🇮🇷 Failing to implement environmentally sound policies will only deepen the crisis, further imperilling both Baluchestan’s fragile ecosystems and its already vulnerable communities.

Our latest report explains why: www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-...

📈 Rising temperatures, sporadic rainfall, over-extraction and poor planning have converged to make water scarcity a major crisis in Sistan and #Baluchestan – and an increasingly pressing concern across #Iran.

13/13 When POTUS first took office, we @CrisisGroup argued he was well-positioned to improve JCPOA. Much has changed, but underlying proposition hasn't: Calibrating means & ends - and with necessary compromises on Tehran's part - a "VNPA" won't be easy, but also not unimaginable.

12/ @POTUS is well placed to pursue this as he’s now armed with the experience of what works/doesn’t with Tehran, he commands the GOP and can strong-arm Congress in ways Obama never could and Biden never would.

11/ On U.S. side, there will be a sense that given Iran's vulnerabilities, max pressure should also have maximalist ends, or no ends save further pressure. If, however, the objectives are reasonably defined, chances of a venn diagram converging becomes, if not likely, possible.

10/ On the Iranian side, the interest in some form of agreement is clear. But it is not translating that interest into a first concessionary move, nor is it at all clear that the system as a whole has the strategic vision, flexibility and will to make the compromises needed.

9/ Adding to those TBD issues is the fact that clock is already running given expiration in October of UNSCR 2231's snapback mechanism. NSPM-2 refers to working with allies (ie, E3) to "complete" the process. If there's little/no progress by mid-year, that is quite probable.

8/ If that is what might be *on* the table, also need to clarify who is *at* the table. P5+1 no longer exists. Would talks be bilateral U.S.-IRI? If so, indirect/mediated or direct? E3 would undoubtedly want to be involved and have excellent non-proliferation expertise to add.

7/ But that may not suffice: In Europe, Iran's drone/missile shipments to Russia are viewed as real concern. Circumstances may also allow for some degree of understandings on the regional front. Non-nuclear issues weren't in JCPOA - it may be possible to better that now.

6/ The first issue: What's on the table? Even if only addressing nuclear issues, the JCPOA framework no longer exists. Deal would need to address two elements of concern: Transparency into Iran's past and present nuclear activity, and limits on its production of fissile material.

5/ If there are to be negotiations leading to a "VNPA" - POTUS says "we should start working on it immediately" - and the Iranians appear game for some sort of talks with his administration there are several elements that must fall into place. This is easier said than done.

4/ As of early 2025, Iran's power projection and influence in the region has been sharply reduced with the weakening of Hamas/Hizbollah and fall of Assad. Its economic situation is already poor, even before sanctions are bolstered. However, nuclear program as advanced as ever.

3/ Under the Biden admin, talks in 2021-22 to revive the JCPOA came to naught. De-escalatory understandings in 2023 collapsed after Hamas's 7 October attack against Israel. U.S. focus turned to avoiding widening of conflict, and defending allies and interests.

2/ In 2018-20, "Max Pressure" post-U.S. withdrawal from JCPOA put a massive dent in Iran's economy. Iran retaliated with a two-pronged counter-pressure campaign: nuclear escalation and regional provocation. There was little substantive engagement/diplomacy between the two sides.