In my view, higher-order evidence - like evidence that one is likely to be thinking irrationally about p - does not defeat one's propositional justification for believing p. But it may well make it impossible for one to believe p in a doxastically justified manner.

The human mind is the most astounding phenomenon that we're aware of, in the whole of the natural world. But everyone reading this actually *has* a human mind! What an amazing privilege is that?!

Almost 20 years ago, in summer 2025, I decided that, in the last 2 pages of my book "The Nature of Normativity" (as a surprise reward for any readers who made it that far into the book…), I'd argue that my kind of realism about normativity undercuts many motivations for theism and religious belief.

Looking forward to taking part in this year's Arizona Workshop in Normative Ethics: www.ethics-arizona.com

The overwhelming majority of ethicists in the history of Western philosophy have advocated excessively monistic unified theories. This is what makes Richard Price's pluralism about the "branches of virtue" all the more remarkable (see Chap. VII of his "Review of the Principal Questions in Morals").

Savage’s “Sure Thing Principle” (STP) is not an axiom of Jeffrey–Bolker’s version of decision theory. So, Jeffrey–Bolker’s theory is not threatened by the Allais paradox. Why is this point not discussed in the literature on the paradox?

I've been teaching a graduate seminar this semester on early modern British moral philosophy. It's been fun. It may inspire me to write another article on the history of ethics - perhaps on my view of the overall grand narrative, possibly entitled "Shaftesbury: The Last Ancient Greek Moralist".

I saw the film "Conclave" this week.
(1) The star of the move - Ralph Fiennes - has an extraordinarily beautiful first name.
(2) It's totally gripping: based on a Robert Harris novel, it's cleverly written and beautifully acted. It's not profound, but it's good intelligent fun. I recommend it!

4. The conclusion that we should draw, I believe, is that coercion is not an excuse; it is a justification. The bank-clerk does not act in a way that is wrong but blameless; he acts in a way that (in the circumstances) is not wrong at all.

3. As Barnes goes on: "Had [the bank-clerk] refused to give in to the gunman I should have judged him foolhardy; and that judgment again presupposes responsibility. [Coercion], then, does not remove responsibility..."

2. "the bank-clerk who opens the safe at pistol-point acts, I judge, with wisdom and prudence; in ascribing such virtues to him I am praising him (in a fairly mild way); and if I praise him, I deem him liable to praise and hence I deem him morally responsible." (p. 417)

1. Jonathan Barnes ("The Presocratic Philosophers") was virtually the first philosophy book that I read. It contains a powerful argument against the common idea that agents who are coerced are not responsible for their actions...