The Trade War Lab
@tradewarlab.bsky.social
Global Trade, Local Consequences. | Analyzing trade politics through research, analysis, engagement, and innovation.
Supported by the University of Kansas.
Supported by the University of Kansas.
Both countries prioritize semiconductors, information tech, aviation, and nuclear energy.
Japan's bills never mention China directly and focus on resource scarcity.
US bills name China as a threat, and securitize things like TikTok with tenuous national security links.
Japan's bills never mention China directly and focus on resource scarcity.
US bills name China as a threat, and securitize things like TikTok with tenuous national security links.
October 8, 2025 at 2:36 PM
Both countries prioritize semiconductors, information tech, aviation, and nuclear energy.
Japan's bills never mention China directly and focus on resource scarcity.
US bills name China as a threat, and securitize things like TikTok with tenuous national security links.
Japan's bills never mention China directly and focus on resource scarcity.
US bills name China as a threat, and securitize things like TikTok with tenuous national security links.
Japan took a different path: fewer bills, tighter focus.
The 2022 ESPA law created a framework to securitize 11 materials based on criteria like supply chain vulnerability and everyday necessity. Budget: <$10B.
Compare that to the US CHIPS Act alone: >$50B.
The 2022 ESPA law created a framework to securitize 11 materials based on criteria like supply chain vulnerability and everyday necessity. Budget: <$10B.
Compare that to the US CHIPS Act alone: >$50B.
October 8, 2025 at 2:36 PM
Japan took a different path: fewer bills, tighter focus.
The 2022 ESPA law created a framework to securitize 11 materials based on criteria like supply chain vulnerability and everyday necessity. Budget: <$10B.
Compare that to the US CHIPS Act alone: >$50B.
The 2022 ESPA law created a framework to securitize 11 materials based on criteria like supply chain vulnerability and everyday necessity. Budget: <$10B.
Compare that to the US CHIPS Act alone: >$50B.
From 2018-2024, US lawmakers introduced 166 "tough on China" bills (mostly Republican-authored).
Only 9 became law.
But in 2023 alone, proposals increased tenfold, signaling sharp acceleration in legislative appetite for restrictions.
Only 9 became law.
But in 2023 alone, proposals increased tenfold, signaling sharp acceleration in legislative appetite for restrictions.
October 8, 2025 at 2:35 PM
From 2018-2024, US lawmakers introduced 166 "tough on China" bills (mostly Republican-authored).
Only 9 became law.
But in 2023 alone, proposals increased tenfold, signaling sharp acceleration in legislative appetite for restrictions.
Only 9 became law.
But in 2023 alone, proposals increased tenfold, signaling sharp acceleration in legislative appetite for restrictions.
The Trump administration already put Section 232 tariffs on automobiles and parts, copper, steel and aluminum. Have they worked?
No. These tariffs have created few US jobs while increasing costs for many US consumers & producers that use these inputs.
www.cato.org/blog/no-secr...
No. These tariffs have created few US jobs while increasing costs for many US consumers & producers that use these inputs.
www.cato.org/blog/no-secr...
By Supporters' Own Standards, the Steel Tariffs Haven't Been "Effective"
Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo’s misplaced agreement with Trump’s tariffs.
www.cato.org
September 25, 2025 at 1:07 PM
The Trump administration already put Section 232 tariffs on automobiles and parts, copper, steel and aluminum. Have they worked?
No. These tariffs have created few US jobs while increasing costs for many US consumers & producers that use these inputs.
www.cato.org/blog/no-secr...
No. These tariffs have created few US jobs while increasing costs for many US consumers & producers that use these inputs.
www.cato.org/blog/no-secr...
But the evidence shows broad tariffs have not succeeded in restoring lost industries. Instead, they raise costs.
The 2018 washing machine tariffs raised washer/dryer prices by about 12%, adding $1.55B annually for consumers, while creating jobs at an estimated cost of over $800,000 each per year.
The 2018 washing machine tariffs raised washer/dryer prices by about 12%, adding $1.55B annually for consumers, while creating jobs at an estimated cost of over $800,000 each per year.
