Today at 1109Z what looks like a mass spoof event of AIS-signal took place in central Baltic Sea.
In an area from approximately Bornholm to mid Gulf of Finland hundreds (thousands?) of new AIS-messages suddenly appeared. A large part of them military ships.
In an area from approximately Bornholm to mid Gulf of Finland hundreds (thousands?) of new AIS-messages suddenly appeared. A large part of them military ships.
November 6, 2025 at 10:54 AM
I tillägg har region Skåne en annan drift och förvaltningsmodell än VGR. Som du säger måste det ena inte nödvändigtvis betyda att det andra går under
November 4, 2025 at 8:11 PM
I tillägg har region Skåne en annan drift och förvaltningsmodell än VGR. Som du säger måste det ena inte nödvändigtvis betyda att det andra går under
När de allierade gick in i Normandie mötte de veteraner från östfronten, de använde alla fula trix de nånsin lärt sig, elaka försåtsmineringar av bunkrar osv.
Vi kommer möta veteraner från Ukraina, med alla fula trix med drönare och gud vet vad
Vi kommer möta veteraner från Ukraina, med alla fula trix med drönare och gud vet vad
November 4, 2025 at 1:58 PM
När de allierade gick in i Normandie mötte de veteraner från östfronten, de använde alla fula trix de nånsin lärt sig, elaka försåtsmineringar av bunkrar osv.
Vi kommer möta veteraner från Ukraina, med alla fula trix med drönare och gud vet vad
Vi kommer möta veteraner från Ukraina, med alla fula trix med drönare och gud vet vad
släpp stridsvagnarna fria!
November 4, 2025 at 8:57 AM
släpp stridsvagnarna fria!
Gjorde en analys på Moskvadata häromdagen. Hon skojar inte
I was having a look at traffic gps data for central Moscow. It is really crazy, wherever you go, you will be teleported. But here are some highlighted hotspots. Red means high jam ratio
November 1, 2025 at 9:33 PM
Gjorde en analys på Moskvadata häromdagen. Hon skojar inte
I have also read articles on using existing Starlink for authenticated positioning. I think we will see developments in this area
… And maybe a strategic secret switch, turn off gps, enable the secret starlink 🤔…
… And maybe a strategic secret switch, turn off gps, enable the secret starlink 🤔…
October 31, 2025 at 7:50 PM
I have also read articles on using existing Starlink for authenticated positioning. I think we will see developments in this area
… And maybe a strategic secret switch, turn off gps, enable the secret starlink 🤔…
… And maybe a strategic secret switch, turn off gps, enable the secret starlink 🤔…
This will absolutely work. There are many ways to sanity check data and enhance quality. The gnss research stations does this. Data centers and many other services relies on gps time for precise sync. More costly, yes
October 31, 2025 at 6:29 PM
This will absolutely work. There are many ways to sanity check data and enhance quality. The gnss research stations does this. Data centers and many other services relies on gps time for precise sync. More costly, yes
Jag var på besök hos Icon Medialab. De hade en kaffemaskin som täckte en hel vägg. De var noga att förklara att den övervakades över internet av servicetekniker i Schweiz
October 31, 2025 at 1:46 PM
Jag var på besök hos Icon Medialab. De hade en kaffemaskin som täckte en hel vägg. De var noga att förklara att den övervakades över internet av servicetekniker i Schweiz
När jag skrev på för mitt första jobb blev jag bjuden på en dykresa till Röda Havet. Dykarcert blev vi såklart bjudna på innan resan
October 31, 2025 at 1:46 PM
När jag skrev på för mitt första jobb blev jag bjuden på en dykresa till Röda Havet. Dykarcert blev vi såklart bjudna på innan resan
I believe the spoofers (but no proof yet) also transmit fake ephemerides in the data packages. But the stations seem to discard them. If they are precise receivers, they may sanity check the data. So my hunt is not over yet
October 30, 2025 at 8:13 PM
I believe the spoofers (but no proof yet) also transmit fake ephemerides in the data packages. But the stations seem to discard them. If they are precise receivers, they may sanity check the data. So my hunt is not over yet
Also the trajectory (ephemeris) is essential, a detailed known position of the satellites, as well as distances. With a number of known distances to satellites, the receiver can solve for a position. The more satellites the better the least square solution is
