Rob Mullins
@robertmullins.bsky.social
Associate Professor, University of Queensland. My views are not the views of my employer.
With apologies to those of you who already have had to wade through my draft on FWS, I think this quote from Lord Fraser in Mandela v Dowell Lee (on a biological approach to defining “ethnic origins”) should have served as a warning to the court.
November 4, 2025 at 10:40 AM
With apologies to those of you who already have had to wade through my draft on FWS, I think this quote from Lord Fraser in Mandela v Dowell Lee (on a biological approach to defining “ethnic origins”) should have served as a warning to the court.
He has a reputation in Australia too.
November 3, 2025 at 10:24 AM
He has a reputation in Australia too.
I've deleted a previous post about this, which appears to show a KC deadnaming a witness because (i) it repeated the deadname and (ii) I'm not sure whether the KC deadnamed her or the poster did. Apologies to those of you who interacted with it.
October 31, 2025 at 10:33 AM
I've deleted a previous post about this, which appears to show a KC deadnaming a witness because (i) it repeated the deadname and (ii) I'm not sure whether the KC deadnamed her or the poster did. Apologies to those of you who interacted with it.
Barristers get put in a similar position when they are told to aggressively/intrusively question sexual assault victims. But there is increased awareness that isn't always appropriate. The KC in question knows this.
October 31, 2025 at 9:32 AM
Barristers get put in a similar position when they are told to aggressively/intrusively question sexual assault victims. But there is increased awareness that isn't always appropriate. The KC in question knows this.
The FA’s interpretation of biological sex in FWS is different from the interpretation I would have made. I would have guessed they were invoking the Corbett v Corbett criteria (on which ovaries/testes are not determinative). The Court really should have offered a definition. It is important.
![The revised CUWAFL constitution (the women’s league) now includes the Football Association’s (FA) new policy on trans participation. It states: “Only biological females (i.e., those born with ovaries) may play in open age Matches and Competitions reserved for women.” “A biological female who has begun or has used testosterone as part of gender-related treatment may not compete [...] until four years have passed since their last such use.” If implimented in full, this will ban all taking masculinising HRT within the past four years, and all trans women.
In this constitution, FA restrictions are also noted for men’s teams:
“Only biological males (i.e., those born with testes) may play in open age Matches and Competitions reserved for men.” “A biological female whose gender identity is male or non-binary may compete [...] if they provide a Confirmation Statement… [and] their GP or another qualified medical practitioner” confirm their testosterone levels are “up to the normal adult male range.”](https://cdn.bsky.app/img/feed_thumbnail/plain/did:plc:svtyrn534rp7povefiuiltb3/bafkreigk5pcgfbhuxjmtgfaixopik2dt3w6idumh7dmuqyxbdu7jq3zory@jpeg)
October 26, 2025 at 11:17 AM
The FA’s interpretation of biological sex in FWS is different from the interpretation I would have made. I would have guessed they were invoking the Corbett v Corbett criteria (on which ovaries/testes are not determinative). The Court really should have offered a definition. It is important.
E.g. look at this
October 24, 2025 at 8:20 AM
E.g. look at this
It might be in part a relationship to the body (how else do we explain medical transition?) but it doesn't have to be a s certainly isn't exclusively about that.
October 22, 2025 at 11:06 PM
It might be in part a relationship to the body (how else do we explain medical transition?) but it doesn't have to be a s certainly isn't exclusively about that.
Forgive me if someone has discussed this already but this is such a telling passage of FWS. What biological characteristic could a service provider use that would be indissociable from sex?
![Conversely, if a certificated sex reading were adopted, it would have the effect of removing an important aspect of group protection for men and women in the way that direct discrimination under section 13 has been understood to operate. It is well-established that where a policy or rule is applied which applies a criterion that is indissociable from sex in order to determine entitlement to some benefit, that will necessarily constitute unlawful direct discrimination that cannot be justified. A clear example is the policy adopted by the council in James v Eastleigh Borough Council [1990] 2 AC 751 (see p764A per Lord Bridge) regarding free admission to the swimming pool for those of pension age at a time when pension ages for men and women were different. For this principle to apply, there must be an “exact correspondence” between the protected characteristic and the criterion in question (see Preddy v Bull [2013] UKSC 73, [2013] 1 WLR 3741 at para 21 per Lady Hale DPSC). A certificated sex reading of sex in the EA 2010 would have the effect of preventing that principle from applying in relation to a criterion which is indissociable from biological sex (for example, a sex-based biological characteristic) because that criterion would not be indissociable from the more complex grouping that would then constitute members of the relevant “sex” as modified by section 9(1). Instead, the application of such a criterion would fall to be considered as a case of indirect discrimination, with the potential for a justification defence. A certificated sex reading of sex would therefore remove this important aspect of protection in relation to direct discrimination under section 13. It is difficult to see why the GRA 2004 could have intended to remove such protection.](https://cdn.bsky.app/img/feed_thumbnail/plain/did:plc:svtyrn534rp7povefiuiltb3/bafkreigr2nwrgtjgupm6qfydltg52qndduyh5upy53c7a2fwl5lo2vibdy@jpeg)
October 17, 2025 at 12:14 PM
Forgive me if someone has discussed this already but this is such a telling passage of FWS. What biological characteristic could a service provider use that would be indissociable from sex?
E.g. this in The Atlantic, which afaict, is just a straightforward inability to grasp the idea of statistical power.
October 7, 2025 at 5:52 AM
E.g. this in The Atlantic, which afaict, is just a straightforward inability to grasp the idea of statistical power.
