Even more striking: the shift to euro lending happened regardless of the bank’s national jurisdiction, i.e. whether the ultimate parent was American, European/G7, or from a non-sanctioning country.

[6/10]

We zoom in on the UK using confidential bank-level data, and show that most of the new euro lending came from the same banks that had decreased their USD lending: both banks that started lending in EUR (🟨👇), and those already lending in EUR which started to lend more
(🟦👇).

[4/10]

But this aggregate picture disguises a striking underlying fact: the share of cross-border lending to Russia in US dollars fell from 65% to 25%. Meanwhile, euro-denominated lending rose from 20% to 45%. (Source: BIS LBS)

How did that happen?

[3/10]

Following the 2014 invasion of Crimea and the imposition of financial sanctions on Russia, global cross-border lending to Russia declined significantly. (Source: BIS LBS)

[2/10]

📣📣📣 New paper out 📣📣📣
With Giovanni Rosso and Roger Vicquery, we study the interplay between financial sanctions and dollar dominance focusing on how post-2014 international lending to Russia de-dollarized ($⬇) in favour of a euroization (€⬆️) ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid...
🧵👇[1/10]

#EconSky

Fantastic 10th Annual West Coast Workshop in International Finance at Santa Clara last Friday. Huge thanks to Vito Cormun, Helen Popper, @sanjaysingh.bsky.social and all organisers!
Top research by colleagues and great to share the latest version of our paper on UK export dollarization post-Brexit.

Really great to see our research on the impact of Brexit on UK trade featured in today’s @adamtooze.bsky.social Chartbook.