The open question isn’t whether there is an argument about what should happen. The open question is whether the people who can make things happen will be forced to live inside that argument—or whether they will simply route around it. (9/9)
February 2, 2026 at 2:19 PM
The open question isn’t whether there is an argument about what should happen. The open question is whether the people who can make things happen will be forced to live inside that argument—or whether they will simply route around it. (9/9)
They’re precisely the kind of exception people invoke as a requirement—and precisely the kind of exception that tends not to arrive on schedule. An extraordinary intervention of civic will or institutional backbone that defies the current momentum. (8/n)
February 2, 2026 at 2:19 PM
They’re precisely the kind of exception people invoke as a requirement—and precisely the kind of exception that tends not to arrive on schedule. An extraordinary intervention of civic will or institutional backbone that defies the current momentum. (8/n)
If we want the 21st century to prove itself different, we need an unusually concrete, unusually “special” result: not just outrage, but durable constraints; not just mobilization, but enforceable accountability; not just symbolic condemnation, but institutional outcomes that change incentives. (7/n)
February 2, 2026 at 2:19 PM
If we want the 21st century to prove itself different, we need an unusually concrete, unusually “special” result: not just outrage, but durable constraints; not just mobilization, but enforceable accountability; not just symbolic condemnation, but institutional outcomes that change incentives. (7/n)
Moral language becomes a form of witness, not a form of control. It describes what is being violated; it rarely prevents the violation. <break> (6/n)
February 2, 2026 at 2:19 PM
Moral language becomes a form of witness, not a form of control. It describes what is being violated; it rarely prevents the violation. <break> (6/n)
When the actor with sufficient power decides to define the rules by force of initiative, did that moral chorus actually bite? Unfortunately, the answer was mostly no at least historically. Korean(A minor power) emissary to the Hague, was not even allowed to enter the place. (5/n)
February 2, 2026 at 2:19 PM
When the actor with sufficient power decides to define the rules by force of initiative, did that moral chorus actually bite? Unfortunately, the answer was mostly no at least historically. Korean(A minor power) emissary to the Hague, was not even allowed to enter the place. (5/n)
If an actor has the power to redefine the rules of the game simply because they possess the means of enforcement, then "ought" becomes an empty concept. In other worlds, “ought” is loud but structurally weak in this game. “Could” is quiet but decisive on the other hand. (4/n)
February 2, 2026 at 2:19 PM
If an actor has the power to redefine the rules of the game simply because they possess the means of enforcement, then "ought" becomes an empty concept. In other worlds, “ought” is loud but structurally weak in this game. “Could” is quiet but decisive on the other hand. (4/n)
The logic currently driving U.S. domestic politics looks uncomfortably similar to the logic that drove early 20th-century great-power decision-making. During that era, the international order was defined not by what a state ought to do (norms and rules), but by what it could do (raw capacity). (3/n)
February 2, 2026 at 2:19 PM
The logic currently driving U.S. domestic politics looks uncomfortably similar to the logic that drove early 20th-century great-power decision-making. During that era, the international order was defined not by what a state ought to do (norms and rules), but by what it could do (raw capacity). (3/n)
Or does coercive capacity simply redefine the boundaries of what is normal and permissible, and then dare the rest of society to catch up? I think I have a reference in the textbook of history. (2/n)
February 2, 2026 at 2:19 PM
Or does coercive capacity simply redefine the boundaries of what is normal and permissible, and then dare the rest of society to catch up? I think I have a reference in the textbook of history. (2/n)
If the system needs that profile as a trigger for mass outrage, that should leave a bad taste in your mouth. It does in mine. (4/4)
February 2, 2026 at 2:04 PM
If the system needs that profile as a trigger for mass outrage, that should leave a bad taste in your mouth. It does in mine. (4/4)
A victim who is legible to the default American imaginary—white, male, professional, “respectable,” with cultural cues that cross partisan lines—works differently. It pierces through the compartmentalization. It recruits people who have trained themselves not to be recruitable. (3/n)
February 2, 2026 at 2:04 PM
A victim who is legible to the default American imaginary—white, male, professional, “respectable,” with cultural cues that cross partisan lines—works differently. It pierces through the compartmentalization. It recruits people who have trained themselves not to be recruitable. (3/n)
Pretti represented the demographic that the system is theoretically designed to protect. His death at the hands of federal agents created a cognitive dissonance that the administration's "domestic terrorist" narrative could not bridge. (2/n)
February 2, 2026 at 2:04 PM
Pretti represented the demographic that the system is theoretically designed to protect. His death at the hands of federal agents created a cognitive dissonance that the administration's "domestic terrorist" narrative could not bridge. (2/n)
이러니저러니 해도 니코동 넷컬쳐의 heritage의 <르네상스> 가 핵심인데 이를 다루는 방식에 대해 교조적인 접근을 고수하는 태도가 두드러지는 이유가 무엇일까에 주목하면 생각할 거리가 많다. [매스어필]을 의식한 [가공]된 컨텐츠로써 전시되는 것에 대한 강한 거부감으로도 해석되는데, 서브컬쳐의 대중성에 대한 의식 차이로 부상하는 부분이라고도 말할 수 있을 듯.
January 27, 2026 at 3:01 AM
이러니저러니 해도 니코동 넷컬쳐의 heritage의 <르네상스> 가 핵심인데 이를 다루는 방식에 대해 교조적인 접근을 고수하는 태도가 두드러지는 이유가 무엇일까에 주목하면 생각할 거리가 많다. [매스어필]을 의식한 [가공]된 컨텐츠로써 전시되는 것에 대한 강한 거부감으로도 해석되는데, 서브컬쳐의 대중성에 대한 의식 차이로 부상하는 부분이라고도 말할 수 있을 듯.