Justin Bloesch
@justinbloesch.bsky.social
Assistant Professor at Cornell. Macro, labor, inequality. "Bloesch" rhymes with "mesh".
Seems like in March, people shifted from nondurable goods to front-run durable goods spending.
More evidence of front-running for
@econberger.bsky.social.
Probably more extreme in April? Question is if nondurable spending will bounce back after real durable purchases drop.
More evidence of front-running for
@econberger.bsky.social.
Probably more extreme in April? Question is if nondurable spending will bounce back after real durable purchases drop.
May 3, 2025 at 1:59 PM
Seems like in March, people shifted from nondurable goods to front-run durable goods spending.
More evidence of front-running for
@econberger.bsky.social.
Probably more extreme in April? Question is if nondurable spending will bounce back after real durable purchases drop.
More evidence of front-running for
@econberger.bsky.social.
Probably more extreme in April? Question is if nondurable spending will bounce back after real durable purchases drop.
The big wildcard here is professional and business services.
Job growth surged coming out of COVID but has completely stalled the last two years. I don't have a good story as to why, but I doubt the recent stagnation is AI-related.
Job growth surged coming out of COVID but has completely stalled the last two years. I don't have a good story as to why, but I doubt the recent stagnation is AI-related.
May 2, 2025 at 1:48 AM
The big wildcard here is professional and business services.
Job growth surged coming out of COVID but has completely stalled the last two years. I don't have a good story as to why, but I doubt the recent stagnation is AI-related.
Job growth surged coming out of COVID but has completely stalled the last two years. I don't have a good story as to why, but I doubt the recent stagnation is AI-related.
The job growth engine of healthcare, education, and government the last two years is running out of steam, as the share of employment in these sectors has rebalanced after COVID.
May 2, 2025 at 1:48 AM
The job growth engine of healthcare, education, and government the last two years is running out of steam, as the share of employment in these sectors has rebalanced after COVID.
Construction employment is unlikely to pick up the slack. Construction spending and construction payroll spending move together quite tightly, and construction spending is clearly slowing down.
High interest rates and tariffs on inputs make the employment outlook worse.
High interest rates and tariffs on inputs make the employment outlook worse.
May 2, 2025 at 1:48 AM
Construction employment is unlikely to pick up the slack. Construction spending and construction payroll spending move together quite tightly, and construction spending is clearly slowing down.
High interest rates and tariffs on inputs make the employment outlook worse.
High interest rates and tariffs on inputs make the employment outlook worse.
Plus, as booming sectors pulled back in 2022/23, traditionally non-cyclical sectors like healthcare and government had a lot of catch up hiring to do after under-hiring relative to their pre-COVID trend.
May 2, 2025 at 1:48 AM
Plus, as booming sectors pulled back in 2022/23, traditionally non-cyclical sectors like healthcare and government had a lot of catch up hiring to do after under-hiring relative to their pre-COVID trend.
I think a lot of people have an intuition that tight labor markets (measured by the unemployment rate gap) should predict higher real wage growth.
Nope!
Nope!
April 30, 2025 at 3:21 PM
I think a lot of people have an intuition that tight labor markets (measured by the unemployment rate gap) should predict higher real wage growth.
Nope!
Nope!
With JOLTS and ECI out, we can update some graphs!
Here is the relationship between the 4 quarter moving average of the private quits rate vs 4 quarter nominal growth in employment cost index wages and salaries for non-union workers, since 1991.
Pretty good.
Here is the relationship between the 4 quarter moving average of the private quits rate vs 4 quarter nominal growth in employment cost index wages and salaries for non-union workers, since 1991.
Pretty good.
April 30, 2025 at 3:21 PM
With JOLTS and ECI out, we can update some graphs!
Here is the relationship between the 4 quarter moving average of the private quits rate vs 4 quarter nominal growth in employment cost index wages and salaries for non-union workers, since 1991.
Pretty good.
Here is the relationship between the 4 quarter moving average of the private quits rate vs 4 quarter nominal growth in employment cost index wages and salaries for non-union workers, since 1991.
Pretty good.
Wage growth is largely back to normal for non-union workers.