September 17, 2025 at 3:53 PM
But the evidence shows broad tariffs have not succeeded in restoring lost industries. Instead, they raise costs.
The 2018 washing machine tariffs raised washer/dryer prices by about 12%, adding $1.55B annually for consumers, while creating jobs at an estimated cost of over $800,000 each per year.
The 2018 washing machine tariffs raised washer/dryer prices by about 12%, adding $1.55B annually for consumers, while creating jobs at an estimated cost of over $800,000 each per year.
The move reflects real grievances.
NAFTA brought concentrated regional job losses and the China Shock caused widespread & concentrated labor market disruption.
But research also finds that trade openness enhances 🇺🇸 economic strength by supporting growth, higher incomes, and innovation.
NAFTA brought concentrated regional job losses and the China Shock caused widespread & concentrated labor market disruption.
But research also finds that trade openness enhances 🇺🇸 economic strength by supporting growth, higher incomes, and innovation.
September 17, 2025 at 3:51 PM
The move reflects real grievances.
NAFTA brought concentrated regional job losses and the China Shock caused widespread & concentrated labor market disruption.
But research also finds that trade openness enhances 🇺🇸 economic strength by supporting growth, higher incomes, and innovation.
NAFTA brought concentrated regional job losses and the China Shock caused widespread & concentrated labor market disruption.
But research also finds that trade openness enhances 🇺🇸 economic strength by supporting growth, higher incomes, and innovation.
Today Trump’s “Liberation Day” IEEPA tariffs extend this dynamic, targeting an even broader set of countries.
As the executive branch increasingly picks trade winners and losers, lobbying is set to remain a central element corporate strategy for those that can afford it.
As the executive branch increasingly picks trade winners and losers, lobbying is set to remain a central element corporate strategy for those that can afford it.
September 11, 2025 at 4:21 AM
Today Trump’s “Liberation Day” IEEPA tariffs extend this dynamic, targeting an even broader set of countries.
As the executive branch increasingly picks trade winners and losers, lobbying is set to remain a central element corporate strategy for those that can afford it.
As the executive branch increasingly picks trade winners and losers, lobbying is set to remain a central element corporate strategy for those that can afford it.
Our data also show lobbying becoming more China-focused over time, interest in China surged as firms sought tariff exclusions.
After dipping in 2020 due to the Phase One Trade Deal & COVID, it surged again under Biden as firms sought to shape semiconductor subsidies and regional trade frameworks.
After dipping in 2020 due to the Phase One Trade Deal & COVID, it surged again under Biden as firms sought to shape semiconductor subsidies and regional trade frameworks.
September 11, 2025 at 4:11 AM
Our data also show lobbying becoming more China-focused over time, interest in China surged as firms sought tariff exclusions.
After dipping in 2020 due to the Phase One Trade Deal & COVID, it surged again under Biden as firms sought to shape semiconductor subsidies and regional trade frameworks.
After dipping in 2020 due to the Phase One Trade Deal & COVID, it surged again under Biden as firms sought to shape semiconductor subsidies and regional trade frameworks.
The numbers are striking: in 2016, only 482 firms lobbied USTR on trade issues.
By 2018—after Trump’s Section 232 and 301 tariffs on $370B of Chinese goods—that figure jumped to 698 firms.
Lobbying expenditures rose 37.5% from 2016–2019, peaking at at $1.1B.
By 2018—after Trump’s Section 232 and 301 tariffs on $370B of Chinese goods—that figure jumped to 698 firms.
Lobbying expenditures rose 37.5% from 2016–2019, peaking at at $1.1B.
September 11, 2025 at 4:06 AM
The numbers are striking: in 2016, only 482 firms lobbied USTR on trade issues.
By 2018—after Trump’s Section 232 and 301 tariffs on $370B of Chinese goods—that figure jumped to 698 firms.
Lobbying expenditures rose 37.5% from 2016–2019, peaking at at $1.1B.
By 2018—after Trump’s Section 232 and 301 tariffs on $370B of Chinese goods—that figure jumped to 698 firms.
Lobbying expenditures rose 37.5% from 2016–2019, peaking at at $1.1B.