The coming months will be fascinating to observe, as Khamenei rebuilds his military command and new players enter the field. This change could presage a new era of Iranian security policy in a variety of unexpected ways.

These entities play critical roles in regime external and internal security. Whoever proceeds to control them will exercise very significant influence over how the regime operates and pursues strategic effects across the Middle East.

Khamenei also needs to appoint a new chief of the IRGC Intelligence Organization, which handles domestic oppression and social control. It also commonly intervenes in domestic political affairs to discredit rival factions.

Notably, Khamenei has yet to fill some crucial positions since Israel killed the incumbents. These positions include the commander of the KoA Central HQ, which is Iran’s seniormost operational HQ and is responsible for joint and wartime operations.

Remnants of the Command Network and like-minded elements could very well retain their influence amid this intra-regime contest for influence. But it’s not guaranteed, especially given that they were the architects of the strategy that got them into the most recent mess and has demonstrably failed.

Israel has ripped this malign fraternity apart, leaving a significant gap in the regime’s strategic-level decision-making space as well as the supreme leader’s inner circle. Supreme Leader Khamenei must now decide how to fill this void.

The Command Network has also come together in times of domestic crisis to assert its political preferences. Perhaps the most notable instance was when the network members wrote a threatening letter to the Iranian president in 1999, demanding that he brutally crack down on student protests.

In the intervening decades, they maintained their close ties and rose together through the ranks. They ultimately came to dominate the highest echelons of the military establishment.

These Command Network members befriended one another when they were young, fighting in the trenches against Saddam Hussein's Iraq in the 1980s.

And while these new elements ascend, older ones will may face decline. Many of the officers killed constituted one of the most enduring and powerful regime factions, which CTP-ISW has historically described as the IRGC Command Network.

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Replacing these individuals will involve elevating a “younger” cadre of military officers, which will in turn reshape how the regime operates at a fundamental level, especially given the extent to which the military (i.e. IRGC) pervades most elements of Iranian society these days.

Israel killed dozens of IRGC general officers during the war, removing figures who had held their positions for years and, in some cases, decades. Some were extremely influential in shaping Iranian strategy and military policy, serving as long-time advisers to the supreme leader.

This text is an important artifact for understanding how Tehran will revise its regional strategy and security doctrine moving forward. We are publishing this text to boost awareness, especially given IRGC efforts to downplay its revelations.