The primer on Jevons paradox that you didn't know you needed.

This paper presents a model of employee poaching with asymmetric employer learning. Firms poach managers not only due to their track record but also for their personnel-specific information about workers. In equilibrium, more productive firms poach managers, whose compensation increases in the quality of their information about workers. While poaching reassigns more able workers to more productive firms, efficiency does not obtain due to information frictions. Drawing on the universe of contracts in Brazil's formal labor market, we test implications of our model and show they are consistent with manager and worker movements and their compensation histories.

Somewhere between mindbending and mindless — you can’t go wrong with these titles.

New research shows that universities can use their market power to keep wages artificially low. Alfonso Flores-Lagunes of the Upjohn Institute and Zhanhan Yu of the University of Glasgow find that a…

YouTube video by Roots of Progress Institute

Patrick Radden Keefe’s bestselling 2019 book “Say Nothing” has been adapted into a miniseries. It repeats the sins of its source material.

Governments increasingly use randomized controlled trials (RCTs) to test innovations, yet we know little about how they incorporate results into policymaking. We study 30 US cities that ran 73 RCTs wi...

Madrid tripled the length of its metro system in just 12 years — faster and cheaper than almost any other city in the world. What can its expansion teach other cities?

Users are now flocking to Bluesky. But every social media platform becomes a wasteland in the end.