Amy J. Nelson
@amyjnelsonphd.bsky.social
Foreign Policy & National Security
Nuclear and AI Futures
Senior Fellow, Future Security Program, New America
Adjunct Faculty, Georgetown University
Nuclear and AI Futures
Senior Fellow, Future Security Program, New America
Adjunct Faculty, Georgetown University
I agree that it's part of a greater strategic shift--that the NPR alone won't resolve ambiguity.
September 26, 2025 at 4:37 PM
I agree that it's part of a greater strategic shift--that the NPR alone won't resolve ambiguity.
My new piece for @newamerica.org examines the strategic consequences of exiting the #JCPOA w/out a plan, the erosion of risk management tools, and diplomacy in a post-agreement era as treaty-making gives way to improvisation.
June 30, 2025 at 8:53 PM
My new piece for @newamerica.org examines the strategic consequences of exiting the #JCPOA w/out a plan, the erosion of risk management tools, and diplomacy in a post-agreement era as treaty-making gives way to improvisation.
5/
Force without diplomacy isn’t strategy—it’s drift.
#Iran #Israel #Nuclear #ForeignPolicy #JCPOA #SecurityStudies #Nonproliferation #Deterrence #FuturesThinking
Force without diplomacy isn’t strategy—it’s drift.
#Iran #Israel #Nuclear #ForeignPolicy #JCPOA #SecurityStudies #Nonproliferation #Deterrence #FuturesThinking
June 16, 2025 at 4:26 PM
5/
Force without diplomacy isn’t strategy—it’s drift.
#Iran #Israel #Nuclear #ForeignPolicy #JCPOA #SecurityStudies #Nonproliferation #Deterrence #FuturesThinking
Force without diplomacy isn’t strategy—it’s drift.
#Iran #Israel #Nuclear #ForeignPolicy #JCPOA #SecurityStudies #Nonproliferation #Deterrence #FuturesThinking
4/
What futures does this signal?
– What happens when coercion becomes default?
– How do adversaries adapt when talks fail?
– What new architectures could rebuild credibility?
What futures does this signal?
– What happens when coercion becomes default?
– How do adversaries adapt when talks fail?
– What new architectures could rebuild credibility?
June 16, 2025 at 4:26 PM
4/
What futures does this signal?
– What happens when coercion becomes default?
– How do adversaries adapt when talks fail?
– What new architectures could rebuild credibility?
What futures does this signal?
– What happens when coercion becomes default?
– How do adversaries adapt when talks fail?
– What new architectures could rebuild credibility?
3/
Military signals—like Israeli strikes—may not be reinforcing diplomacy anymore, but replacing it. And that risks accelerating the very threats they aim to deter.
Military signals—like Israeli strikes—may not be reinforcing diplomacy anymore, but replacing it. And that risks accelerating the very threats they aim to deter.
June 16, 2025 at 4:26 PM
3/
Military signals—like Israeli strikes—may not be reinforcing diplomacy anymore, but replacing it. And that risks accelerating the very threats they aim to deter.
Military signals—like Israeli strikes—may not be reinforcing diplomacy anymore, but replacing it. And that risks accelerating the very threats they aim to deter.
2/
The JCPOA collapsed. U.S. policy whiplash, maximalist demands, and reversals have left adversaries doubting whether any concessions will yield lasting outcomes.
The JCPOA collapsed. U.S. policy whiplash, maximalist demands, and reversals have left adversaries doubting whether any concessions will yield lasting outcomes.
June 16, 2025 at 4:26 PM
2/
The JCPOA collapsed. U.S. policy whiplash, maximalist demands, and reversals have left adversaries doubting whether any concessions will yield lasting outcomes.
The JCPOA collapsed. U.S. policy whiplash, maximalist demands, and reversals have left adversaries doubting whether any concessions will yield lasting outcomes.
2/
🔧 Reverse Engineering
Iran captured a U.S. RQ-170 Sentinel in 2011. From it—and other downed drones—it built the Shahed-171 & Saegheh. Copy first, innovate later.
🔧 Reverse Engineering
Iran captured a U.S. RQ-170 Sentinel in 2011. From it—and other downed drones—it built the Shahed-171 & Saegheh. Copy first, innovate later.
