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thebjps.bsky.social
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
@thebjps.bsky.social
5.5K followers 990 following 280 posts
Latest issue:
https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/toc/bjps/current

BJPS Review of Books:
https://www.thebsps.org/reviewofbooks/

BJPS Short Reads:
https://www.thebsps.org/short-reads/

Podcast:
https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/bjps
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thebjps.bsky.social
Just accepted:

Scepticism about Post Hoc Explainability and Idealized Models
– Aleks Knoks & Thomas Raleigh

Abstract in alt text or read it here:
www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/...

#philsci #philsky
ABSTRACT. Deep neural networks and other AI systems engineered using advanced machine learning techniques can tackle a wide range of tasks with proficiency that seems to match and even surpass human ability. Yet they are also notoriously opaque and worries surrounding their opacity have given rise to the burgeoning field of explainable artificial intelligence (XAI), with its large variety of explainability methods. This includes post hoc explainability methods that purport to explain opaque AI systems on the basis of their input–output behaviour alone, without looking into their inner workings. But many have expressed deep scepticism about post hoc explainability. We explore the two main objections that the sceptics have raised and argue that we shouldn’t be swayed by them. Using ideas from recent literature on scientific explanation, we draw a parallel between post hoc explainability methods and idealized models in science, and use the parallel in reply to the sceptics.
October 30, 2025 at 10:15 AM
thebjps.bsky.social
Just accepted:

Scientific Contributions and Scientific Authorship
– Mikkel Gerken

Abstract in alt text or read it here:
www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/...

#philsci
ABSTRACT. As a non-consensually enlisted contributor to the article ‘What’s the Point of Authors?’, who has made virtually no contribution to it, I argue against its proposed re-conception of authorship. In particular, I argue that a core component of the account—namely, the conception of contributorship—is implausible, infeasible, undesirable, and, in far too many cases, unethical.
October 29, 2025 at 10:15 AM
thebjps.bsky.social
Just accepted:

Explanatory Understanding in the Metaphysics of Science
– Peter Tan

Abstract in alt text or read the paper here:
www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/...

#philsci #philsky
ABSTRACT. This article develops a novel account of metaphysics’ explanatory contributions to the philosophy of science. A recent objection alleges that explanations of features of science in metaphysical terms are nothing more than rephrases of their target explananda. That is, these explanations are alleged to fail with respect to what has recently been called ‘explanatory distance’. In response, I show that putative explanations of the scientific image in metaphysical terms often exemplify an explanatory strategy found elsewhere in science, which I call type–token explanations. If successful, these explanations would achieve appropriate explanatory distance. Additionally, because this mode of explanation coheres with a pre-existing explanatory strategy in science, my account implies that the metaphysics of science can generate understanding about its target phenomena in the same way that scientific explanations can provide scientific understanding of their target explananda
October 24, 2025 at 9:45 AM
thebjps.bsky.social
Just accepted:

Determinism and Asymmetry in General Relativity
– J B Manchak, Thomas Barrett, Hans Halvorson & James Weatherall

Abstract in alt text or read the paper here:
www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/...

#philsci #philsky
ABSTRACT. This article concerns the question of which collections of general relativistic spacetimes are deterministic relative to which definitions. We begin by considering a series of three definitions of increasing strength due to Belot. The strongest of these definitions is particularly interesting for spacetime theories because it involves an asymmetry condition called `rigidity' that has been studied previously in a different context by Geroch. We show how Belot's strongest definition is connected to a formal result emphasized by Weatherall. We then go on to explore other (stronger) asymmetry conditions that give rise to other (stronger) forms of determinism. We introduce a number of definitions of this type and clarify the relationships between them and the three considered by Belot. We show that there are collections of general relativistic spacetimes that satisfy much stronger forms of determinism than previously known. We also highlight a number of open questions.
October 23, 2025 at 9:15 AM
thebjps.bsky.social
Just accepted:

How Do We Know If Animals Remember? Proximal Functions and the Distribution of Episodic Memory
– Arieh Schwartz & Alexandria Boyle

Abstract in alt text or read it here: www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/...

#philsci #philsky
ABSTRACT. Which animals have episodic memory? One reason this is difficult to answer is that episodic memory could be expected to vary across species, making it hard to give a principled account of what ‘counts’ as an episodic memory system. In this article, we propose that the investigation of episodic memory in animals should be guided by an account of its proximal proper functions: its most basic selected effects. In short, an animal has episodic memory if it has a memory system with the proximal functions of episodic memory. While there are many accounts of episodic memory’s distal functions, little attention has been paid to its proximal functions. To remedy this, we develop a preliminary account of episodic memory’s proximal functions and use this to evaluate existing evidence about episodic memory in animals.
October 20, 2025 at 9:15 AM
thebjps.bsky.social
Just accepted:

Entanglement Swapping for Entanglement Realists
– Jørn Kløvfjell Mjelva

Abstract in alt text or read it here:
www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/...

#philsci #philsky
ABSTRACT. Delayed-choice entanglement swapping experiments have been argued to undermine realism about entanglement. One response has been to argue that the correlations displayed in delayed-choice entanglement swapping experiments have a different physical interpretation than the correlations in the non-delayed case. This strategy runs into problems when applied to cases of spacelike entanglement swapping, as it would appear to require one to either posit a privileged foliation of spacetime or otherwise accept that whether entanglement obtains is frame dependent. In this article, I present a realist-friendly account of entanglement swapping that circumvents this dilemma, in which entanglement is explicated via the notion of a common ground. The issue of frame dependence is resolved by adopting the past light-cone criterion for property attribution, and the correlations displayed in the spacelike entanglement swapping experiments are attributed to a joint common ground.
October 8, 2025 at 9:15 AM
thebjps.bsky.social
Just accepted:

Algorithmic Randomness and Probabilistic Laws
– Jeffrey Barrett & Eddy Keming Chen

Abstract in alt text or read it here:
www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/...

#philsci #philsky
ABSTRACT. We apply recent ideas about complexity and randomness to the philosophy of laws and chances, developing two ways to use algorithmic randomness to characterize probabilistic laws of nature: a generative chance law that employs a non-standard notion of chance, and a probabilistic constraining law that imposes relative frequency and randomness constraints that every physically possible world must satisfy. This removes an obstacle to a unified governing account of non-Humean laws, whereby laws govern by constraining physical possibilities; it also offers independently motivated solutions to problems for the Humean best-system account. On either approach, probabilistic laws are tied more tightly to corresponding sets of possible worlds: some histories permitted by traditional probabilistic laws are now ruled out as physically impossible. Consequently, the framework avoids one variety of empirical underdetermination while bringing to light others that are typically overlooked.
October 1, 2025 at 9:15 AM
thebjps.bsky.social
Just accepted:

Kinematical Equivalence and Cosmic Conspiracies
– Caspar Jacobs & Eleanor March

Abstract in alt text or read it here:
www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/...

#philsci #philsky
ABSTRACT. Discussions of theoretical equivalence typically only concern a theory's dynamically possible models. Recently, however, March has shown that a theory's kinematically possible models are also relevant to questions of theoretical equivalence. We apply March's notion of kinematic equivalence to the difference between reduced and sophisticated theories introduced by Dewar. Although Dewar claims that these are equivalent, Jacobs has argued that only sophisticated theories can explain what are otherwise `cosmic conspiracies'. We show that this is a consequence of the kinematical inequivalence of reduced and sophisticated theories. Furthermore, we use Caulton's `downwards Hume's dictum' to show that kinematically inequivalent theories are also ontologically inequivalent.
September 29, 2025 at 9:15 AM
thebjps.bsky.social
Just accepted:

Reviving Reduction
– Dominik Ehrenfels

Abstract in alt text or read it here:
www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/...

#philsci #philsky
ABSTRACT. Possessing symmetries often indicates that a theory’s models exhibit surplus structure, in turn suggesting the theory needs reformulation either by reduction or sophistication. Lately, sophistication has become more popular, on the grounds that reductions are difficult to find and often not as attractive. But this arises from a restrictive way of thinking about reduction. It is often held that theory reduction must be formulated in terms of symmetry-invariant quantities and must be empirically equivalent to the original. Using Barbour and Bertotti’s successful reformulation of Newtonian gravitation theory (NGT), I argue that reductions need not meet these criteria. While it is possible to sophisticate NGT with respect to scale symmetry, this has been a challenge for the reduction strategy, giving the impression that sophistication is superior. The approach to reduction I argue for here, however, is versatile enough to handle this case, arguably in a way superior to its rival.
September 22, 2025 at 9:15 AM
thebjps.bsky.social
Just accepted:

Climate Sensitivity through the Lens of Measurement Practice
– Matthias Ackermann

Abstract in alt text or read it here:
www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/...

