(2/3)On Friday 27 June (13:10 - 14:50, Room 1A.11) I present joint work with @ta-huikuri.bsky.social on Women in International negotiations as part of the panel 'Gender Representation: rhetoric and parliamentary speeches' chaired by @clint0475.bsky.social

9/ We don't think that states are any more likely to exit agreements with flexible exit clauses. But highly democratically accountable states consider the prospects of exit already at time of negotiations to remain responsive to domestic public opinion. And more so at times of high uncertainty. /end

7/ We argue that governments resolve the tradeoff by negotiating long exit clauses with partners that have weak property rights protections, but shorter ones with those that have mitigating domestic institutions. But *only if they are democratically accountable*.

7/ We argue that governments resolve the tradeoff by negotiating long exit clauses with partners that have weak property rights protections, but shorter ones with those that have mitigating domestic institutions. But *only if they are democratically accountable*.

6/ For example, although the investors from the US and Europe have usually benefitted from BITs, their home governments in the West have themselves faced investment arbitration claims for example because of green transition.

unctad.org/news/energy-...

5/ States must balance between constraining their partners and maintaining exit flexibility for themselves. Although major capital exporters want long BITs with capital importers to protect their MNCs abroad, they worry whether their own publics will remain pro-MNCs in the future.

4/ Effective commitment length varies a lot in investment treaties (no surprises here for the investment treaty geeks!) But why do states negotiate exit clauses with varying commitment lengths even in the same issue area, and with different partners?

3/ When looking more closely at exit clauses in international agreements, we noticed that they differ in their “effective commitment”: while states are locked into some ratified agreements for 12 months, some are stuck in them for decades(!) even if they decide to exit tomorrow.

2/ Remember when Trump exited from the Paris Agreement back in 2017 for the first time? The effect of exit was effectively negated because of the exit clauses in the agreement. Turns out that after withdrawal, it takes four years to actually get out of the Paris Agreement!