June 15, 2025 at 5:46 PM
2/
🔧 Reverse Engineering
Iran captured a U.S. RQ-170 Sentinel in 2011. From it—and other downed drones—it built the Shahed-171 & Saegheh. Copy first, innovate later.
🔧 Reverse Engineering
Iran captured a U.S. RQ-170 Sentinel in 2011. From it—and other downed drones—it built the Shahed-171 & Saegheh. Copy first, innovate later.
7/
Adaptation beats invention. Constraints don’t always slow proliferation—they sometimes accelerate it.
#Iran #UAV #Drones #MilitaryTech #TechDiffusion #Security
Adaptation beats invention. Constraints don’t always slow proliferation—they sometimes accelerate it.
#Iran #UAV #Drones #MilitaryTech #TechDiffusion #Security
June 15, 2025 at 5:46 PM
7/
Adaptation beats invention. Constraints don’t always slow proliferation—they sometimes accelerate it.
#Iran #UAV #Drones #MilitaryTech #TechDiffusion #Security
Adaptation beats invention. Constraints don’t always slow proliferation—they sometimes accelerate it.
#Iran #UAV #Drones #MilitaryTech #TechDiffusion #Security
6/
Bottom line: Iran’s drone evolution challenges the idea that only big powers can field or export this kind of capability.
Bottom line: Iran’s drone evolution challenges the idea that only big powers can field or export this kind of capability.
June 15, 2025 at 5:46 PM
6/
Bottom line: Iran’s drone evolution challenges the idea that only big powers can field or export this kind of capability.
Bottom line: Iran’s drone evolution challenges the idea that only big powers can field or export this kind of capability.
5/
And they learned by using them. Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Lebanon—conflicts that doubled as live-fire R&D labs. The feedback loop mattered.
And they learned by using them. Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Lebanon—conflicts that doubled as live-fire R&D labs. The feedback loop mattered.
June 15, 2025 at 5:46 PM
5/
And they learned by using them. Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Lebanon—conflicts that doubled as live-fire R&D labs. The feedback loop mattered.
And they learned by using them. Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Lebanon—conflicts that doubled as live-fire R&D labs. The feedback loop mattered.
4/
Then came the domestic ramp-up. Despite sanctions, Iran scaled production of ISR drones, loitering munitions, and the Shahed-136—now seen in Ukraine.
Then came the domestic ramp-up. Despite sanctions, Iran scaled production of ISR drones, loitering munitions, and the Shahed-136—now seen in Ukraine.
June 15, 2025 at 5:46 PM
4/
Then came the domestic ramp-up. Despite sanctions, Iran scaled production of ISR drones, loitering munitions, and the Shahed-136—now seen in Ukraine.
Then came the domestic ramp-up. Despite sanctions, Iran scaled production of ISR drones, loitering munitions, and the Shahed-136—now seen in Ukraine.
3/
Foreign help played a role early on—tech and designs from China, Russia, maybe even North Korea. Nothing cutting-edge, but enough to build on.
Foreign help played a role early on—tech and designs from China, Russia, maybe even North Korea. Nothing cutting-edge, but enough to build on.
June 15, 2025 at 5:46 PM
3/
Foreign help played a role early on—tech and designs from China, Russia, maybe even North Korea. Nothing cutting-edge, but enough to build on.
Foreign help played a role early on—tech and designs from China, Russia, maybe even North Korea. Nothing cutting-edge, but enough to build on.
2/
It started with reverse engineering. Iran captured a U.S. RQ-170 in 2011, studied other downed UAVs, and built its own: Shahed-171, Saegheh, and more.
It started with reverse engineering. Iran captured a U.S. RQ-170 in 2011, studied other downed UAVs, and built its own: Shahed-171, Saegheh, and more.
June 15, 2025 at 5:46 PM
2/
It started with reverse engineering. Iran captured a U.S. RQ-170 in 2011, studied other downed UAVs, and built its own: Shahed-171, Saegheh, and more.
It started with reverse engineering. Iran captured a U.S. RQ-170 in 2011, studied other downed UAVs, and built its own: Shahed-171, Saegheh, and more.