and if we allow no reaction from NATO, than it's a win-win for russia. I still hope we are not that stupid.
September 11, 2025 at 9:48 AM
If we divert AD from deliveries to Ukraine and if we allow no reaction from NATO, than it's a win-win for russia. I still hope we are not that stupid.
When not directly transferred to Ukraine, these systems could at least create a kind of no fly zone at least 30km deep along the border. But there are other consequences too, I tried to summarize a bit again:
September 11, 2025 at 9:05 AM
When not directly transferred to Ukraine, these systems could at least create a kind of no fly zone at least 30km deep along the border. But there are other consequences too, I tried to summarize a bit again: