Gönül Tol
@gonultol.bsky.social
Director of Middle East Institute's Turkish Program / Author of Erdoğan’s War: A Strongman’s Struggle at Home and in Syria.
In a geoeconomically fragmenting world, it is interesting to watch what actually counts as “power” for middle powers like Turkey. www.state.gov/releases/off...
The United States to Host Critical Minerals Ministerial - United States Department of State
On February 4, 2026, Secretary of State Marco Rubio will host the inaugural Critical Minerals Ministerial at the Department of State in Washington, D.C. The United States will welcome delegations from...
www.state.gov
February 10, 2026 at 9:56 PM
In a geoeconomically fragmenting world, it is interesting to watch what actually counts as “power” for middle powers like Turkey. www.state.gov/releases/off...
The Trump administration is trying to build a critical minerals trading bloc with allies—using tariffs to enforce minimum prices and push back against China’s grip on supply chains. It even hosted a summit in DC last week.
Turkey wasn’t invited. 1/2
Turkey wasn’t invited. 1/2
February 10, 2026 at 9:56 PM
The Trump administration is trying to build a critical minerals trading bloc with allies—using tariffs to enforce minimum prices and push back against China’s grip on supply chains. It even hosted a summit in DC last week.
Turkey wasn’t invited. 1/2
Turkey wasn’t invited. 1/2
Today, the same concept—rebranded as “strategic partnership”—is being celebrated. 4/4
February 8, 2026 at 3:28 PM
Today, the same concept—rebranded as “strategic partnership”—is being celebrated. 4/4
That phrase matters because it signals that on the most consequential issues nothing has fundamentally changed, the relationship remains transactional.
In 2005, when France and Germany floated the idea of a “privileged partnership” it sparked outrage in Turkey. 3/4
In 2005, when France and Germany floated the idea of a “privileged partnership” it sparked outrage in Turkey. 3/4
February 8, 2026 at 3:28 PM
That phrase matters because it signals that on the most consequential issues nothing has fundamentally changed, the relationship remains transactional.
In 2005, when France and Germany floated the idea of a “privileged partnership” it sparked outrage in Turkey. 3/4
In 2005, when France and Germany floated the idea of a “privileged partnership” it sparked outrage in Turkey. 3/4
None of Turkey’s core demands—modernizing the Customs Union, easing visa restrictions for Turkish citizens, or access to SAFE (let alone a credible membership horizon)—have moved an inch.
If anything, the key takeaway from the visit was the EU’s repeated emphasis on a “strategic partnership.” 2/4
If anything, the key takeaway from the visit was the EU’s repeated emphasis on a “strategic partnership.” 2/4
February 8, 2026 at 3:28 PM
None of Turkey’s core demands—modernizing the Customs Union, easing visa restrictions for Turkish citizens, or access to SAFE (let alone a credible membership horizon)—have moved an inch.
If anything, the key takeaway from the visit was the EU’s repeated emphasis on a “strategic partnership.” 2/4
If anything, the key takeaway from the visit was the EU’s repeated emphasis on a “strategic partnership.” 2/4
EU commissioner Marta Kos’s visit to Turkey—and her warm rhetoric about Turkey’s growing importance and the EU’s need to deepen ties—has had the intended effect. In Ankar, it’s being hailed as the start of a new chapter in Turkey–EU relations. But that reading is far too optimistic. 1/4
February 8, 2026 at 3:28 PM
EU commissioner Marta Kos’s visit to Turkey—and her warm rhetoric about Turkey’s growing importance and the EU’s need to deepen ties—has had the intended effect. In Ankar, it’s being hailed as the start of a new chapter in Turkey–EU relations. But that reading is far too optimistic. 1/4
slow erasure of a shared cultural symbol. The building was left to decay for years, then demolished in 2018 and rebuilt in 2021. It was part of a broader effort to challenge what Erdogan sees as the cultural dominance of secular elites and to leave his own imprint.
February 2, 2026 at 3:06 PM
slow erasure of a shared cultural symbol. The building was left to decay for years, then demolished in 2018 and rebuilt in 2021. It was part of a broader effort to challenge what Erdogan sees as the cultural dominance of secular elites and to leave his own imprint.
Trump’s fixation on the Kennedy Center echoes Erdogan’s obsession with the Atatürk Cultural Center (AKM) — a modernist landmark and a symbol of the secular republic founded by Atatürk.
In 2008, Erdoğan shut the AKM under the pretext of “renovation” and what followed was a ++
In 2008, Erdoğan shut the AKM under the pretext of “renovation” and what followed was a ++
Breaking news: President Trump said that the Kennedy Center could temporarily close for roughly two years to undergo construction.
https://wapo.st/49VsdCk
https://wapo.st/49VsdCk
February 2, 2026 at 3:06 PM
Trump’s fixation on the Kennedy Center echoes Erdogan’s obsession with the Atatürk Cultural Center (AKM) — a modernist landmark and a symbol of the secular republic founded by Atatürk.
In 2008, Erdoğan shut the AKM under the pretext of “renovation” and what followed was a ++
In 2008, Erdoğan shut the AKM under the pretext of “renovation” and what followed was a ++
Reposted by Gönül Tol
📌Trump Orta Doğu'da Türkiye'yi dışlıyor mu?
📌Suriye'de Amerikan diplomasisi ile askeriyesi karşı karşıya mı geldi?
📌Trump İran'ı vurma emri verir mi?
Gönül Tol @gonultol.bsky.social ile konuşuyoruz.
Abone olmayı unutmayın!
www.youtube.com/watch?v=WRJ-...
📌Suriye'de Amerikan diplomasisi ile askeriyesi karşı karşıya mı geldi?
📌Trump İran'ı vurma emri verir mi?
Gönül Tol @gonultol.bsky.social ile konuşuyoruz.
Abone olmayı unutmayın!
www.youtube.com/watch?v=WRJ-...
Trump İran'ı vurur mu, Orta Doğu'dan ne istiyor? Gönül Tol ile konuşuyoruz.
YouTube video by Hediye Levent
www.youtube.com
January 29, 2026 at 12:52 PM
📌Trump Orta Doğu'da Türkiye'yi dışlıyor mu?
📌Suriye'de Amerikan diplomasisi ile askeriyesi karşı karşıya mı geldi?
📌Trump İran'ı vurma emri verir mi?
Gönül Tol @gonultol.bsky.social ile konuşuyoruz.
Abone olmayı unutmayın!
www.youtube.com/watch?v=WRJ-...
📌Suriye'de Amerikan diplomasisi ile askeriyesi karşı karşıya mı geldi?
📌Trump İran'ı vurma emri verir mi?
Gönül Tol @gonultol.bsky.social ile konuşuyoruz.
Abone olmayı unutmayın!
www.youtube.com/watch?v=WRJ-...
Reposted by Gönül Tol
🧵 New piece: What Syria’s fast-moving map changes mean for Turkey’s PKK push—and the Turkey–Israel rivalry inside Syria.
1/ Post-Assad Syria posed Ankara two immediate problems: Kurdish autonomy along Turkey’s border + Israeli actions Ankara saw as undercutting its goals. (1)
1/ Post-Assad Syria posed Ankara two immediate problems: Kurdish autonomy along Turkey’s border + Israeli actions Ankara saw as undercutting its goals. (1)
January 27, 2026 at 5:51 PM
🧵 New piece: What Syria’s fast-moving map changes mean for Turkey’s PKK push—and the Turkey–Israel rivalry inside Syria.
1/ Post-Assad Syria posed Ankara two immediate problems: Kurdish autonomy along Turkey’s border + Israeli actions Ankara saw as undercutting its goals. (1)
1/ Post-Assad Syria posed Ankara two immediate problems: Kurdish autonomy along Turkey’s border + Israeli actions Ankara saw as undercutting its goals. (1)
Reposted by Gönül Tol
Ankara’s double win: Kurds, Israel, and the new Syria mei.edu/publication/...
By @gonultol.bsky.social #Syria #Turkey #Kurds #Israel
By @gonultol.bsky.social #Syria #Turkey #Kurds #Israel
January 28, 2026 at 6:25 AM
Ankara’s double win: Kurds, Israel, and the new Syria mei.edu/publication/...
By @gonultol.bsky.social #Syria #Turkey #Kurds #Israel
By @gonultol.bsky.social #Syria #Turkey #Kurds #Israel
Reposted by Gönül Tol
Good on Syria, and the balance between Turkish and Israeli influence.
🧵 New piece: What Syria’s fast-moving map changes mean for Turkey’s PKK push—and the Turkey–Israel rivalry inside Syria.
1/ Post-Assad Syria posed Ankara two immediate problems: Kurdish autonomy along Turkey’s border + Israeli actions Ankara saw as undercutting its goals. (1)
1/ Post-Assad Syria posed Ankara two immediate problems: Kurdish autonomy along Turkey’s border + Israeli actions Ankara saw as undercutting its goals. (1)
January 27, 2026 at 6:21 PM
Good on Syria, and the balance between Turkish and Israeli influence.
to Turkey’s tens of thousands of troops inside Syria.
7/ Israel’s dilemma: If no deal is reached with Damascus—and Israel maintains its post–December 8 presence in Syria—Damascus may feel increasingly exposed and respond by deepening its cooperation with Ankara.
Full piece here 👇
7/ Israel’s dilemma: If no deal is reached with Damascus—and Israel maintains its post–December 8 presence in Syria—Damascus may feel increasingly exposed and respond by deepening its cooperation with Ankara.
Full piece here 👇
Ankara’s double win: Kurds, Israel, and the new Syria - Middle East Institute
mei.edu
January 27, 2026 at 5:51 PM
to Turkey’s tens of thousands of troops inside Syria.
7/ Israel’s dilemma: If no deal is reached with Damascus—and Israel maintains its post–December 8 presence in Syria—Damascus may feel increasingly exposed and respond by deepening its cooperation with Ankara.
Full piece here 👇
7/ Israel’s dilemma: If no deal is reached with Damascus—and Israel maintains its post–December 8 presence in Syria—Damascus may feel increasingly exposed and respond by deepening its cooperation with Ankara.
Full piece here 👇
Israel may find it harder to resist U.S. pressure to compromise.
6/ Ankara’s view: once the SDF issue is settled, a division of influence (Israel in the south, Turkey in the north) is acceptable—maybe even advantageous. If Israeli forces withdraw, scrutiny will inevitably shift (4)
6/ Ankara’s view: once the SDF issue is settled, a division of influence (Israel in the south, Turkey in the north) is acceptable—maybe even advantageous. If Israeli forces withdraw, scrutiny will inevitably shift (4)
January 27, 2026 at 5:51 PM
Israel may find it harder to resist U.S. pressure to compromise.
6/ Ankara’s view: once the SDF issue is settled, a division of influence (Israel in the south, Turkey in the north) is acceptable—maybe even advantageous. If Israeli forces withdraw, scrutiny will inevitably shift (4)
6/ Ankara’s view: once the SDF issue is settled, a division of influence (Israel in the south, Turkey in the north) is acceptable—maybe even advantageous. If Israeli forces withdraw, scrutiny will inevitably shift (4)
4/ But “PKK disarmament process is dead” is premature: Öcalan likely sticks with disarmament talks unless violence against Kurds spirals out of control.
5/ Israel file: Ankara is in a stronger position than before. With Sharaa gaining ground—and Trump seemingly backing him— (3)
5/ Israel file: Ankara is in a stronger position than before. With Sharaa gaining ground—and Trump seemingly backing him— (3)
January 27, 2026 at 5:51 PM
4/ But “PKK disarmament process is dead” is premature: Öcalan likely sticks with disarmament talks unless violence against Kurds spirals out of control.
5/ Israel file: Ankara is in a stronger position than before. With Sharaa gaining ground—and Trump seemingly backing him— (3)
5/ Israel file: Ankara is in a stronger position than before. With Sharaa gaining ground—and Trump seemingly backing him— (3)
2/ The latest shifts suggest Trump envoy Tom Barrack helped tip the balance toward Ankara on both fronts.
3/ PKK file: the SDF’s collapse + the end of the Kurdish autonomy project strengthen Erdoğan’s hand at home and weaken Öcalan’s leverage. (2)
3/ PKK file: the SDF’s collapse + the end of the Kurdish autonomy project strengthen Erdoğan’s hand at home and weaken Öcalan’s leverage. (2)
January 27, 2026 at 5:51 PM
2/ The latest shifts suggest Trump envoy Tom Barrack helped tip the balance toward Ankara on both fronts.
3/ PKK file: the SDF’s collapse + the end of the Kurdish autonomy project strengthen Erdoğan’s hand at home and weaken Öcalan’s leverage. (2)
3/ PKK file: the SDF’s collapse + the end of the Kurdish autonomy project strengthen Erdoğan’s hand at home and weaken Öcalan’s leverage. (2)
🧵 New piece: What Syria’s fast-moving map changes mean for Turkey’s PKK push—and the Turkey–Israel rivalry inside Syria.
1/ Post-Assad Syria posed Ankara two immediate problems: Kurdish autonomy along Turkey’s border + Israeli actions Ankara saw as undercutting its goals. (1)
1/ Post-Assad Syria posed Ankara two immediate problems: Kurdish autonomy along Turkey’s border + Israeli actions Ankara saw as undercutting its goals. (1)
January 27, 2026 at 5:51 PM
🧵 New piece: What Syria’s fast-moving map changes mean for Turkey’s PKK push—and the Turkey–Israel rivalry inside Syria.
