💥 "Navigating the New Nuclear Map" 💥

The nuclear landscape is more complex than ever. Our multi-author roundtable chaired by @laurensukin.bsky.social and @rohanmukherjee.bsky.social explores the evolving challenges, from Asia to Europe and the Middle East. 🌍⚛️

tnsr.org/roundtable/n...

How are alliances like AUKUS and cooperation between Russia, China, and North Korea reshaping the nuclear order? @laurensukin.bsky.social and @rohanmukherjee.bsky.social introduce the essays and explore the effects of domestic politics and global competition.

📖 Read here: tnsr.org/roundtable/n...

The work builds on a recent article we published in Contemporary Security Policy on U.S. approaches to ally vs. partner relationships in the Indo-Pacific. Check out that research here: www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10....

In this article, we argue that members of Congress, state governments, and American industry all have a role to play in strengthening and solidifying these critical relationships.

Unlike its approach to European allies, which has been largely cold and critical, the Trump administration has emphasised the threat from China and importance of alliance commitments in containing it. At the same time, many of the key points of collaboration that make alliances strong are weakening.

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As the U.S. has increasingly relied on partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region, understanding the benefits and limitations of these arrangements is crucial.

Read our article here: www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10....

3.) Both the type and the quality of a relationship matter. Beyond the (in)formality of a state's relationship to the U.S., its economic, social, and military closeness also influence the public support it would receive in a crisis.

2.) The U.S. public is more likely to endorse sending support to treaty allies than to partners, but the relationship a state has with Washington has a smaller effect on whether the U.S. public would support retaliating against China on its behalf.

1.) The U.S. public is relatively conflict-averse, even in the face of significant great power rivalry. If China aggressed against a U.S. ally or partner, the U.S. public would be willing to offer friendly support, but would be reticent to retaliate.

As the U.S. increasingly relies on partnerships in its Indo-Pacific strategy, understanding the benefits and limitations of these arrangements is crucial.

Read more here: www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.....

3.) Both the type and the quality of a relationship matter. Beyond the (in)formality of a state's relationship to the U.S., its economic, social, and military closeness also influence the public support it would receive in a crisis.

2.) The U.S. public is more likely to endorse sending support to treaty allies than to partners, but the relationship a state has with Washington has a smaller effect on whether the U.S. public would support retaliating against China on its behalf.

1.) The U.S. public is relatively conflict-averse, even in the face of significant great power rivalry. If China aggressed against a U.S. ally or partner, the U.S. public would be willing to offer friendly support, but would be reticent to retaliate.

Our article is part of an upcoming special edition of JPAND, so keep an eye out for some exciting new work about regional nuclear challenges. Particular thanks goes out to the Federation of American Scientists for convening!