The surge in catch-up wage growth for union workers looks like it is coming to a close.
The surge in catch-up wage growth for union workers looks like it is coming to a close.
April 30, 2025 at 2:37 PM
Wage growth is largely back to normal for non-union workers.
The surge in catch-up wage growth for union workers looks like it is coming to a close.
The surge in catch-up wage growth for union workers looks like it is coming to a close.
Now that we're entering a totally new economic policy world, it's worth reflecting on the remarkable "landing" of the economy from the COVID era inflation.
Never before has the US achieved such a large slowdown in nominal GDP growth without a fall in employment rate for people aged 25-54.
Never before has the US achieved such a large slowdown in nominal GDP growth without a fall in employment rate for people aged 25-54.
March 12, 2025 at 2:38 PM
Now that we're entering a totally new economic policy world, it's worth reflecting on the remarkable "landing" of the economy from the COVID era inflation.
Never before has the US achieved such a large slowdown in nominal GDP growth without a fall in employment rate for people aged 25-54.
Never before has the US achieved such a large slowdown in nominal GDP growth without a fall in employment rate for people aged 25-54.
Lastly, was high nominal wage growth responding to inflation, or was it a result of tight labor markets?
While it's hard to parse empirically, *posted* wages rose before either realized inflation or inflation expectations.
While it's hard to parse empirically, *posted* wages rose before either realized inflation or inflation expectations.
January 10, 2025 at 5:08 PM
Lastly, was high nominal wage growth responding to inflation, or was it a result of tight labor markets?
While it's hard to parse empirically, *posted* wages rose before either realized inflation or inflation expectations.
While it's hard to parse empirically, *posted* wages rose before either realized inflation or inflation expectations.
This is my favorite graph in the paper: relative to the pre-COVID trend, employment levels by industry recovered *very* unevenly, as remote work, health risk, and demand for goods disrupted labor markets.
But since early 2022, most industries have returned to their old trends.
But since early 2022, most industries have returned to their old trends.
January 10, 2025 at 5:08 PM
This is my favorite graph in the paper: relative to the pre-COVID trend, employment levels by industry recovered *very* unevenly, as remote work, health risk, and demand for goods disrupted labor markets.
But since early 2022, most industries have returned to their old trends.
But since early 2022, most industries have returned to their old trends.
So how about COVID? The disruption shifted out the Beveridge curve, suggesting that it was hard to match workers with jobs.
But since April 2022, the Beveridge curve has shifted back in.
Are there other indicators that labor market mismatch has faded? I would say yes:
But since April 2022, the Beveridge curve has shifted back in.
Are there other indicators that labor market mismatch has faded? I would say yes:
January 10, 2025 at 5:08 PM
So how about COVID? The disruption shifted out the Beveridge curve, suggesting that it was hard to match workers with jobs.
But since April 2022, the Beveridge curve has shifted back in.
Are there other indicators that labor market mismatch has faded? I would say yes:
But since April 2022, the Beveridge curve has shifted back in.
Are there other indicators that labor market mismatch has faded? I would say yes:
Job openings could be useful for measuring labor market tightness, but the level of job openings has risen over time relative to quits and hires.
This raises doubts about whether job openings is comparable over time (as Simon Mongey has written about as well).
This raises doubts about whether job openings is comparable over time (as Simon Mongey has written about as well).
January 10, 2025 at 5:08 PM
Job openings could be useful for measuring labor market tightness, but the level of job openings has risen over time relative to quits and hires.
This raises doubts about whether job openings is comparable over time (as Simon Mongey has written about as well).
This raises doubts about whether job openings is comparable over time (as Simon Mongey has written about as well).
First, there is a wage Phillips curve. Lots of labor market variables do well in predicting nominal wage growth, and the quits rate does really well.
This makes sense: turnover is costly, and firms raise wages to prevent turnover.
This makes sense: turnover is costly, and firms raise wages to prevent turnover.
January 10, 2025 at 5:08 PM
First, there is a wage Phillips curve. Lots of labor market variables do well in predicting nominal wage growth, and the quits rate does really well.
This makes sense: turnover is costly, and firms raise wages to prevent turnover.
