Willem Sleegers
@willemsleegers.bsky.social
Methodologist at Statistics Netherlands | Tilburg University | Website: https://www.willemsleegers.com
Yeah are they doing much? Either way there are issues with how those measures are presented by some psychologists. And the trouble is you need to basically become a psychologist yourself to figure out what to believe about these things.
November 7, 2025 at 8:08 PM
Yeah are they doing much? Either way there are issues with how those measures are presented by some psychologists. And the trouble is you need to basically become a psychologist yourself to figure out what to believe about these things.
To be clear, my view is not based entirely on our replication study. It’s mostly based on an assessment of the literature as a whole (like we kinda do in our Reply to the commentaries). And yeah, I’m skeptical of a lot as a result. Even some of the things you mention.
November 7, 2025 at 7:30 PM
To be clear, my view is not based entirely on our replication study. It’s mostly based on an assessment of the literature as a whole (like we kinda do in our Reply to the commentaries). And yeah, I’m skeptical of a lot as a result. Even some of the things you mention.
Not valid as a measure of prejudice, which yeah, it’s a tough concept but I’d be very hesitant to call it anything close to prejudice when it doesn’t seem to be correlated (strongly) with explicit measures of prejudice. And I would not call having associations anything like prejudice.
November 7, 2025 at 7:22 PM
Not valid as a measure of prejudice, which yeah, it’s a tough concept but I’d be very hesitant to call it anything close to prejudice when it doesn’t seem to be correlated (strongly) with explicit measures of prejudice. And I would not call having associations anything like prejudice.
I’m critical of it being useful measures. They are very unreliable and also don’t even seem to be valid; I don’t think they measure prejudice.
November 7, 2025 at 6:41 PM
I’m critical of it being useful measures. They are very unreliable and also don’t even seem to be valid; I don’t think they measure prejudice.
Some other examples I took seriously or others believe in but shouldn't: implicit attitude measures, lie detection based on non-verbal cues, Marshmallow test, relationship between video games and aggression, stereotype threat, Stanford prison experiment, ego depletion. It's not nothing.
November 7, 2025 at 6:02 PM
Some other examples I took seriously or others believe in but shouldn't: implicit attitude measures, lie detection based on non-verbal cues, Marshmallow test, relationship between video games and aggression, stereotype threat, Stanford prison experiment, ego depletion. It's not nothing.
I would now also add cognitive dissonance to the list. And yeah, there are many other effects that you and I might not have believed, but if you read the textbooks, you can see others do and more will.
November 7, 2025 at 5:59 PM
I would now also add cognitive dissonance to the list. And yeah, there are many other effects that you and I might not have believed, but if you read the textbooks, you can see others do and more will.
Unconscious thought theory was a big one for me; I was explicitly taught it was true and had to change my mind. The same goes for priming being as influential as they said it was. Various smaller effects from textbooks I also initially took seriously, like strong effects of teacher expectations.
November 7, 2025 at 5:58 PM
Unconscious thought theory was a big one for me; I was explicitly taught it was true and had to change my mind. The same goes for priming being as influential as they said it was. Various smaller effects from textbooks I also initially took seriously, like strong effects of teacher expectations.
How so? It’s been a while for me too.
November 7, 2025 at 5:45 PM
How so? It’s been a while for me too.
Social psychology also has decades of p-hacking and publication bias. How can you tell the evidence base is solid? We’ve seen bad things happen to many theories and effects by now.
November 7, 2025 at 5:41 PM
Social psychology also has decades of p-hacking and publication bias. How can you tell the evidence base is solid? We’ve seen bad things happen to many theories and effects by now.
That, and the Kitayama paper, though I don’t put much credence on those papers alone. It’s mostly just random observations here and there, like having conversations with people (eg discussing the meat paradox, religion, font inconsistencies in slides :p)
November 7, 2025 at 5:39 PM
That, and the Kitayama paper, though I don’t put much credence on those papers alone. It’s mostly just random observations here and there, like having conversations with people (eg discussing the meat paradox, religion, font inconsistencies in slides :p)
I don’t think it’s strange. What I think is strange is the overconfidence in the theory. That confidence can’t come from the scientific literature.
November 7, 2025 at 5:33 PM
I don’t think it’s strange. What I think is strange is the overconfidence in the theory. That confidence can’t come from the scientific literature.
I think that's likely yes, though as noted by others, it does mean cognitive dissonance is a lot less interesting as a result. And I'm also curious about how universal it is, both in terms of culture, personality, and situation, since not everyone finds all inconsistencies aversive.
November 7, 2025 at 4:46 PM
I think that's likely yes, though as noted by others, it does mean cognitive dissonance is a lot less interesting as a result. And I'm also curious about how universal it is, both in terms of culture, personality, and situation, since not everyone finds all inconsistencies aversive.