Is this comment (by a trans woman on the thread) accurate as a characterisation of the position? It's been too long since I read into the casual theory of reference. Anyway, it's devastating.
September 23, 2025 at 10:53 PM
Is this comment (by a trans woman on the thread) accurate as a characterisation of the position? It's been too long since I read into the casual theory of reference. Anyway, it's devastating.
With apologies for the photo quality, I was excited to see this 👑 while hanging out the washing in my courtyard this afternoon.
September 23, 2025 at 9:05 AM
With apologies for the photo quality, I was excited to see this 👑 while hanging out the washing in my courtyard this afternoon.
I like this concluding passage in particular.
![The second passage worth bearing in mind is in the ECtHR’s judgment in Semenya:
… the Court has repeatedly held that differences based exclusively on sex require “very weighty reasons”, “particularly serious reasons” or, as it is sometimes said, “particularly weighty and convincing reasons” by way of justification (see Stec and Others, cited above, § 52; Vallianatos and Others, cited above, § 77; and Konstantin Markin v. Russia [GC], no. 30078/06, § 127, ECHR 2012 (extracts)). The Court considers that similar considerations apply where a difference in treatment is based on the sex characteristics of an individual or his or her status as an intersex person. Furthermore, where a particularly important facet of an individual’s existence or identity is at stake, the margin allowed to the State will be restricted (see, for example, Hämäläinen v. Finland [GC], no. 37359/09, § 67, ECHR 2014; X and Y v. the Netherlands, 26 March 1985, §§ 24 and 27, Series A no. 91; and Christine Goodwin v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 28957/95, § 90, ECHR 2002-VI; see also Pretty, cited above, § 71). [para 169]
So, we should realise that Caster Semenya’s treatment is not just an isolated issue of limited concern. The ECtHR’s review of her treatment may yet force the UK to enlarge its concept of sex to something like that of race and ethnicity, not binary but as having a range of different aspects. If that is so for persons with DSD, it is likely to be true for transgender persons too.](https://cdn.bsky.app/img/feed_thumbnail/plain/did:plc:svtyrn534rp7povefiuiltb3/bafkreibvcskgyedu5m45syzwwcvvyndlq5p2gnq7puguninjpsx2ujvy5y@jpeg)
September 18, 2025 at 7:41 AM
I like this concluding passage in particular.
I'm loath to defend Lord Hodge here, but I think what he might be saying in this passage, very politely, is that the EHRC and others have badly misrepresented the decision.
September 13, 2025 at 7:00 PM
I'm loath to defend Lord Hodge here, but I think what he might be saying in this passage, very politely, is that the EHRC and others have badly misrepresented the decision.
My reply is also partly inspired by this horrifying specimen .
August 25, 2025 at 12:18 PM
My reply is also partly inspired by this horrifying specimen .
Fellas, just so you know:
Dancing 'like a girl' ✅ (as long as you were gay from a young age)
Wearing women's clothes ❌ (because you will be unable to resist getting trans with it)
Dancing 'like a girl' ✅ (as long as you were gay from a young age)
Wearing women's clothes ❌ (because you will be unable to resist getting trans with it)
August 20, 2025 at 9:29 PM
Fellas, just so you know:
Dancing 'like a girl' ✅ (as long as you were gay from a young age)
Wearing women's clothes ❌ (because you will be unable to resist getting trans with it)
Dancing 'like a girl' ✅ (as long as you were gay from a young age)
Wearing women's clothes ❌ (because you will be unable to resist getting trans with it)
This is sadly, what we have all expected. But, from a technical perspective I think the judge has made a mistake in their discussion of the comparator selection in these paragraphs. I'll try to explain. 🧵
August 2, 2025 at 10:47 AM
This is sadly, what we have all expected. But, from a technical perspective I think the judge has made a mistake in their discussion of the comparator selection in these paragraphs. I'll try to explain. 🧵
More nuanced than I remember but not great.
August 1, 2025 at 9:39 AM
More nuanced than I remember but not great.
I thought it was telling when Ben Cooper suggested a strained reading of the association provision relying on s. 3 of the HRA. Oh ya think? I wonder what else might need a strained reading.
July 13, 2025 at 10:48 PM
I thought it was telling when Ben Cooper suggested a strained reading of the association provision relying on s. 3 of the HRA. Oh ya think? I wonder what else might need a strained reading.
Particularly confusing if you look at his paper from the Bellinger era on the "common sense" UK approach. It's like they genuinely didn't see this coming.
June 14, 2025 at 2:05 AM
Particularly confusing if you look at his paper from the Bellinger era on the "common sense" UK approach. It's like they genuinely didn't see this coming.
This should read: "Avoid areas where demonstrations and protests are occurring due to potential violence from state officials."
June 9, 2025 at 2:33 AM
This should read: "Avoid areas where demonstrations and protests are occurring due to potential violence from state officials."
'it's like Naomi said'
June 6, 2025 at 5:56 AM
'it's like Naomi said'
Here's Lord Reed circa 2005 writing about the English laissez fair attitude
June 5, 2025 at 11:54 AM
Here's Lord Reed circa 2005 writing about the English laissez fair attitude
7/ I don't think this approach is compatible with the privacy and dignity of intersex people, who have a right to have their legal sex match their gender identity. This is the sort of problem that gender recognition law is designed to solve, and will need to solve in future.
June 5, 2025 at 5:32 AM
7/ I don't think this approach is compatible with the privacy and dignity of intersex people, who have a right to have their legal sex match their gender identity. This is the sort of problem that gender recognition law is designed to solve, and will need to solve in future.