Ralph Wedgwood
@ralphwedgwood.bsky.social
Philosopher, cyclist, lover of classical music, occasional hiker, based mostly in Southern California
So, I think I could basically incorporate your view into the kind of framework that I prefer.
May 12, 2025 at 10:09 PM
So, I think I could basically incorporate your view into the kind of framework that I prefer.
But I do think it is better - in a certain distinctive respect - for the social practice of appreciating artworks (like Hokusai prints) to be extended over more people and over longer periods of time, and for this social practice to involve the appreciation of a greater diversity of artworks.
May 12, 2025 at 10:08 PM
But I do think it is better - in a certain distinctive respect - for the social practice of appreciating artworks (like Hokusai prints) to be extended over more people and over longer periods of time, and for this social practice to involve the appreciation of a greater diversity of artworks.
This sounds very interesting! I think I reject the very idea of the "amount" of a value: this idea makes the value into a kind of stuff (like e.g. gasoline), where its "amount" is an extensive quantity (like the total mass or volume of this stuff in the universe as a whole).
May 12, 2025 at 10:04 PM
This sounds very interesting! I think I reject the very idea of the "amount" of a value: this idea makes the value into a kind of stuff (like e.g. gasoline), where its "amount" is an extensive quantity (like the total mass or volume of this stuff in the universe as a whole).
This view is defended in my 2023 book, "Rationality and Belief", especially Sections 2.3, 2.5, 11.2 and 11.3. It still seems to me more plausible than the common view that such higher-order evidence can defeat propositional justification...
April 13, 2025 at 1:46 AM
This view is defended in my 2023 book, "Rationality and Belief", especially Sections 2.3, 2.5, 11.2 and 11.3. It still seems to me more plausible than the common view that such higher-order evidence can defeat propositional justification...
Even if I might, in the end, demur and prefer a different formulation, isn't there something incredibly compelling in what the Stoics say about this...?
February 2, 2025 at 4:39 AM
Even if I might, in the end, demur and prefer a different formulation, isn't there something incredibly compelling in what the Stoics say about this...?
This kind of perception, I believe, is what motivated the ancient Greek and Roman Stoics to say that all of us who have a human mind are "children of God" (e.g. Epictetus, Discourses, 1.3).
February 2, 2025 at 4:37 AM
This kind of perception, I believe, is what motivated the ancient Greek and Roman Stoics to say that all of us who have a human mind are "children of God" (e.g. Epictetus, Discourses, 1.3).
Do I really want to wade into this debate? Do I have the competence to say anything about this that could be valuable for an audience of more than a few of my fellow philosophers? Perhaps I should try, anyway. It seems daunting, but I believe that I have insights into these questions.
January 24, 2025 at 5:02 AM
Do I really want to wade into this debate? Do I have the competence to say anything about this that could be valuable for an audience of more than a few of my fellow philosophers? Perhaps I should try, anyway. It seems daunting, but I believe that I have insights into these questions.
I am coming to think that I need to write something (perhaps even a book?), arguing against all of the revealed religions -Judaism, Christianity, and Islam... - on both philosophical and historical grounds. and advocating a different approach towards understanding the basic problems of human life.
January 24, 2025 at 4:58 AM
I am coming to think that I need to write something (perhaps even a book?), arguing against all of the revealed religions -Judaism, Christianity, and Islam... - on both philosophical and historical grounds. and advocating a different approach towards understanding the basic problems of human life.
Later, 5 years ago, I acquired an interest in later Stoicism (of the 1st two centuries CE). So, I have been thinking intensely about that historical period. I'm convinced that the historical evidence about that period makes it probable that some of the most central claims of Christianity are false.
January 24, 2025 at 4:55 AM
Later, 5 years ago, I acquired an interest in later Stoicism (of the 1st two centuries CE). So, I have been thinking intensely about that historical period. I'm convinced that the historical evidence about that period makes it probable that some of the most central claims of Christianity are false.
The short answer is: (1) We need to recognize "local" as well as "global" value-bearers (even though all value-bearers are states of affairs); (2) We need to embrace a thoroughgoing pluralism about values; (3) We need to reject "part-whole aggregation", recognizing only "multiple-value aggregation".
January 16, 2025 at 2:38 PM
The short answer is: (1) We need to recognize "local" as well as "global" value-bearers (even though all value-bearers are states of affairs); (2) We need to embrace a thoroughgoing pluralism about values; (3) We need to reject "part-whole aggregation", recognizing only "multiple-value aggregation".
My talk at this workshop is going to explore the following question: If our ethical theory is to be (a) in a strong sense grounded in values, but (b) not even in a weak sense consequentialist, how should we think of these values?
January 16, 2025 at 2:35 PM
My talk at this workshop is going to explore the following question: If our ethical theory is to be (a) in a strong sense grounded in values, but (b) not even in a weak sense consequentialist, how should we think of these values?
