He watched a stock he sold go up 10x before ultimately being proven correct about competition.

Again, this was a long sega where the intelligence of his decison was unclear for years.

He quotes Fisher: "It is easier to know WHAT will happen than WHEN it will happen"

(7/x)

He juxtaposed this to Sun Microsystems, which was even more extreme.

He owned the stock at 5x earnings.

Then sold at a gain because of competition fears in 1997.

It traded at 100x earnings before crashing below his orginal acquistion price years earlier.

(6/x)

This whole sega was a 5 year ordeal.

He felt smart for making the investment.

Stupid for selling early.

Then vindicated for heavily trimming.

To ultimately be wrong for a different reason-- the quality of the business was low if it couldn't withstand a recession

(5/x)

A recession came in 2002 and the stock was cut 80%

It wasn't just valuation that was hit;

weakness in the business model was exposed as well.

(4/x)

Then shares the went up 300%...

When writing a post-mortem in 1999 (two years after he sold), he thought he made a mistake with one caveat:

until there was a recession, he would not admit he was wrong to sell.

(3/x)

In 1997, Bombardier made up 20% of his portfolio, and he cut it down 90%.

At the time he thought the valuation was high, future prospects were worse, and a key manager left.

(2/x)

François Rochon is a well known investment manager who has compounded at ~15% annualized for 30 years (!)

In 2002 though he was much more obscure.
A single stock was 20% of his portfolio.

Below he shares his thoughts on selling and other mistakes.

(1/x)

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Check them all out at SpeedwellMemos.com