#philsci #philsky
ABSTRACT. In its Sixth Assessment Report, the IPCC moved from a climate model-based to a climate model-supported assessment of equilibrium climate sensitivity. Unlike previous reports, climate model information is no longer used directly for estimates of equilibrium climate sensitivity. I offer a measurement view on the equilibrium climate sensitivity assessment that allows us to evaluate this shift in practice in terms of its practical and epistemic consequences. In particular, I argue for two conclusions involved in this move. First, the change in using climate models as direct sources of evidence to a supporting role involves a kind of repurposing of climate models as epistemic tools. This change should be evaluated relative to the researchers' aims, which include more accurately assessing equilibrium climate sensitivity. Second, I suggest that this shift in practice shares a kinship to calibration activities aimed at increasing the reliability of a measurement procedure.
September 19, 2025 at 9:45 AM
thebjps.bsky.social
Just accepted:

What Gibbsian Statistical Mechanics Says: In Defence of Bare Probabilism
– David Wallace

Abstract in alt text or read the full paper here: www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/...

#philsci #philsky
ABSTRACT. I expound and defend the `bare probabilism' reading of Gibbsian (that is, mainstream) statistical mechanics, responding to Frigg and Werndl's recent plea: `can somebody please say what Gibbsian statistical mechanics says?'.
September 18, 2025 at 9:15 AM
thebjps.bsky.social
Statistical Autonomous Explanations and the Patterns of Nature: A Modified Account
– Travis Holmes & André Ariew

Abstract in alt text or read it here:
www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/...

#philsci #philsky
ABSTRACT. This article provides a fuller account of purely statistical pattern-level explanations—that is, those that explain macro-level events by invoking limit theorems. The statistical autonomous explanation account is modified via integration with the maximum entropy approach for generating limit distributions. This achieves two important results: (1) the range of statistical autonomous explanations is vastly extended and shown to range over many different kinds of limit distributions; (2) the modified account permits answers to questions about why these limit distribution patterns are so common in nature; why these patterns are robust; and also why these patterns are insensitive to most lower-level details pertaining to the characters or events that comprise the statistical ensemble. The modified account can be understood as a corrective for many extant accounts of statistical pattern-level explanations that fail to answer these crucial questions.
September 17, 2025 at 9:15 AM
thebjps.bsky.social
Sifting the Signal from the Noise
– Daniel Herrmann & Jacob VanDrunen

Abstract in alt text or read the full paper here: www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/...

#philsci #philsky
ABSTRACT. Signalling games are useful for understanding how language emerges. In the standard models, the dynamics in some sense already know what the signals are, even if they do not yet have meaning. In this article, we relax this assumption and develop a simple model we call an ‘attention game’, in which agents have to learn which feature of their environment is the signal. We demonstrate that simple reinforcement learning agents can still learn to coordinate in contexts where the agents do not already know what the signal is, and the other features in the agents’ environment are uncorrelated with the signal. Furthermore, we show that in cases where other features are correlated with the signal, there is a surprising trade-off between learning what the signal is and success in action. We show that the mutual information between a signal and a feature plays a key role in governing the accuracy and attention of the agent.
September 15, 2025 at 9:15 AM
thebjps.bsky.social
Knowledge of the Quantum Domain: An Overlap Strategy
– James Fraser & Peter Vickers

Abstract in alt text or read the full paper here:
www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/...

#philsci #philsky
ABSTRACT. The existence of multiple interpretations of quantum mechanics appears to pose a serious challenge for knowledge claims about the quantum domain. Hoefer argues that a scientific realist epistemology must be abandoned in this context, while Callender argues that the realist’s only option is to break the underdetermination between rival interpretations by appealing to extra-empirical virtues. We develop a different response to the quantum underdetermination problem based on identifying statements about the unobservable that all the major ontic interpretations of quantum mechanics agree on. It is commonly believed that Everettian, Bohmian, and GRW (Ghirardi–Rimini–Weber) quantum mechanics share nothing but empirical content. We argue that while they say very different things about the fundamental nature of quantum systems, they can be understood as agreeing on a plethora of more abstract theoretical claims. In our view, focusing on this descriptive overlap represents the most promising strategy for defending knowledge claims in the quantum domain. We close by considering how this overlap strategy relates to working posits formulations of scientific realism.
September 12, 2025 at 9:45 AM
thebjps.bsky.social
Host Specificity in Biological Control
– Thomas Blanchard

Abstract in alt text or read it here:
www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/...

#philsci #philsky
ABSTRACT. In recent years, the notion of biological specificity has attracted significant philosophical attention. This article focuses on host specificity, a kind of biological specificity that has not yet been discussed by philosophers, and which concerns the extent to which a species is selective in the range of other species it exploits for feeding and/or reproduction. Host specificity is an important notion in ecology, where it plays a variety of theoretical roles. Here, I focus on the role of host specificity in biological control, a field of applied ecology that deals with the suppression of pests through the use of living organisms. Examining host specificity and its role in biological control yields several valuable contributions to our understanding of biological specificity. In particular, I argue that host specificity cannot be fully understood in terms of Woodward’s well-known account of causal specificity. To adequately account for host specificity, we need a notion of causal specificity that takes into consideration the extent to which a variable’s effects are similar to one another—a dimension not captured in Woodward’s account. In addition, the literature on host specificity in biological control highlights certain aspects in which causally specific relationships can be practically valuable—aspects that have not yet been addressed in philosophical discussions of specificity. The literature also reveals that, in certain contexts, specificity can hinder rather than foster effective control, thus leading to a nuanced assessment of the practical value of specific causes.
September 11, 2025 at 9:15 AM
thebjps.bsky.social
Depression as a Disorder of Consciousness
– Cecily Whiteley

Abstract in alt text or read it here:
www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/...

#philsci #philsky
ABSTRACT. First-person reports of major depressive disorder reveal that when an individual becomes depressed a profound change or ‘shift’ to one’s conscious experience occurs. The depressed person reports that something fundamental to their experience has been disturbed or shifted, a change associated with the common but elusive claim that when depressed one finds oneself in a ‘different world’ detached from reality and other people. Existing attempts to utilize these phenomenological observations in a psychiatric context are challenged by the fact that this experiential ‘shift’ characteristic of depression appears mysterious and resists analysis in scientific terms. This article offers a way out of this predicament. The hypothesis proposed is that when an individual becomes depressed, the individual departs from a state of ordinary wakeful consciousness and enters a distinctive global state of consciousness akin to dreaming and the psychedelic state. After unpacking and motivating this hypothesis in the context of research in consciousness science, I outline two of its important implications for the neurobiology of depression and psychedelic psychiatry. The upshot is a promising and conceptually well-motivated hypothesis about depression that is apt for empirical uptake and development.
September 10, 2025 at 9:15 AM
thebjps.bsky.social
From the new issue

The Literalist Fallacy and the Free Energy Principle: Model Building, Scientific Realism & Instrumentalism
– Michael David Kirchhoff, Julian Kiverstein & Ian Robertson

Read it here:
www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/...

#philsci #philsky
ABSTRACT. Disagreement about how best to think of the relation between theories and the realities they represent has a long-standing and venerable history. We take up this debate in relation to active inference models based on the free energy principle (FEP)—a contemporary framework in computational neuroscience, theoretical biology, and the philosophy of cognitive science. Active inference under the FEP is a very ambitious form of model-based science, being applied to explain everything from neurobiological structure and function to the biology of self-organization. In this context, some find apparent discrepancies between the map (active inference models based on the FEP) and the territory (target systems) to be a compelling reason to defend instrumentalism about such models. We take this to be misguided. We identify an important fallacy made by those defending instrumentalism about active inference models. We call it the literalist fallacy: this is the fallacy of accepting or affirming instrumentalism based on the claim that the properties of active inference models based on the FEP do not literally map onto real-world target systems. We conclude that a version of scientific realism about active inference models under the FEP is a live and tenable option.
September 8, 2025 at 9:15 AM
thebjps.bsky.social
Time Reversal Invariance and Ontology
– Ward Struyve

Abstract in alt text or read it here:
www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/...

