doi.org/10.1093/cybs...
doi.org/10.1093/cybs...
Recently, @percepticon.bsky.social found similar limitations based on data from Ukraine and Gaza, using and expanding on our TECI-model for analysis of cyber ops.
It's worth a read: link.springer.com/article/10.1....
Recently, @percepticon.bsky.social found similar limitations based on data from Ukraine and Gaza, using and expanding on our TECI-model for analysis of cyber ops.
It's worth a read: link.springer.com/article/10.1....
1) strategic utility through a persistent barrage against critical infrastructure, and
2) operational and tactical utility in a war's beginning when it's easier to integrate cyber and non-cyber operations.
1) strategic utility through a persistent barrage against critical infrastructure, and
2) operational and tactical utility in a war's beginning when it's easier to integrate cyber and non-cyber operations.
1) difficulties integrating cyber ops into conventional operations due to differences in operational tempi.
2) high costs and one-shot nature of sophisticated payloads that are more likely to cause impactful effects
1) difficulties integrating cyber ops into conventional operations due to differences in operational tempi.
2) high costs and one-shot nature of sophisticated payloads that are more likely to cause impactful effects
Highlight of the interview: "I've been asked if NATO's gonna be able to invoke Article 5. I don't care. If Latvia is attacked, I'll send all my forces, they can court-martial me later."
Highlight of the interview: "I've been asked if NATO's gonna be able to invoke Article 5. I don't care. If Latvia is attacked, I'll send all my forces, they can court-martial me later."
It will culminate with complaints about how European militarisation supposedly threatens America.
It will culminate with complaints about how European militarisation supposedly threatens America.