Thomas Bourany
@tbourany.bsky.social
Econ PhD, Job Market Candidate, 2024-25, from @UChicago
Macroeconomics, Environmental, International Trade
Alumn from @sciencespo, and @sorbonne_univ
Website: http://thomasbourany.github.io/
From France 🥖🧀🍷🥐🇫🇷
Macroeconomics, Environmental, International Trade
Alumn from @sciencespo, and @sorbonne_univ
Website: http://thomasbourany.github.io/
From France 🥖🧀🍷🥐🇫🇷
Thank you for reading until the end! The full paper can be found here:
thomasbourany.github.io/files/Bouran...
thomasbourany.github.io/files/Bouran...
thomasbourany.github.io
March 17, 2025 at 4:27 PM
Thank you for reading until the end! The full paper can be found here:
thomasbourany.github.io/files/Bouran...
thomasbourany.github.io/files/Bouran...
Quantifying climate damages and geographic spillovers (through migration and trade) is also challenging. Jordan
@jordanrk.bsky.social 's research focuses on estimating climate costs, studies model uncertainty, and explores the role of cities in adapting to global warming. Check out his work!
@jordanrk.bsky.social 's research focuses on estimating climate costs, studies model uncertainty, and explores the role of cities in adapting to global warming. Check out his work!
March 17, 2025 at 4:27 PM
Quantifying climate damages and geographic spillovers (through migration and trade) is also challenging. Jordan
@jordanrk.bsky.social 's research focuses on estimating climate costs, studies model uncertainty, and explores the role of cities in adapting to global warming. Check out his work!
@jordanrk.bsky.social 's research focuses on estimating climate costs, studies model uncertainty, and explores the role of cities in adapting to global warming. Check out his work!
International agreements are crucial for effective action. We can improve welfare by optimally choosing the carbon tax, the tariffs to enforce agreements, and the optimal size of the "club" when countries can free ride, as I study in my JMP bsky.app/profile/tbou...
March 17, 2025 at 4:27 PM
International agreements are crucial for effective action. We can improve welfare by optimally choosing the carbon tax, the tariffs to enforce agreements, and the optimal size of the "club" when countries can free ride, as I study in my JMP bsky.app/profile/tbou...
Moreover, renewable subsidies are less effective than carbon taxes. Coordinated policies like "climate clubs", i.e. carbon tax with tariffs (e.g. EU’s CBAM) generate global gains but unequal costs across countries depending on differences in climate, energy, and trade linkages
March 17, 2025 at 4:27 PM
Moreover, renewable subsidies are less effective than carbon taxes. Coordinated policies like "climate clubs", i.e. carbon tax with tariffs (e.g. EU’s CBAM) generate global gains but unequal costs across countries depending on differences in climate, energy, and trade linkages
Global climate policies are most effective, reducing emissions by 4% with a $50 carbon tax. But they create stark redistributive effects: hot countries benefit from improved climate, while the strength of the substitution between coal, oil, and gas affects energy costs and rents
March 17, 2025 at 4:27 PM
Global climate policies are most effective, reducing emissions by 4% with a $50 carbon tax. But they create stark redistributive effects: hot countries benefit from improved climate, while the strength of the substitution between coal, oil, and gas affects energy costs and rents
Carbon taxation affects countries differently based on their energy profile. China's reliance on coal means that carbon taxes shift consumption toward oil/gas, raising global fossil fuel prices. This benefits oil exporters like Saudi Arabia & Russia while hurting energy importers
March 17, 2025 at 4:27 PM
Carbon taxation affects countries differently based on their energy profile. China's reliance on coal means that carbon taxes shift consumption toward oil/gas, raising global fossil fuel prices. This benefits oil exporters like Saudi Arabia & Russia while hurting energy importers
Unilateral climate policies have limited effects on global emissions but create significant winners and losers through energy markets and international trade. The welfare effects of carbon leakage can be an order of magnitude larger than gains from emission reductions
March 17, 2025 at 4:27 PM
Unilateral climate policies have limited effects on global emissions but create significant winners and losers through energy markets and international trade. The welfare effects of carbon leakage can be an order of magnitude larger than gains from emission reductions
Aside from observable moments, such as countries' energy mix (in oil, gas, coal, renewable), international trade shares, or energy rents as a share of GDP, we estimate key parameters like the climate damage and fossil energy supply elasticities
March 17, 2025 at 4:27 PM
Aside from observable moments, such as countries' energy mix (in oil, gas, coal, renewable), international trade shares, or energy rents as a share of GDP, we estimate key parameters like the climate damage and fossil energy supply elasticities
We do a log-linearization of this model to do a welfare decomposition of these policies into four channels: (i) climate damages or direct productivity, (ii) the terms-of-trade effects, (iii) the impact on energy prices and costs, (iv) the effect on profits/energy rents
March 17, 2025 at 4:27 PM
We do a log-linearization of this model to do a welfare decomposition of these policies into four channels: (i) climate damages or direct productivity, (ii) the terms-of-trade effects, (iii) the impact on energy prices and costs, (iv) the effect on profits/energy rents
We study these effects in a model with heterogeneous countries, trade, and energy markets to quantify the welfare effects of climate policies. We summarize them with "sufficient statistics" which only requires observable data moments (energy mix, trade shares) and key elasticities
March 17, 2025 at 4:27 PM
We study these effects in a model with heterogeneous countries, trade, and energy markets to quantify the welfare effects of climate policies. We summarize them with "sufficient statistics" which only requires observable data moments (energy mix, trade shares) and key elasticities
One of the major drawbacks of carbon taxation is the “leakage effect”: (i) carbon taxes raise goods' prices, reallocating activity to countries without climate policies, and (ii) reducing fossil fuels demand lowers the price of oil and gas for other countries, which now consume and emit more
March 17, 2025 at 4:27 PM
One of the major drawbacks of carbon taxation is the “leakage effect”: (i) carbon taxes raise goods' prices, reallocating activity to countries without climate policies, and (ii) reducing fossil fuels demand lowers the price of oil and gas for other countries, which now consume and emit more
Thank you for reading until the end! Happy to chat more about these topics during this Job Market season and at upcoming conferences!