#philsci #philsky
ABSTRACT. Albert and Callender have challenged the received view that theories like classical electrodynamics and non-relativistic quantum mechanics are time-reversal invariant. They claim that time reversal should correspond to the mere reversal of the temporal order of the instantaneous states without any accompanying change of the instantaneous state itself, as in the standard view. Given this, they claim that these theories are not time-reversal invariant. The view of Albert and Callender has been much criticized, with many philosophers arguing that time reversal may correspond to more than the reversal of the temporal order. This article will not so much engage with that aspect of the debate, but rather deflate the disagreement by exploiting the ontological underdetermination. Namely, it will be argued that with a suitable choice of ontology, these theories are in fact time-reversal invariant in the sense of Albert and Callender, in agreement with the standard view.
September 5, 2025 at 9:45 AM
thebjps.bsky.social
A Complementary Account of Scientific Modelling
– Martin Zach

Abstract in alt text or read it here:
www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/...

#philsci #philsky
ABSTRACT. According to a widely held view, scientific modelling consists of entertaining a set of model descriptions that specify a model. Rather than studying the phenomenon of interest directly, scientists investigate the phenomenon indirectly via a model in the hope of learning about some of the phenomenon’s features. I call this view the description-driven modelling (DDM) account. I argue that although it is an accurate description of much of scientific research, the DDM account is found wanting as regards the mechanistic modelling found in many branches of biology. By analysing research practices in cancer immunology concerning the development of mechanistic models of the process of cancer metastasis, this article presents and argues for a complementary account of scientific modelling, herein called the experimentation-driven modelling (EDM) account. In EDM, scientists investigate a set of experimental systems and then integrate the results obtained from experiments into a mechanistic model. While EDM shares some key features with DDM, the two are epistemically very different approaches to research.
September 4, 2025 at 9:15 AM
thebjps.bsky.social
The Comparison of Inequality Measurements across Countries and Time
– Alessandra Basso

Read it here: www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/...

#philsci #philsky
ABSTRACT. Comparing inequality across countries and over time is difficult because national inequality measurements are based on country-specific methods and presuppositions, which also vary over time within the same country. Researchers interested in comparative analysis often rely on harmonized data sets that express heterogeneous measurements in homogeneous terms. Economists, however, have warned against the uncritical employment of harmonized outcomes, by showing that they might bring about misleading conclusions. This article provides a new way of looking at harmonizing methods that overcomes some of their limitations and clarifies the conditions under which harmonizations are legitimate. By drawing on recent philosophical literature on measurement, I argue that harmonizations can be interpreted as ex post corrections to the measurement outcomes, which harmonize the presuppositions and adjust the outcomes accordingly, without intervening in the actual procedure. This interpretation provides the necessary framework for evaluating the effects of these adjustments on the accuracy of harmonized outcomes and their meaningfulness. Based on this framework, the article pursues two claims. The first is that harmonizing methods can be improved by modifying some of the assumptions on which they rely so as to mitigate their detrimental effects on measurement accuracy. The second claim is that harmonizations are legitimate only when they modify the original presuppositions without compromising the meaningfulness of the outcomes.
September 3, 2025 at 9:15 AM
thebjps.bsky.social
The One Magic Wave: Quantum Monism Meets Wavefunction Realism
– Claudio Calosi

Abstract in alt text or read it here:
www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/...

#philsci #philsky
ABSTRACT. This article provides a systematic assessment of wavefunction mereological priority monism, the combination of priority mereological monism and wavefunction realism. Such a combination has been recently discussed and defended both in philosophy of physics and metaphysics. I argue that such a combination threatens to undermine the master arguments in favour of its components. Furthermore, wavefunction mereological priority monism entails controversial consequences for both mereology and location. In light of the above, I explore different ways to resist the arguments and different combinations of monism and realism about the wavefunction.
September 1, 2025 at 9:15 AM
thebjps.bsky.social
The Interdisciplinary Entanglement of Characterization and Explanation
– Max Dresow & Alan C Love

Abstract in alt text or read it for free here:
www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/...