By the latter 'literature' I mean non-scientific literature.
November 7, 2025 at 4:14 PM
By the latter 'literature' I mean non-scientific literature.
It's at stake because it stems from the studies that test these finicky manipulations and processes. I think that's a crucial point. Why do we tend to believe in CDT? Is it because of the literature (which consists of bad studies) or because of other sources (e.g., own experience, literature, etc.).
November 7, 2025 at 4:13 PM
It's at stake because it stems from the studies that test these finicky manipulations and processes. I think that's a crucial point. Why do we tend to believe in CDT? Is it because of the literature (which consists of bad studies) or because of other sources (e.g., own experience, literature, etc.).
I don't see how it should manipulate importance. The whole idea is that choice manipulates the attribution. If I had no choice, I can attribute my inconsistent behavior to something else, so I resolve the dissonance that way. With choice, you can't do that, so you need another strategy.
November 7, 2025 at 3:44 PM
I don't see how it should manipulate importance. The whole idea is that choice manipulates the attribution. If I had no choice, I can attribute my inconsistent behavior to something else, so I resolve the dissonance that way. With choice, you can't do that, so you need another strategy.
It's a good point. I think I'd be fine with bringing back that debate. I'm more worried about there not actually being effects to argue over or there being other explanations that are much less interesting (I see self-persuasion as less interesting, social psychologically speaking).
November 7, 2025 at 3:15 PM
It's a good point. I think I'd be fine with bringing back that debate. I'm more worried about there not actually being effects to argue over or there being other explanations that are much less interesting (I see self-persuasion as less interesting, social psychologically speaking).
So choice not working is, to me, a problem for everyone, unless you can argue that somehow manipulating choice is not a good way of manipulating dissonance (and argue why manipulating something like incentives does count as a good manipulation).
November 7, 2025 at 3:09 PM
So choice not working is, to me, a problem for everyone, unless you can argue that somehow manipulating choice is not a good way of manipulating dissonance (and argue why manipulating something like incentives does count as a good manipulation).
I'm quite confused by people making a big fuss over the role of choice. My view is that choice is simply one of the ways to manipulate dissonance (like incentives). It's not a theoretically distinct component that should be treated as like... a variant of CDT.
November 7, 2025 at 3:07 PM
I'm quite confused by people making a big fuss over the role of choice. My view is that choice is simply one of the ways to manipulate dissonance (like incentives). It's not a theoretically distinct component that should be treated as like... a variant of CDT.
My experience is that there are many people who don't like the affect measures so they would have blamed that. I would have very much liked to see the choice manipulation work over the affect measure; it would have been a win for the theory.
November 7, 2025 at 12:49 PM
My experience is that there are many people who don't like the affect measures so they would have blamed that. I would have very much liked to see the choice manipulation work over the affect measure; it would have been a win for the theory.
Yeah you can't expect to rule out all alternatives, but you need to rule out some in order to show the unique contribution of the theory (Festinger and Carlsmith were keenly aware of that in their seminal paper, but didn't run a high-quality study to actually rule it out).
November 7, 2025 at 12:12 PM
Yeah you can't expect to rule out all alternatives, but you need to rule out some in order to show the unique contribution of the theory (Festinger and Carlsmith were keenly aware of that in their seminal paper, but didn't run a high-quality study to actually rule it out).
Then you're just constructing a non-falsifiable theory.
November 7, 2025 at 12:07 PM
Then you're just constructing a non-falsifiable theory.
There's an enormous literature of underpowered studies with a lot of potential for publication bias. There are no large-scaled studies like ours that clearly rule out the alternative explanations.
November 7, 2025 at 12:05 PM
There's an enormous literature of underpowered studies with a lot of potential for publication bias. There are no large-scaled studies like ours that clearly rule out the alternative explanations.
With the whole team of course. =)
November 7, 2025 at 12:02 PM
With the whole team of course. =)
The whole idea about the paradigm we tested is that manipulation choice rules out the alternative explanations, so it can provide support for the theory, but we didn't find that. We only found effects that can be explained by alternative processes. (Also, I read the paper since I wrote it)
November 7, 2025 at 12:01 PM
The whole idea about the paradigm we tested is that manipulation choice rules out the alternative explanations, so it can provide support for the theory, but we didn't find that. We only found effects that can be explained by alternative processes. (Also, I read the paper since I wrote it)
The finding that an inconsistency produces negative affect is not enough. Nor is attitude change enough. People can feel uncomfortable arguing to raise tuition because they don't want that to happen. They can also change their attitude afterwards because they can convince themselves: self-persuasion
November 7, 2025 at 11:59 AM
The finding that an inconsistency produces negative affect is not enough. Nor is attitude change enough. People can feel uncomfortable arguing to raise tuition because they don't want that to happen. They can also change their attitude afterwards because they can convince themselves: self-persuasion