The job market paper and my research can be found here: thomasbourany.github.io/research/
#EconJMP #EconSky
The job market paper and my research can be found here: thomasbourany.github.io/research/
#EconJMP #EconSky
Research & Work in progress
thomasbourany.github.io
December 3, 2024 at 8:06 PM
Thank you for reading until the end! Happy to chat more about these topics during this Job Market season and at upcoming conferences!
The job market paper and my research can be found here: thomasbourany.github.io/research/
#EconJMP #EconSky
The job market paper and my research can be found here: thomasbourany.github.io/research/
#EconJMP #EconSky
I stand on the shoulders of giants: Nordhaus, of course, and the amazing research on carbon taxation and the impacts of climate change by my advisors at UChicago,
@UChicago economics: Mike Golosov, Esteban Rossi-Hansberg, Lars Hansen, and Michael Greenstone (not yet converted to #EconSky)
11/10
@UChicago economics: Mike Golosov, Esteban Rossi-Hansberg, Lars Hansen, and Michael Greenstone (not yet converted to #EconSky)
11/10
December 3, 2024 at 7:59 PM
I stand on the shoulders of giants: Nordhaus, of course, and the amazing research on carbon taxation and the impacts of climate change by my advisors at UChicago,
@UChicago economics: Mike Golosov, Esteban Rossi-Hansberg, Lars Hansen, and Michael Greenstone (not yet converted to #EconSky)
11/10
@UChicago economics: Mike Golosov, Esteban Rossi-Hansberg, Lars Hansen, and Michael Greenstone (not yet converted to #EconSky)
11/10
In the paper, I study additional policy instruments and extensions (transfers to developing countries, as discussed in COP28-29, fossil-fuel-specific sanctions, retaliation and trade wars, carbon tax Laffer curve, etc.). Happy to discuss them in more detail! 10/
December 3, 2024 at 7:59 PM
In the paper, I study additional policy instruments and extensions (transfers to developing countries, as discussed in COP28-29, fossil-fuel-specific sanctions, retaliation and trade wars, carbon tax Laffer curve, etc.). Happy to discuss them in more detail! 10/
As a result, it is optimal to lower the carbon tax (from $150/tCO2 to ~$100) to encourage participation. But not too much! It is beneficial to leave Russia out of the club, otherwise we would need to decrease carbon tax so much that we lose the benefits of climate cooperation! 9/
December 3, 2024 at 7:59 PM
As a result, it is optimal to lower the carbon tax (from $150/tCO2 to ~$100) to encourage participation. But not too much! It is beneficial to leave Russia out of the club, otherwise we would need to decrease carbon tax so much that we lose the benefits of climate cooperation! 9/
The result is summarized in this graph: it shows the participation of different regions for various carbon taxes (y-axis) and trade tariffs (x-axis). We see that Russia, Gulf countries, and South Asia have little incentives to join a climate club for high carbon taxes, in spite of large tariffs 8/
December 3, 2024 at 7:59 PM
The result is summarized in this graph: it shows the participation of different regions for various carbon taxes (y-axis) and trade tariffs (x-axis). We see that Russia, Gulf countries, and South Asia have little incentives to join a climate club for high carbon taxes, in spite of large tariffs 8/
This policy question is challenging: it involves solving jointly for the optimal policy (as in Public Finance) and the choice of countries (as in Combinatorial Discrete Choice problems) in a Nash Equilibria. I develop a method inspired by these two lit. to handle this problem 7/
December 3, 2024 at 7:59 PM
This policy question is challenging: it involves solving jointly for the optimal policy (as in Public Finance) and the choice of countries (as in Combinatorial Discrete Choice problems) in a Nash Equilibria. I develop a method inspired by these two lit. to handle this problem 7/
I build a quantitative Integrated-Assessment Model, extended with heterogeneous countries, energy markets, and international trade. It replicates empirically realistic features that are at the heart of countries' decisions to join climate agreements (e.g. income, energy mix, gains from trade) 6/
December 3, 2024 at 7:59 PM
I build a quantitative Integrated-Assessment Model, extended with heterogeneous countries, energy markets, and international trade. It replicates empirically realistic features that are at the heart of countries' decisions to join climate agreements (e.g. income, energy mix, gains from trade) 6/
This reveals a trade-off between an intensive margin - a small club with a high carbon tax (think of the EU) - and an extensive margin - a club with more countries, at the cost of lowering the carbon tax in order to encourage participation (e.g. a non-binding world agreement) 5/
December 3, 2024 at 7:59 PM
This reveals a trade-off between an intensive margin - a small club with a high carbon tax (think of the EU) - and an extensive margin - a club with more countries, at the cost of lowering the carbon tax in order to encourage participation (e.g. a non-binding world agreement) 5/
In my Job Market Paper, I study the optimal design of such climate clubs: the optimal choice of the carbon tax and trade tariffs, and the choice of countries in the climate agreement, subject to strategic participation constraints when countries can deviate and leave the agreement 4/
December 3, 2024 at 7:59 PM
In my Job Market Paper, I study the optimal design of such climate clubs: the optimal choice of the carbon tax and trade tariffs, and the choice of countries in the climate agreement, subject to strategic participation constraints when countries can deviate and leave the agreement 4/