1/ Post-Assad Syria posed Ankara two immediate problems: Kurdish autonomy along Turkey’s border + Israeli actions Ankara saw as undercutting its goals. (1)
1/ Post-Assad Syria posed Ankara two immediate problems: Kurdish autonomy along Turkey’s border + Israeli actions Ankara saw as undercutting its goals. (1)
Here is the most striking thing: Rojava’s rise helped Erdoğan consolidate power at home—and its unraveling looks set to bolster his grip on power well beyond 2028. 4/4
January 19, 2026 at 3:58 PM
Here is the most striking thing: Rojava’s rise helped Erdoğan consolidate power at home—and its unraveling looks set to bolster his grip on power well beyond 2028. 4/4
presidential rule and the accumulation of unprecedented power. For the Kurds, by contrast, dismissing Washington’s warnings contributed to the unraveling of what many saw as their greatest achievement: Rojava. 3/4
January 19, 2026 at 3:58 PM
presidential rule and the accumulation of unprecedented power. For the Kurds, by contrast, dismissing Washington’s warnings contributed to the unraveling of what many saw as their greatest achievement: Rojava. 3/4
Yet their shared skepticism toward US engagement produced starkly different outcomes. President Erdoğan skillfully used US–SDF cooperation to stoke anti-American sentiment and nationalist fears, forging a durable alliance with the nationalist MHP that enabled his long-sought shift to 2/4
January 19, 2026 at 3:58 PM
Yet their shared skepticism toward US engagement produced starkly different outcomes. President Erdoğan skillfully used US–SDF cooperation to stoke anti-American sentiment and nationalist fears, forging a durable alliance with the nationalist MHP that enabled his long-sought shift to 2/4
Since the United States began airdropping weapons to Syrian militias fighting ISIS in Kobane in 2014, American officials have repeatedly insisted that the partnership was “transactional and temporary.” Two actors never accepted that claim: Turkey and the Kurds. 1/4
January 19, 2026 at 3:58 PM
Since the United States began airdropping weapons to Syrian militias fighting ISIS in Kobane in 2014, American officials have repeatedly insisted that the partnership was “transactional and temporary.” Two actors never accepted that claim: Turkey and the Kurds. 1/4
New reports that Ankara is mediating between Hezbollah and Damascus have sparked a fresh debate: is Turkey emerging as Hezbollah’s new partner? Several experts—including me—weighed in. Read the full debate 👇 amwaj.media/en/debate/de...
Debate: Will Hezbollah have a new partner in Turkey? | Amwaj.media
The war in Gaza, Hezbollah's setbacks in Lebanon and the fall of former president Bashar Al-Assad in Syria have all diminished Iran's strategic depth in the Levant. What was once the core of Tehran's ...
amwaj.media
January 17, 2026 at 2:40 PM
New reports that Ankara is mediating between Hezbollah and Damascus have sparked a fresh debate: is Turkey emerging as Hezbollah’s new partner? Several experts—including me—weighed in. Read the full debate 👇 amwaj.media/en/debate/de...
Bottom line: Turkey’s strategy is not to choose between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, but to balance both. And the Turkey–Saudi–Pakistan defense pact is far less ambitious than a “Muslim NATO." You can read the full piece here. mei.edu/publication/...
What Ankara Sees in Riyadh — and Why It Still Needs Abu Dhabi - Middle East Institute
mei.edu
January 17, 2026 at 2:38 PM
Bottom line: Turkey’s strategy is not to choose between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, but to balance both. And the Turkey–Saudi–Pakistan defense pact is far less ambitious than a “Muslim NATO." You can read the full piece here. mei.edu/publication/...
corporate partnerships —giving the UAE greater structural leverage. Ankara is also acutely aware of Abu Dhabi’s lobbying clout in Washington, which Turkish officials believe has previously worked against Turkey’s interests.(5/6)
January 17, 2026 at 2:38 PM
corporate partnerships —giving the UAE greater structural leverage. Ankara is also acutely aware of Abu Dhabi’s lobbying clout in Washington, which Turkish officials believe has previously worked against Turkey’s interests.(5/6)
not a binding commitment to automatic military action. Crucially, Turkey has no interest in sidelining the UAE. While Saudi capital has helped Erdoğan at key moments, Abu Dhabi’s financial footprint is far more deeply embedded in Turkey’s economy—from currency swaps and capital markets to (4/6)
January 17, 2026 at 2:38 PM
not a binding commitment to automatic military action. Crucially, Turkey has no interest in sidelining the UAE. While Saudi capital has helped Erdoğan at key moments, Abu Dhabi’s financial footprint is far more deeply embedded in Turkey’s economy—from currency swaps and capital markets to (4/6)