#philsci #philsky
ABSTRACT. Philosophers have traditionally focused on the nature of scientific explanation while ignoring the process by which features of the world are formulated as discrete explanantia and explananda. However, the characterization of phenomena is an important activity in its own right, and is intertwined with evaluations of the appropriateness and sufficiency of explanatory strategies. We explore this entanglement of characterization and explanation using an extended case study from deep time: research into the Cambrian explosion. Our analysis focuses on three spheres of research that together illustrate key features of characterization for complex phenomena, including open-endedness, interdisciplinarity, and a concern with explananda and explanantia alike. In addition, they suggest a pair of substantive claims: (1) characterizations of complex phenomena are frequently contested along several dimensions of descriptive understanding, and (2) the dynamics of characterization for complex phenomena are poorly described by models that treat recharacterization primarily as a response to explanatory failures.
August 29, 2025 at 9:45 AM
thebjps.bsky.social
This issue's Editors' Choice paper:

Inference to the Best Contradiction?
– Sam Baron

Abstract in alt text or read it for free here:
www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/...

#philsci #philsky
ABSTRACT. I argue that there is nothing about the structure of inference to the best explanation (IBE) that prevents it from establishing a contradiction in general, though there are some potential limitations on when it can be used for this purpose. Studying the relationship between IBE and contradictions is worthwhile for three reasons. First, it enhances our understanding of IBE. We see that, in many cases, IBE does not require explanations to be consistent, though there are some cases where consistency may be required. Second, the argument has implications for the debate over scientific realism. Many scientific theories appear to be inconsistent. The best argument for scientific realism, however, appeals to IBE. My argument thus shows that a certain kind of realist faces a threat from inconsistent theories. Third, the argument is important for dialetheism. Dialetheists maintain that some contradictions are true. Many of the arguments in favour of dialetheism appeal to explanatory considerations. What I say here provides support for defending dialethism using an IBE-based methodology.
August 28, 2025 at 9:15 AM
thebjps.bsky.social
Latest issue of the BJPS out now: Signals! Inferences! Ontology! Models! Measurement! Explanation! Also including everyone’s favourite: Fallacies! (May include magic.)
Read it here: www.journals.uchicago.edu/toc/bjps/cur...

#philsci #philsky
BJPS Volume 76, Issue 3 Table of Contents The Interdisciplinary Entanglement of Characterization and Explanation By Max Dresow & Alan C Love The One Magic Wave: Quantum Monism Meets Wavefunction Realism By Claudio Calosi The Comparison of Inequality Measurements across Countries and Time By Alessandra Basso A Complementary Account of Scientific Modelling:Modelling Mechanisms in Cancer Immunology By Martin Zach Time Reversal Invariance and Ontology By Ward Struyve The Literalist Fallacy and the Free Energy Principle: Model Building, Scientific Realism, and Instrumentalism By Michael Kirchhoff, Julian Kiverstein & Ian Robertson Depression as a Disorder of Consciousness By Cecily Whiteley Host Specificity in Biological Control By Thomas Blanchard Knowledge of the Quantum Domain: An Overlap Strategy By James D Fraser & Peter Vickers Sifting the Signal from the Noise By Daniel A Herrmann & Jacob VanDrunen Editors’ Choice Article: Inference to the Best Contradiction? By Sam Baron Statistical Autonomous Explanations and the Patterns of Nature: A Modified Account By Travis Holmes & André I Ariew
August 27, 2025 at 9:15 AM
thebjps.bsky.social
Just accepted:

Situated Cognition in Early Modern Experimentation: The Case of Compelled Assent
– Kirsten Walsh, Adrian Currie & Tom Roberts

Abstract in alt text or read the full paper here:

#philsci #philsky #hps
ABSTRACT. The early moderns surely didn’t defend an embodied, extended, embedded, or enacted conception of the mind, but we aim to show that this perspective can make sense of some of their practices; in particular, the epistemology of early modern experimentation. Focusing on Newton’s early optical work, we argue that the epistemic warrant he claims for his experimental results turns crucially on how the experimenter is situated towards gaining particular kinds of maker’s knowledge. Our account provides one answer to a long-standing puzzle regarding Newton’s method: his appeal to ‘compelled assent’ as an epistemic standard. We thus provide both a novel interpretation of Newton’s epistemology and a proof of concept towards applying tools from contemporary philosophy of mind to the history of science.
August 25, 2025 at 9:15 AM