Ronan Mainprize
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ronanmainprize.bsky.social
Ronan Mainprize
@ronanmainprize.bsky.social
Ax:son Johnson Postdoctoral Fellow, Center for Statecraft and Strategic Communication

Research on intelligence, statecraft, and strategy • Writing a book on Lyndon Johnson, the CIA, and the Global Cold War • University of Warwick PhD
Reposted by Ronan Mainprize
On ‘64, I’d also add Burr and Richelson’s article in International Security (www.jstor.org/stable/2626706) and a @sarabcastro.bsky.social chapter about assumptions and intelligence on China’s nuclear programme (bokforlagetstolpe.com/en/books/int...).
I’ve been thinking a lot about Frank Gavin’s ‘Nuclear Statecraft’, in particular ch. 4 on US policy towards China’s nuclear test in ‘64.

Provocative for thinking about the risks of nuclear armed rogue states and proliferation in 2025. An analogy to ‘64 perhaps shows a rush to war is unnecessary?
June 18, 2025 at 12:32 PM
On ‘64, I’d also add Burr and Richelson’s article in International Security (www.jstor.org/stable/2626706) and a @sarabcastro.bsky.social chapter about assumptions and intelligence on China’s nuclear programme (bokforlagetstolpe.com/en/books/int...).
I’ve been thinking a lot about Frank Gavin’s ‘Nuclear Statecraft’, in particular ch. 4 on US policy towards China’s nuclear test in ‘64.

Provocative for thinking about the risks of nuclear armed rogue states and proliferation in 2025. An analogy to ‘64 perhaps shows a rush to war is unnecessary?
June 18, 2025 at 12:32 PM