Nicolas Longuet-Marx
@nicolaslonguetmarx.bsky.social
Postdoctoral fellow at the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research
Political Economy | Environmental Economics | Empirical Industrial Organization
https://nicolaslonguetmarx.github.io/
Political Economy | Environmental Economics | Empirical Industrial Organization
https://nicolaslonguetmarx.github.io/
November 12, 2024 at 10:16 PM
You can read the full paper and find more of my work in political economy, environmental economics, and empirical industrial organization on my website: nicolaslonguetmarx.github.io
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Nicolas Longuet-Marx
nicolaslonguetmarx.github.io
November 12, 2024 at 9:25 PM
You can read the full paper and find more of my work in political economy, environmental economics, and empirical industrial organization on my website: nicolaslonguetmarx.github.io
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I show that current Democratic positions on the environment, which are heavily cultural, deter less-educated voters. In contrast, an equally progressive policy with a stronger economic focus, like a 'Green New Deal,' would attract more support from these voters.
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November 12, 2024 at 9:25 PM
I show that current Democratic positions on the environment, which are heavily cultural, deter less-educated voters. In contrast, an equally progressive policy with a stronger economic focus, like a 'Green New Deal,' would attract more support from these voters.
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In the final section of the paper, I use the model to examine how parties' cultural polarization shapes voter support for environmental policy. I show that Democratic candidates' environmental stances are largely cultural, while Republicans emphasize economic dimensions more.
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November 12, 2024 at 9:24 PM
In the final section of the paper, I use the model to examine how parties' cultural polarization shapes voter support for environmental policy. I show that Democratic candidates' environmental stances are largely cultural, while Republicans emphasize economic dimensions more.
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In contrast, shifts on the demand side—particularly less-educated voters' growing support for progressive economic policies—have pulled less-educated voters toward Democratic candidates. Without these changes, partisan realignment would have been even more pronounced.
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November 12, 2024 at 9:24 PM
In contrast, shifts on the demand side—particularly less-educated voters' growing support for progressive economic policies—have pulled less-educated voters toward Democratic candidates. Without these changes, partisan realignment would have been even more pronounced.
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I show that parties' polarization on cultural issues has been a key driver of realignment, leading Democratic candidates to lose less-educated voters and attract more-educated ones. This cultural polarization has been only slightly offset by moderate economic polarization.
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November 12, 2024 at 9:24 PM
I show that parties' polarization on cultural issues has been a key driver of realignment, leading Democratic candidates to lose less-educated voters and attract more-educated ones. This cultural polarization has been only slightly offset by moderate economic polarization.
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Step 5: Finally, I evaluate how much of the observed changes in voting behavior arise from demand-side versus supply-side factors by simulating counterfactual scenarios in which one factor is held constant.
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November 12, 2024 at 9:23 PM
Step 5: Finally, I evaluate how much of the observed changes in voting behavior arise from demand-side versus supply-side factors by simulating counterfactual scenarios in which one factor is held constant.
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I show that party discipline is much stronger in the Republican Party and has grown over time in both parties, leading to an overall uniformity of candidates within each party around the positions of party leaders.
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November 12, 2024 at 9:23 PM
I show that party discipline is much stronger in the Republican Party and has grown over time in both parties, leading to an overall uniformity of candidates within each party around the positions of party leaders.
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Step 4: I estimate a model of candidate behavior to assess the degree to which candidates can adjust their positions to reflect constituent demands (from step 3) versus how much they are constrained by the party line.
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November 12, 2024 at 9:23 PM
Step 4: I estimate a model of candidate behavior to assess the degree to which candidates can adjust their positions to reflect constituent demands (from step 3) versus how much they are constrained by the party line.
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I show that less-educated voters consistently support conservative stances on cultural issues while becoming more supportive of progressive economic policies. The reverse is true for more-educated voters.
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November 12, 2024 at 9:23 PM
I show that less-educated voters consistently support conservative stances on cultural issues while becoming more supportive of progressive economic policies. The reverse is true for more-educated voters.
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A key challenge is that candidates choose their positions partly based on unobserved voter preferences. To isolate causal effects, I compare contiguous precincts across district borders, with precincts sharing a similar taste shock but facing candidates with different positions.
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November 12, 2024 at 9:23 PM
A key challenge is that candidates choose their positions partly based on unobserved voter preferences. To isolate causal effects, I compare contiguous precincts across district borders, with precincts sharing a similar taste shock but facing candidates with different positions.
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Step 3: I estimate voter demand for House candidate positions using a structural model of voting behavior, revealing how voters respond to their candidates' stances.
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November 12, 2024 at 9:22 PM
Step 3: I estimate voter demand for House candidate positions using a structural model of voting behavior, revealing how voters respond to their candidates' stances.
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Tracking the evolution of candidate positions over time reveals that polarization on cultural issues has become twice as pronounced as on economic issues.
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November 12, 2024 at 9:22 PM
Tracking the evolution of candidate positions over time reveals that polarization on cultural issues has become twice as pronounced as on economic issues.
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Step 2: To measure House candidate positioning since 2000, I build a multimodal text-and-survey model, combining candidate website and survey data to determine their stances on cultural and economic dimensions.
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November 12, 2024 at 9:22 PM
Step 2: To measure House candidate positioning since 2000, I build a multimodal text-and-survey model, combining candidate website and survey data to determine their stances on cultural and economic dimensions.
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I also show that this trend didn’t start in 2016; rather, there has been a gradual increase in the correlation between education and Democratic voting over time.
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November 12, 2024 at 9:21 PM
I also show that this trend didn’t start in 2016; rather, there has been a gradual increase in the correlation between education and Democratic voting over time.
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I show that realignment along educational lines has outpaced shifts along other demographic dimensions, such as income or race and ethnicity.
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November 12, 2024 at 9:21 PM
I show that realignment along educational lines has outpaced shifts along other demographic dimensions, such as income or race and ethnicity.
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Step 1: To precisely track voting patterns, I build a new panel dataset of precinct-level election results since 2000, capturing changes at a very granular level (~1,000 voters per precinct, totaling 1.6 million precinct results).
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November 12, 2024 at 9:21 PM
Step 1: To precisely track voting patterns, I build a new panel dataset of precinct-level election results since 2000, capturing changes at a very granular level (~1,000 voters per precinct, totaling 1.6 million precinct results).
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This thread outlines the paper's strategy, which is built on 5 key steps:
November 12, 2024 at 9:20 PM
This thread outlines the paper's strategy, which is built on 5 key steps:
TL;DR: I show that parties’ stronger polarization on cultural vs. economic issues has been the main driver of voter realignment. Meanwhile, shifts in preferences—esp. blue-collar voters' growing support for progressive economic policies—have slowed their defection from Democrats.
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November 12, 2024 at 9:20 PM
TL;DR: I show that parties’ stronger polarization on cultural vs. economic issues has been the main driver of voter realignment. Meanwhile, shifts in preferences—esp. blue-collar voters' growing support for progressive economic policies—have slowed their defection from Democrats.
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