Of course, within Jeffrey's framework, there is no "redescription" of "the outcome". For Jeffrey, outcomes are propositions, which are individuated by the worlds at which they are true. It's just obviously a different outcome!
January 13, 2025 at 11:22 PM
Of course, within Jeffrey's framework, there is no "redescription" of "the outcome". For Jeffrey, outcomes are propositions, which are individuated by the worlds at which they are true. It's just obviously a different outcome!
Great - thank you so much, Richard! I'm familiar with Buchak's book; but, so far as I can see, she doesn't discuss Jeffrey's decision theory in this connection at all. (There's no index entry for Jeffrey, and he is not mentioned in the Chapter on "Redescription").
January 13, 2025 at 11:20 PM
Great - thank you so much, Richard! I'm familiar with Buchak's book; but, so far as I can see, she doesn't discuss Jeffrey's decision theory in this connection at all. (There's no index entry for Jeffrey, and he is not mentioned in the Chapter on "Redescription").
From my perspective, Kant's monistic thesis, that all "absolute" goodness is explicable in terms of the purely "formal" goodness of the "good will", has absolutely no advantages over the blinkered utilitarian view that Price criticizes here. Price was so much more perceptive than Kant or Bentham...
January 13, 2025 at 2:49 AM
From my perspective, Kant's monistic thesis, that all "absolute" goodness is explicable in terms of the purely "formal" goodness of the "good will", has absolutely no advantages over the blinkered utilitarian view that Price criticizes here. Price was so much more perceptive than Kant or Bentham...
"I deny not but that, in the human mind, as well as in the natural world, the most wonderful simplicity takes place; but we ought to learn to wait, till we can, by careful observation and enquiry, find out wherein it consists; and not suffer ourselves rashly to determine anything concerning it..."
January 13, 2025 at 2:41 AM
"I deny not but that, in the human mind, as well as in the natural world, the most wonderful simplicity takes place; but we ought to learn to wait, till we can, by careful observation and enquiry, find out wherein it consists; and not suffer ourselves rashly to determine anything concerning it..."
"What mistakes and extravagances in natural philosophy have been produced, by the desire of discovering one principle which shall account for all effects?
January 13, 2025 at 2:40 AM
"What mistakes and extravagances in natural philosophy have been produced, by the desire of discovering one principle which shall account for all effects?
His criticism of Hutcheson's utilitarian reduction of all virtue to benevolence is poignant:
"How unreasonable is that love of uniformity and simplicity which inclines men thus to seek them where it is so difficult to find them? It is this that, on other subjects, has often led men astray....
"How unreasonable is that love of uniformity and simplicity which inclines men thus to seek them where it is so difficult to find them? It is this that, on other subjects, has often led men astray....
January 13, 2025 at 2:39 AM
His criticism of Hutcheson's utilitarian reduction of all virtue to benevolence is poignant:
"How unreasonable is that love of uniformity and simplicity which inclines men thus to seek them where it is so difficult to find them? It is this that, on other subjects, has often led men astray....
"How unreasonable is that love of uniformity and simplicity which inclines men thus to seek them where it is so difficult to find them? It is this that, on other subjects, has often led men astray....
In this way, Jeffrey–Bolker decision theory guarantees that the outcomes of different lotteries never count as strictly “the same outcome”. I remain somewhat puzzled about why the fact that this decision theory is immune to the Allais paradox is not more prominent in the decision theory literature.
January 12, 2025 at 1:30 AM
In this way, Jeffrey–Bolker decision theory guarantees that the outcomes of different lotteries never count as strictly “the same outcome”. I remain somewhat puzzled about why the fact that this decision theory is immune to the Allais paradox is not more prominent in the decision theory literature.
However, the Allais preferences are consistent with this principle. The first Allais preference concerns propositions A1 and B1 that are true in worlds where one has entered Lottery 1; the second preference concerns propositions A2 and B2 that are true in worlds where one has entered Lottery 2.
January 12, 2025 at 1:30 AM
However, the Allais preferences are consistent with this principle. The first Allais preference concerns propositions A1 and B1 that are true in worlds where one has entered Lottery 1; the second preference concerns propositions A2 and B2 that are true in worlds where one has entered Lottery 2.
Admittedly, something similar to the STP holds in this theory: If A and B are equally probable, C and D are equally probable, and A, B, C, and D are all pairwise incompatible with each other, then, if you prefer ‘A or C’ over ‘B or C’, you must also prefer ‘A or D’ over ‘B or D’.
January 12, 2025 at 1:12 AM
Admittedly, something similar to the STP holds in this theory: If A and B are equally probable, C and D are equally probable, and A, B, C, and D are all pairwise incompatible with each other, then, if you prefer ‘A or C’ over ‘B or C’, you must also prefer ‘A or D’ over ‘B or D’.