October 30, 2025 at 8:13 PM
Also the trajectory (ephemeris) is essential, a detailed known position of the satellites, as well as distances. With a number of known distances to satellites, the receiver can solve for a position. The more satellites the better the least square solution is
A recap. Satellite transmits a clock code and trajectory, based on detailed measurements on the difference vs a local clock, distances to satellites can be calculated. There are much more to this to get a precise measurement, adjustment for difference in speed of light through iono and troposphere,
October 30, 2025 at 8:13 PM
A recap. Satellite transmits a clock code and trajectory, based on detailed measurements on the difference vs a local clock, distances to satellites can be calculated. There are much more to this to get a precise measurement, adjustment for difference in speed of light through iono and troposphere,
Data is published in RINEX format, essentially containing the time codes for signals, measured signal strength, doppler shift, this can then be analyzed in many ways. Here we see signal strength vs angle over horizon. Should normally follow fairly well
October 30, 2025 at 8:13 PM
Data is published in RINEX format, essentially containing the time codes for signals, measured signal strength, doppler shift, this can then be analyzed in many ways. Here we see signal strength vs angle over horizon. Should normally follow fairly well
But why are we not solving for Kaliningrad, as all AIS data consistently is doing? We are missing one piece in the puzzle, the broadcast navigation data. I am using global known satellite trajectories. If the spoofer also transmits fake ephemerides (trajectories), we may solve for other locations
October 30, 2025 at 6:32 PM
But why are we not solving for Kaliningrad, as all AIS data consistently is doing? We are missing one piece in the puzzle, the broadcast navigation data. I am using global known satellite trajectories. If the spoofer also transmits fake ephemerides (trajectories), we may solve for other locations
This is Hoburgen data. Signal strength is OK, satellites supposedly over horizon. Code residuals are very consistent for a solution
October 30, 2025 at 6:29 PM
This is Hoburgen data. Signal strength is OK, satellites supposedly over horizon. Code residuals are very consistent for a solution
The shooting lines happens when solved for the satellites marked below. Plotted are "code residuals", ie difference from calculated time distance vs calculated distance based on satellite trajectory and known position of station. It should stay at zero, but time signal is shooting off
October 30, 2025 at 6:16 PM
The shooting lines happens when solved for the satellites marked below. Plotted are "code residuals", ie difference from calculated time distance vs calculated distance based on satellite trajectory and known position of station. It should stay at zero, but time signal is shooting off
Ryktet om det bemannade spetsflygets död verkar betydligt överdriven
Vi betackar oss för en allians av Quislingar, de skall behandlas därefter
Vi betackar oss för en allians av Quislingar, de skall behandlas därefter
October 29, 2025 at 10:57 AM
Ryktet om det bemannade spetsflygets död verkar betydligt överdriven
Vi betackar oss för en allians av Quislingar, de skall behandlas därefter
Vi betackar oss för en allians av Quislingar, de skall behandlas därefter
It is a border patrol coat, with border patrol markings and badge
October 28, 2025 at 5:41 PM
It is a border patrol coat, with border patrol markings and badge
My aim is to be able to see valid pseudorange residuals as well as ephemeris data that can resolve to spoofed locations. This would give insights to understand the mode of the spoofers, for me there are still some unknowns in the actual functionality
October 28, 2025 at 1:54 PM
My aim is to be able to see valid pseudorange residuals as well as ephemeris data that can resolve to spoofed locations. This would give insights to understand the mode of the spoofers, for me there are still some unknowns in the actual functionality