This makes sense: turnover is costly, and firms raise wages to prevent turnover.
The gap between job openings are real labor market flows (hires and quits) in JOLTS widens again.
I worry about the comparability of the level of job openings over time. The divergence makes reading the labor market in real time harder.
I worry about the comparability of the level of job openings over time. The divergence makes reading the labor market in real time harder.
January 7, 2025 at 4:28 PM
The gap between job openings are real labor market flows (hires and quits) in JOLTS widens again.
I worry about the comparability of the level of job openings over time. The divergence makes reading the labor market in real time harder.
I worry about the comparability of the level of job openings over time. The divergence makes reading the labor market in real time harder.
Lastly, wage growth for construction workers has remained strong as the sector continues to pull in new workers. I think part of the reason the labor market slowdown didn't turn into a recession is the strength of the construction sector.
December 15, 2024 at 1:56 AM
Lastly, wage growth for construction workers has remained strong as the sector continues to pull in new workers. I think part of the reason the labor market slowdown didn't turn into a recession is the strength of the construction sector.
A big story of the COVID recovery was also that wages grew the fastest for low-wage workers. This is now starting to reverse a bit, as wage growth for low-wage workers slows, but wage growth for high-wage workers is staying high.
December 15, 2024 at 1:56 AM
A big story of the COVID recovery was also that wages grew the fastest for low-wage workers. This is now starting to reverse a bit, as wage growth for low-wage workers slows, but wage growth for high-wage workers is staying high.
I've posted before that wage growth for unionized workers has been catching up to the growth that non-unionized workers saw in 2022-2023. A large chunk of this is also public sector workers, whose pay growth was previously lagging. The public sector is now doing some catch-up.
December 15, 2024 at 1:56 AM
I've posted before that wage growth for unionized workers has been catching up to the growth that non-unionized workers saw in 2022-2023. A large chunk of this is also public sector workers, whose pay growth was previously lagging. The public sector is now doing some catch-up.
The latest one-month reading of the Atlanta Fed tracker is down to 3.8%,well within the range of normal in past business cycle highs. While I expect this to bounce around quite a bit, I see little evidence that nominal wage growth has been 'sticky' coming down.
December 15, 2024 at 1:56 AM
The latest one-month reading of the Atlanta Fed tracker is down to 3.8%,well within the range of normal in past business cycle highs. While I expect this to bounce around quite a bit, I see little evidence that nominal wage growth has been 'sticky' coming down.
When wage growth series disagree, it's helpful when another series comes in clearly on one side. Average hourly earnings has been ticking back up, while ECI has been slowing down.
But with the latest Atlanta Fed wage tracker reading, it's clear that the slowdown in wage growth is continuing.
But with the latest Atlanta Fed wage tracker reading, it's clear that the slowdown in wage growth is continuing.
December 15, 2024 at 1:56 AM
When wage growth series disagree, it's helpful when another series comes in clearly on one side. Average hourly earnings has been ticking back up, while ECI has been slowing down.
But with the latest Atlanta Fed wage tracker reading, it's clear that the slowdown in wage growth is continuing.
But with the latest Atlanta Fed wage tracker reading, it's clear that the slowdown in wage growth is continuing.
JOLTS round up: quits up, layoffs down, vacancies per quit and vacancies per hire are still elevated.
These numbers are more consistent with a 4.1% unemployment rate than were the JOTLS numbers from the last few months.
These numbers are more consistent with a 4.1% unemployment rate than were the JOTLS numbers from the last few months.
December 3, 2024 at 3:17 PM
JOLTS round up: quits up, layoffs down, vacancies per quit and vacancies per hire are still elevated.
These numbers are more consistent with a 4.1% unemployment rate than were the JOTLS numbers from the last few months.
These numbers are more consistent with a 4.1% unemployment rate than were the JOTLS numbers from the last few months.
Kicking off my bluesky posts, I was digging through employment cost index data for union and nonunion workers going back to 1995. Here you go:
November 19, 2024 at 3:55 PM
Kicking off my bluesky posts, I was digging through employment cost index data for union and nonunion workers going back to 1995. Here you go: