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thebjps.bsky.social
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
@thebjps.bsky.social
5.5K followers 990 following 280 posts
Latest issue:
https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/toc/bjps/current

BJPS Review of Books:
https://www.thebsps.org/reviewofbooks/

BJPS Short Reads:
https://www.thebsps.org/short-reads/

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https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/bjps
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British Journal for the Philosophy of Science @thebjps.bsky.social · Nov 11
Welcome new followers! Some of the content we post will be behind a paywall (boo! hiss!)—but that wall is, like, two inches high. Join the BSPS for $20 ($4 for students) to get complete access to everything as well as the warm glow of supporting the society working for your discipline!
Journal subscriptions for The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science from the University of Chicago Press website.
Journal subscriptions for The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science from the University of Chicago Press website.
press.uchicago.edu
thebjps.bsky.social
New Letter to the Editors

Gijsbers on Jacobs on Gijsbers on Presentist Velocities…

#philsci #philsky
On Gijsbers, Presentist Velocities | BJPS Letters to the Editor
Correspondence from Caspar Jacobs, with a reply from Victor Gijsbers
www.thebsps.org
October 31, 2025 at 10:45 AM
thebjps.bsky.social
Just accepted:

Scepticism about Post Hoc Explainability and Idealized Models
– Aleks Knoks & Thomas Raleigh

Abstract in alt text or read it here:
www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/...

#philsci #philsky
ABSTRACT. Deep neural networks and other AI systems engineered using advanced machine learning techniques can tackle a wide range of tasks with proficiency that seems to match and even surpass human ability. Yet they are also notoriously opaque and worries surrounding their opacity have given rise to the burgeoning field of explainable artificial intelligence (XAI), with its large variety of explainability methods. This includes post hoc explainability methods that purport to explain opaque AI systems on the basis of their input–output behaviour alone, without looking into their inner workings. But many have expressed deep scepticism about post hoc explainability. We explore the two main objections that the sceptics have raised and argue that we shouldn’t be swayed by them. Using ideas from recent literature on scientific explanation, we draw a parallel between post hoc explainability methods and idealized models in science, and use the parallel in reply to the sceptics.
October 30, 2025 at 10:15 AM
thebjps.bsky.social
Just accepted:

Scientific Contributions and Scientific Authorship
– Mikkel Gerken

Abstract in alt text or read it here:
www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/...

#philsci
ABSTRACT. As a non-consensually enlisted contributor to the article ‘What’s the Point of Authors?’, who has made virtually no contribution to it, I argue against its proposed re-conception of authorship. In particular, I argue that a core component of the account—namely, the conception of contributorship—is implausible, infeasible, undesirable, and, in far too many cases, unethical.
October 29, 2025 at 10:15 AM
thebjps.bsky.social
Just accepted:

Explanatory Understanding in the Metaphysics of Science
– Peter Tan

Abstract in alt text or read the paper here:
www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/...

#philsci #philsky
ABSTRACT. This article develops a novel account of metaphysics’ explanatory contributions to the philosophy of science. A recent objection alleges that explanations of features of science in metaphysical terms are nothing more than rephrases of their target explananda. That is, these explanations are alleged to fail with respect to what has recently been called ‘explanatory distance’. In response, I show that putative explanations of the scientific image in metaphysical terms often exemplify an explanatory strategy found elsewhere in science, which I call type–token explanations. If successful, these explanations would achieve appropriate explanatory distance. Additionally, because this mode of explanation coheres with a pre-existing explanatory strategy in science, my account implies that the metaphysics of science can generate understanding about its target phenomena in the same way that scientific explanations can provide scientific understanding of their target explananda
October 24, 2025 at 9:45 AM
thebjps.bsky.social
Just accepted:

Determinism and Asymmetry in General Relativity
– J B Manchak, Thomas Barrett, Hans Halvorson & James Weatherall

Abstract in alt text or read the paper here:
www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/...

#philsci #philsky
ABSTRACT. This article concerns the question of which collections of general relativistic spacetimes are deterministic relative to which definitions. We begin by considering a series of three definitions of increasing strength due to Belot. The strongest of these definitions is particularly interesting for spacetime theories because it involves an asymmetry condition called `rigidity' that has been studied previously in a different context by Geroch. We show how Belot's strongest definition is connected to a formal result emphasized by Weatherall. We then go on to explore other (stronger) asymmetry conditions that give rise to other (stronger) forms of determinism. We introduce a number of definitions of this type and clarify the relationships between them and the three considered by Belot. We show that there are collections of general relativistic spacetimes that satisfy much stronger forms of determinism than previously known. We also highlight a number of open questions.
October 23, 2025 at 9:15 AM
thebjps.bsky.social
Just accepted:

How Do We Know If Animals Remember? Proximal Functions and the Distribution of Episodic Memory
– Arieh Schwartz & Alexandria Boyle

Abstract in alt text or read it here: www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/...

#philsci #philsky
ABSTRACT. Which animals have episodic memory? One reason this is difficult to answer is that episodic memory could be expected to vary across species, making it hard to give a principled account of what ‘counts’ as an episodic memory system. In this article, we propose that the investigation of episodic memory in animals should be guided by an account of its proximal proper functions: its most basic selected effects. In short, an animal has episodic memory if it has a memory system with the proximal functions of episodic memory. While there are many accounts of episodic memory’s distal functions, little attention has been paid to its proximal functions. To remedy this, we develop a preliminary account of episodic memory’s proximal functions and use this to evaluate existing evidence about episodic memory in animals.
October 20, 2025 at 9:15 AM
Reposted by British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
lsephilosophy.bsky.social
🚨We're hiring! 🚨

👉Open Position: Assistant Professor of #Philosophy with focus on #AI

🗓️ Application deadline: 3 November 2025

Apply via: jobs.lse.ac.uk/Vacancies/W/...

#PartOfLSE #LSEPhilosophy #Jobs
August 19, 2025 at 2:08 PM
Reposted by British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
philsci.bsky.social
PSA is in the process of launching a subdivision focused on postdoctoral scholars! Help shape its mission and priorities—take our 5-minute survey here, All interested PSA members are welcome to join the conversation!
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October 16, 2025 at 4:31 PM
thebjps.bsky.social
Just accepted:

Entanglement Swapping for Entanglement Realists
– Jørn Kløvfjell Mjelva

Abstract in alt text or read it here:
www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/...

#philsci #philsky
ABSTRACT. Delayed-choice entanglement swapping experiments have been argued to undermine realism about entanglement. One response has been to argue that the correlations displayed in delayed-choice entanglement swapping experiments have a different physical interpretation than the correlations in the non-delayed case. This strategy runs into problems when applied to cases of spacelike entanglement swapping, as it would appear to require one to either posit a privileged foliation of spacetime or otherwise accept that whether entanglement obtains is frame dependent. In this article, I present a realist-friendly account of entanglement swapping that circumvents this dilemma, in which entanglement is explicated via the notion of a common ground. The issue of frame dependence is resolved by adopting the past light-cone criterion for property attribution, and the correlations displayed in the spacelike entanglement swapping experiments are attributed to a joint common ground.
October 8, 2025 at 9:15 AM
thebjps.bsky.social
Are you a phd student? Are you in the vicinity of one and want to help them with their bad life choices? Then this is for you! #philsci
philsci.bsky.social Philosophy of Science Association @philsci.bsky.social · Oct 6
✨Don't forget✨ PSA Office Hours are back! Join us this Thursday, October 9 at 12 PM EST with S. Andrew Schroeder. Sign up at the link below to save your spot!

www.philsci.org/psa_...
October 6, 2025 at 7:57 PM
Reposted by British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
alisabokulich.bsky.social
#Postdoc at U. of Vienna in philosophy of science, with focus on scientific modeling, interdisciplinarity &/or philosophy of engineering, w/ Prof. Tarja Knuuttila. English & German language proficiency required.
Deadline: Oct 9th
#philsci

jobs.univie.ac.at/job/Universi...
University Assistant postdoctoral, in the research area of Philosophy of Science
University Assistant postdoctoral, in the research area of Philosophy of Science
jobs.univie.ac.at
October 1, 2025 at 1:04 PM
thebjps.bsky.social
Just accepted:

Algorithmic Randomness and Probabilistic Laws
– Jeffrey Barrett & Eddy Keming Chen

Abstract in alt text or read it here:
www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/...

#philsci #philsky
ABSTRACT. We apply recent ideas about complexity and randomness to the philosophy of laws and chances, developing two ways to use algorithmic randomness to characterize probabilistic laws of nature: a generative chance law that employs a non-standard notion of chance, and a probabilistic constraining law that imposes relative frequency and randomness constraints that every physically possible world must satisfy. This removes an obstacle to a unified governing account of non-Humean laws, whereby laws govern by constraining physical possibilities; it also offers independently motivated solutions to problems for the Humean best-system account. On either approach, probabilistic laws are tied more tightly to corresponding sets of possible worlds: some histories permitted by traditional probabilistic laws are now ruled out as physically impossible. Consequently, the framework avoids one variety of empirical underdetermination while bringing to light others that are typically overlooked.
October 1, 2025 at 9:15 AM
thebjps.bsky.social
Just accepted:

Kinematical Equivalence and Cosmic Conspiracies
– Caspar Jacobs & Eleanor March

Abstract in alt text or read it here:
www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/...

#philsci #philsky
ABSTRACT. Discussions of theoretical equivalence typically only concern a theory's dynamically possible models. Recently, however, March has shown that a theory's kinematically possible models are also relevant to questions of theoretical equivalence. We apply March's notion of kinematic equivalence to the difference between reduced and sophisticated theories introduced by Dewar. Although Dewar claims that these are equivalent, Jacobs has argued that only sophisticated theories can explain what are otherwise `cosmic conspiracies'. We show that this is a consequence of the kinematical inequivalence of reduced and sophisticated theories. Furthermore, we use Caulton's `downwards Hume's dictum' to show that kinematically inequivalent theories are also ontologically inequivalent.
September 29, 2025 at 9:15 AM
Reposted by British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
alisabokulich.bsky.social
#PhilJobs Dept Philosophy @ Stanford University
AOS: Philosophy of Physics (understood broadly to include all physical sciences, complexity, etc.), Philosophy of Science
AOC: Open
Open rank: tenure-track Assistant Prof, tenured Associate Prof, or Full Prof
Deadline: November 1
#PhilSci #philsky
Stanford | Faculty Positions: Details - Open Rank Faculty Position in Philosophy of Physics
facultypositions.stanford.edu
September 25, 2025 at 7:43 PM
thebjps.bsky.social
Just accepted:

Reviving Reduction
– Dominik Ehrenfels

Abstract in alt text or read it here:
www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/...

#philsci #philsky
ABSTRACT. Possessing symmetries often indicates that a theory’s models exhibit surplus structure, in turn suggesting the theory needs reformulation either by reduction or sophistication. Lately, sophistication has become more popular, on the grounds that reductions are difficult to find and often not as attractive. But this arises from a restrictive way of thinking about reduction. It is often held that theory reduction must be formulated in terms of symmetry-invariant quantities and must be empirically equivalent to the original. Using Barbour and Bertotti’s successful reformulation of Newtonian gravitation theory (NGT), I argue that reductions need not meet these criteria. While it is possible to sophisticate NGT with respect to scale symmetry, this has been a challenge for the reduction strategy, giving the impression that sophistication is superior. The approach to reduction I argue for here, however, is versatile enough to handle this case, arguably in a way superior to its rival.
September 22, 2025 at 9:15 AM
thebjps.bsky.social
Just accepted:

Climate Sensitivity through the Lens of Measurement Practice
– Matthias Ackermann

Abstract in alt text or read it here:
www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/...

#philsci #philsky
ABSTRACT. In its Sixth Assessment Report, the IPCC moved from a climate model-based to a climate model-supported assessment of equilibrium climate sensitivity. Unlike previous reports, climate model information is no longer used directly for estimates of equilibrium climate sensitivity. I offer a measurement view on the equilibrium climate sensitivity assessment that allows us to evaluate this shift in practice in terms of its practical and epistemic consequences. In particular, I argue for two conclusions involved in this move. First, the change in using climate models as direct sources of evidence to a supporting role involves a kind of repurposing of climate models as epistemic tools. This change should be evaluated relative to the researchers' aims, which include more accurately assessing equilibrium climate sensitivity. Second, I suggest that this shift in practice shares a kinship to calibration activities aimed at increasing the reliability of a measurement procedure.
September 19, 2025 at 9:45 AM
thebjps.bsky.social
Just accepted:

What Gibbsian Statistical Mechanics Says: In Defence of Bare Probabilism
– David Wallace

Abstract in alt text or read the full paper here: www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/...

#philsci #philsky
ABSTRACT. I expound and defend the `bare probabilism' reading of Gibbsian (that is, mainstream) statistical mechanics, responding to Frigg and Werndl's recent plea: `can somebody please say what Gibbsian statistical mechanics says?'.
September 18, 2025 at 9:15 AM
thebjps.bsky.social
Statistical Autonomous Explanations and the Patterns of Nature: A Modified Account
– Travis Holmes & André Ariew

Abstract in alt text or read it here:
www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/...

#philsci #philsky
ABSTRACT. This article provides a fuller account of purely statistical pattern-level explanations—that is, those that explain macro-level events by invoking limit theorems. The statistical autonomous explanation account is modified via integration with the maximum entropy approach for generating limit distributions. This achieves two important results: (1) the range of statistical autonomous explanations is vastly extended and shown to range over many different kinds of limit distributions; (2) the modified account permits answers to questions about why these limit distribution patterns are so common in nature; why these patterns are robust; and also why these patterns are insensitive to most lower-level details pertaining to the characters or events that comprise the statistical ensemble. The modified account can be understood as a corrective for many extant accounts of statistical pattern-level explanations that fail to answer these crucial questions.
September 17, 2025 at 9:15 AM
Reposted by British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
dailynous.com
The Philosophy of Science Association makes experts on various topics available for conversation with graduate students anywhere with its "Office Hour" program. Other associations should consider doing this.
The PSA’s “Office Hour” Returns - Daily Nous
The Philosophy of Science Association (PSA) is continuing its excellent expert "office hour" series this semester---a program other academic associations should consider adopting. "The PSA Office Hour aims to facilitate interactions between our graduate student membership and prominent philosophers of science, and in a more controlled, accessible, and carbon-conscious setting than is provided by our
dailynous.com
September 16, 2025 at 2:11 PM
Reposted by British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
eugenechua.bsky.social
Very happy to announce that the CFP is now open for APSA26: The Inaugural Biennial Conference of the Asian Philosophy of Science Association! It will be held at Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. The keynote will be Craig Callender. Submission deadline: 31 Dec 2025. URL: tinyurl.com/APSA26
Asian Philosophy of Science Association (APSA) Conference 2026
tinyurl.com
September 15, 2025 at 1:56 PM
thebjps.bsky.social
Sifting the Signal from the Noise
– Daniel Herrmann & Jacob VanDrunen

Abstract in alt text or read the full paper here: www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/...

