Ahahaha good idea actually might look into that

My partner had the brilliant idea of taking them from the HKS library when they were giving it away and they have been a burden ever since

Would be a good idea if I had a car ahah

Just the system bsky.app/profile/nico...

You basically just have to look at the design bureaus to identify which projects were revived. Peresvet is a clearer example than Burevestnik IMO. Burevestnik seems more of the result of few different designs between NPO Mash and Novator/nuclear-powered aviation/SLVs.

We know little about Poseidon beyond the leaked presentation aired on Russian television. Yet, given previous Soviet interest, Poseidon represents less a technical revolution than a persistence of concept. IMO it also has the most interesting history out of the novel weapons.

Soviet research institutes modeled such detonations in Lake Ladoga and later on Novaya Zemlya. The studies showed that continental shelves absorb most of the energy — massive waves dissipate rapidly, making large-scale coastal destruction physically unrealistic.

One scientist proposed that a tsunami-type wave from a 100-megaton underwater explosion could devastate portions of the U.S. coastline. Khrushchev ordered a study on its potential.

The Tsar Bomba test (1961) revived Khrushchev’s interest in ultra-high-yield systems and unconventional delivery methods. Political enthusiasm for “superweapons” spurred renewed exploration of underwater thermonuclear effects.

When the Navy finally reviewed it, naval engineers concluded that to launch the T-15, a submarine would have to approach within 40 km of defended coasts, surface for orientation, and expose itself to immediate destruction. The concept was dropped.

The T-15 concept was paired with the USSR’s first nuclear-powered submarine, Project 627. The torpedo measured roughly 23m in length, used an electric motor with an approx 30 km range, and carried a multi-megaton warhead. The project advanced without the Navy’s knowledge.

The first major attempt was Project T-15 (1949–53), initiated under Sredmash. With no submarine-launched ballistic missiles available, Soviet designers envisioned a very large thermonuclear torpedo capable of striking coastal targets.

Naturally, there are contradictory reports on it but it doesn't seem like its going to be 100-300 megatons like some western reports suggested. This one suggests 2 megatons tass.ru/armiya-i-opk...

Iran’s leadership seems to recognize the limits of threshold status. It may mean a reluctance to leverage ambiguity via visible weaponization-related activities or a search for covert, less visible pathways. The direction remains unclear, perhaps even to Iran’s own leadership.

Iran’s threshold status or latent deterrent, meanwhile, lacked credibility. It was devoid of a survivable retaliatory capability to impose tangible costs on its opponent. It was merely a signal of potential, not a capability to be actualized in the midst of war.