... from state-backed consumer boycotts to formal export controls — all manually coded and regularly updated.

Visualize the full spectrum of PRC sanctions at: www.chinasanctionsmonitor.com

Economist: www.economist.com/china/2025/0...

If you're interested in China’s latest moves in the sanctions space, have a look at our new resource, the China Sanctions Monitor: chinasanctionsmonitor.com

Joint statement: www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-st...

MOFCOM statements: exportcontrol.mofcom.gov.cn/article/gndt...

exportcontrol.mofcom.gov.cn/article/gndt...

Overall, China’s export control system remains firmly in place, and Beijing retains considerable flexibility in how it applies these controls to actors in both the United States and Europe.

Second, China is not (even) committing to fully withdraw these restrictions — Chinese companies must still apply for permission to do business with the listed entities, and MOFCOM retains the authority to reject those applications.

Based on MOFCOM’s statements, China appears to be suspending only four decisions from April 4 and 9, covering 28 US entities on the export control list and 17 US entities on the Unreliable Entity List.

First, the promise to ease non-tariff measures remains highly partial — it applies only to measures against the United States imposed since April 2, while many export licensing requirements were introduced earlier.

Some may have hoped China’s shift to formal sanctions would bring clarity. It hasn’t (yet). Licensing remains opaque, justifications vague, enforcement selective. This underscores the need for the EU to further sharpen its monitoring tools to detect coercion.

Report: kinacentrum.se/en/publicati...

In the years ahead, Europe should be prepared for the possibility that China could use export controls more frequently, not only to pressure member states and derail EU policies it opposes, but also to target firms that pose a threat to its commercial dominance. /6

China’s new global export controls also create problems for third parties. In Europe, some firms have had to halt production due to delays—delays that may have been intended as a warning against imposing further restrictions or aligning too closely with Washington. /5

The US agreed to a compromise with Beijing just 3 months after its first tariffs—twice as fast as in the first trade war. A key reason may be that China’s use of formal sanctions like export controls, resembling Western legal tools, delivered a more credible and legible threat to Washington. /4

Beijing increasingly uses a flexible two-step sanctions method: first establishing legal grounds for escalation, then activating them when tensions rise. Export controls, antitrust actions, and anti-monopoly probes all follow this pattern. /3

The second US–China trade war in early 2025 was the first real test of China’s new economic weapons. At least 26 measures, formal and informal, targeted the US—tariffs, export controls, regulatory probes, and more—demonstrating an increasingly sophisticated approach to economic coercion /2