#philsci #philsky
ABSTRACT. Signalling games are useful for understanding how language emerges. In the standard models, the dynamics in some sense already know what the signals are, even if they do not yet have meaning. In this article, we relax this assumption and develop a simple model we call an ‘attention game’, in which agents have to learn which feature of their environment is the signal. We demonstrate that simple reinforcement learning agents can still learn to coordinate in contexts where the agents do not already know what the signal is, and the other features in the agents’ environment are uncorrelated with the signal. Furthermore, we show that in cases where other features are correlated with the signal, there is a surprising trade-off between learning what the signal is and success in action. We show that the mutual information between a signal and a feature plays a key role in governing the accuracy and attention of the agent.
September 15, 2025 at 9:15 AM
Reposted by British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
thebjps.bsky.social
New letter to the Editors

Caspar Jacobs, Against Presentist Velocities: Response to Gijsbers

www.thebsps.org/letters/gijs...

#philsci #philsky
On Gijsbers, Presentist Velocities | Letters to the Editor
Correspondence from Caspar Jacobs
www.thebsps.org
September 9, 2025 at 10:23 AM
Reposted by British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
sabinaleonelli.bsky.social
JOB AD: If you research philosophy, history or social studies of biology, with interest in agroecology, crop science or environmental intelligence, consider applying for 3-year postdoctoral fellowship in Munich! Deadline for applications: 31/10, details www.sts.sot.tum.de/en/sts/arbei... #philsci
Jobs
www.sts.sot.tum.de
September 12, 2025 at 10:35 AM
thebjps.bsky.social
Knowledge of the Quantum Domain: An Overlap Strategy
– James Fraser & Peter Vickers

Abstract in alt text or read the full paper here:
www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/...

#philsci #philsky
ABSTRACT. The existence of multiple interpretations of quantum mechanics appears to pose a serious challenge for knowledge claims about the quantum domain. Hoefer argues that a scientific realist epistemology must be abandoned in this context, while Callender argues that the realist’s only option is to break the underdetermination between rival interpretations by appealing to extra-empirical virtues. We develop a different response to the quantum underdetermination problem based on identifying statements about the unobservable that all the major ontic interpretations of quantum mechanics agree on. It is commonly believed that Everettian, Bohmian, and GRW (Ghirardi–Rimini–Weber) quantum mechanics share nothing but empirical content. We argue that while they say very different things about the fundamental nature of quantum systems, they can be understood as agreeing on a plethora of more abstract theoretical claims. In our view, focusing on this descriptive overlap represents the most promising strategy for defending knowledge claims in the quantum domain. We close by considering how this overlap strategy relates to working posits formulations of scientific realism.
September 12, 2025 at 9:45 AM
thebjps.bsky.social
Host Specificity in Biological Control
– Thomas Blanchard

Abstract in alt text or read it here:
www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/...

#philsci #philsky
ABSTRACT. In recent years, the notion of biological specificity has attracted significant philosophical attention. This article focuses on host specificity, a kind of biological specificity that has not yet been discussed by philosophers, and which concerns the extent to which a species is selective in the range of other species it exploits for feeding and/or reproduction. Host specificity is an important notion in ecology, where it plays a variety of theoretical roles. Here, I focus on the role of host specificity in biological control, a field of applied ecology that deals with the suppression of pests through the use of living organisms. Examining host specificity and its role in biological control yields several valuable contributions to our understanding of biological specificity. In particular, I argue that host specificity cannot be fully understood in terms of Woodward’s well-known account of causal specificity. To adequately account for host specificity, we need a notion of causal specificity that takes into consideration the extent to which a variable’s effects are similar to one another—a dimension not captured in Woodward’s account. In addition, the literature on host specificity in biological control highlights certain aspects in which causally specific relationships can be practically valuable—aspects that have not yet been addressed in philosophical discussions of specificity. The literature also reveals that, in certain contexts, specificity can hinder rather than foster effective control, thus leading to a nuanced assessment of the practical value of specific causes.
September 11, 2025 at 9:15 AM