Hybridity in Privateering- Pt 2 – Lion Hunters and Pirate Ports - Global Maritime History
Continuing on from the first part of this series, we shift our gaze away from the general impact on war economies of both the host and enemy nation to the roles in which privateers operate. There is a plethora of different ways in which privateers fit into the battlefield itself. As the outfitting of these ships could range from simply ten men on a whaleboat with a swivel gun all the way up to custom built vessels that British captains would recognize as frigates, privateer tactics ran the gambit from ambushes utilizing false flags to direct confrontation with naval vessels. This mix of both unconventional and conventional capabilities naturally make them a hybrid threat. Privateers can share aspects of different fighting forces with which many are familiar. They can be as business oriented as mercenaries, with money being a primary motivator in what they will do. Alongside that, these more professional privateers are seen to go after vulnerable military ships, rather than simply merchants. On the other side of the metaphorical coin, Privateers can function like guerilla fighters. They can be under-gunned and opportunistic while also being hard to tackle and deal with for a conventional force. These things make a privateer a hard thing to categorize as simply an analog to something on land, as they can often fill multiple roles at once. This section will attempt to highlight their part in hybrid warfare, while also demonstrating how these different roles a privateer could fill often clashed or melded together. Hybrid Warfare: Lion Hunters It was April 14th, 1781. Three British Naval vessels exited the Potomac River. A soft warm glow may have been seen, specifically on the Maryland side of the river. One could likely spot plumes of smoke rising out from smoldering husks of buildings. The three vessels had made their way down the river, burning plantations and homes along the way. Captain Thomas Graves of the H.M.S Savage had led the force. Graves had coincidentally encountered the Virginian plantation of George Washington, Mount Vernon, which at the time was being managed by his cousin Lund Washington. After discussing with Lund, Graves promised he would not burn down the arch-traitor’s home. Lund had been so thankful that he had sent sheep, hogs, and other things to the British sailors. When George Washington heard that his home had been spared, though, he considered it an insult. He stated in a letter to Lund that “It would have been a less painful circumstance to me, to have heard, that in consequence of your noncompliance with their request, they had burnt my House, & laid the plantation in ruins.” George Washington doubted their raiding would stop without “the arrival of a superior naval force.” While the Savage’s raid along the Potomac was quite successful, the British sloop-of-war would run into a superior naval force in September of 1781. Still, it would not be a ship from the Continental Navy or the French Navy. September 6th, 1781. Captain Charles Sterling held fast to one of the railings near the helm of the Savage, waiting for one of his subordinates to hand him his spyglass. They were about 35 miles from Charleston and had just encountered an American vessel. As he was handed his spyglass, he attempted to appraise the vessel. With the intelligence he currently had, he believed it to be an American privateer with only 20 nine-pounders. It was barreling full sail towards them, seeming to think it could go toe-to-toe with the Savage. Likely trusting in his ship’s sixteen six-pounder guns and the fact it was purposefully built for war, he went to meet the vessel. He soon realized his catastrophic mistake as the Savage drew closer. It was the Congress, one of the Americans’ most fearsome privateer vessels. One of which bristled with over twenty twelve-pounders on its main deck alone. Her majesty’s vessel was no longer a hunting lion but rather a lion being hunted. Stirling watched as, in an instant, the Congress tore into the Savage. Within the first hour of the four-hour engagement, Stirling saw crucial components, cannons, and crew of the Savage being blasted away. The Congress would eventually capture the Savage, with the prize’s mast threatening to fall and over thirty-four of its crew, including Sterling, wounded. This first account highlights a few aspects of privateers. First, the more mercenary character of a privateer comes out. For a privateer vessel that was large enough, a British warship represented a target that was even juicier than your average merchant vessel. This was due to the American government at the time being entitled to half of the value of a captured merchant ship but letting a privateer keep the full value of any enemy naval ship they captured. With a bigger payday on the table, certain privateers were much more willing to enter direct combat with an enemy’s navy in a conventional, albeit opportune, way. It is hard to argue that there are few things more conventional than foregoing the false flag strategy that so many privateers liked to use in favor of just charging straight at a British warship in the hope of a payday. Though, unlike mercenaries, they were not paid for simply the battle, but rather their plunder after it. Unfortunately for the case of the Congress, they were unable to get their prize back to port as it was recaptured by the British. Yet, that is just at the level of a battle. At a grander strategic level, something else is revealed by this account. While the Congress had acted conventionally by charging at the Savage outside of Charleston, its home port was all the way in Pennsylvania. In terms of good cruising grounds for British merchant ships, few would think the South Carolinian port of Charleston to be a place for such clientele. Whether or not the Congress had specifically gone down to Charleston to hunt British warships is unknown, but one would wager that it is unlikely. Considering that the British warship had […]