Confused CPT
@josh97.bsky.social
Combined Arms, History, Star Wars, and INDOPACOM
Oh yeah. Fall is coming
September 19, 2025 at 2:58 PM
Oh yeah. Fall is coming
Oh man - we haven’t had Once an Eagle discourse in a minute!!!
(I kinda agree with the author)
(I kinda agree with the author)
September 9, 2025 at 7:53 PM
Oh man - we haven’t had Once an Eagle discourse in a minute!!!
(I kinda agree with the author)
(I kinda agree with the author)
Literally the source article describes how this is a myth and ignores that 1) the militia mostly sucked 2) Fredrich von Steuben
August 23, 2025 at 9:58 PM
Literally the source article describes how this is a myth and ignores that 1) the militia mostly sucked 2) Fredrich von Steuben
This book literally led to this paper. Like had some suspicion of WWII food crises just from logic and random sentences in books that it was something hiding just out of stage
thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2...
thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2...
August 1, 2025 at 9:53 PM
This book literally led to this paper. Like had some suspicion of WWII food crises just from logic and random sentences in books that it was something hiding just out of stage
thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2...
thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2...
Play (combined arms breach) theory
July 19, 2025 at 3:22 AM
Play (combined arms breach) theory
“Oh look we reinvented the Raven”
July 17, 2025 at 9:24 PM
“Oh look we reinvented the Raven”
Don’t worry - I’m sure the USMC will get a chance to show how they can march better
June 15, 2025 at 2:14 AM
Don’t worry - I’m sure the USMC will get a chance to show how they can march better
For @davidalman.bsky.social point about why drones. Seems pretty clear it’s because in positional/attritional warfare everyone goes for increasing firepower vice manpower (WW1-MGs and artillery, WWII-same but now tanks) and the UAF is pretty short on artillery
static.rusi.org/tactical-dev...
static.rusi.org/tactical-dev...
June 4, 2025 at 3:58 PM
For @davidalman.bsky.social point about why drones. Seems pretty clear it’s because in positional/attritional warfare everyone goes for increasing firepower vice manpower (WW1-MGs and artillery, WWII-same but now tanks) and the UAF is pretty short on artillery
static.rusi.org/tactical-dev...
static.rusi.org/tactical-dev...
This does make more sense now tbh
June 2, 2025 at 6:53 PM
This does make more sense now tbh
www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Mil...
Oh yeah we need 25th, 101, 82nd in the INDOPACIFIC. Just perhaps not the way you expect
Oh yeah we need 25th, 101, 82nd in the INDOPACIFIC. Just perhaps not the way you expect
June 1, 2025 at 3:03 PM
www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Mil...
Oh yeah we need 25th, 101, 82nd in the INDOPACIFIC. Just perhaps not the way you expect
Oh yeah we need 25th, 101, 82nd in the INDOPACIFIC. Just perhaps not the way you expect
Except for the fact that average rate of an advance for an ABCT currently appears to be about 6-7 kilometers/day (hello DuPiy institute lol)- not exactly blitzkrieging
And there’s plenty of spots where you should go slow and lead with infantry. Especially considering how weak BH is
And there’s plenty of spots where you should go slow and lead with infantry. Especially considering how weak BH is
April 25, 2025 at 5:35 PM
Except for the fact that average rate of an advance for an ABCT currently appears to be about 6-7 kilometers/day (hello DuPiy institute lol)- not exactly blitzkrieging
And there’s plenty of spots where you should go slow and lead with infantry. Especially considering how weak BH is
And there’s plenty of spots where you should go slow and lead with infantry. Especially considering how weak BH is
Robert Leonard would like a word about focusing on long range lethality and protective fight and forgetting the close 6/x
April 25, 2025 at 5:35 PM
Robert Leonard would like a word about focusing on long range lethality and protective fight and forgetting the close 6/x
Yes, but also BTGs weren’t designed to do that and the initial concept of operations did the invasion was the UAF wasn’t gonna resist and this is an occupation so tight ROE + limited warning so like they didn’t even try to do that lol 5/x
April 25, 2025 at 5:35 PM
Yes, but also BTGs weren’t designed to do that and the initial concept of operations did the invasion was the UAF wasn’t gonna resist and this is an occupation so tight ROE + limited warning so like they didn’t even try to do that lol 5/x
Yes, but also 16 months into a near-peer mechanized war losing 1200 tanks isn’t actually that bad. That’s 80 tanks/month. I don’t have monthly AFV losses in the ETO 1939-45 but I’m pretty sure no one would bat an eye at that. The problem is more of a can industry replace that 4/
April 25, 2025 at 5:35 PM
Yes, but also 16 months into a near-peer mechanized war losing 1200 tanks isn’t actually that bad. That’s 80 tanks/month. I don’t have monthly AFV losses in the ETO 1939-45 but I’m pretty sure no one would bat an eye at that. The problem is more of a can industry replace that 4/
This is an interesting analysis but although while dismount:AFV ratio is a data point, I don’t know if it’s always the best one
For example it misses that a Russian MECH IN PLT dismounts ~12 riflemen a US MECH IN PLT dismounts ~27.
3/
For example it misses that a Russian MECH IN PLT dismounts ~12 riflemen a US MECH IN PLT dismounts ~27.
3/
April 25, 2025 at 5:35 PM
This is an interesting analysis but although while dismount:AFV ratio is a data point, I don’t know if it’s always the best one
For example it misses that a Russian MECH IN PLT dismounts ~12 riflemen a US MECH IN PLT dismounts ~27.
3/
For example it misses that a Russian MECH IN PLT dismounts ~12 riflemen a US MECH IN PLT dismounts ~27.
3/
Previously mentioned this but it is bitterly ironic to me that at the exact same time there’s arguments that the UAF going infantry heavy in their concept of operations is wrong, 1-8 CAV is going no yeah that probably the right strategy 2/?
April 25, 2025 at 5:35 PM
Previously mentioned this but it is bitterly ironic to me that at the exact same time there’s arguments that the UAF going infantry heavy in their concept of operations is wrong, 1-8 CAV is going no yeah that probably the right strategy 2/?
I’d say read doctrine but we literally haven’t had doctrine in armor operations in restricted terrain except don’t do it (thanks lol) since 1998
April 22, 2025 at 2:41 PM
I’d say read doctrine but we literally haven’t had doctrine in armor operations in restricted terrain except don’t do it (thanks lol) since 1998
(L) U.S. officials in the summer of 2023: The Ukrainians need to mass armor and breach natural and manmade (fortifications) restricted terrain. Stop this lead with IN shit
(R): 1-8 CAV, 2/1 CD literally at the same time. We should consider using IN to pull armor forward in restricted terrain
(R): 1-8 CAV, 2/1 CD literally at the same time. We should consider using IN to pull armor forward in restricted terrain
April 22, 2025 at 2:39 PM
(L) U.S. officials in the summer of 2023: The Ukrainians need to mass armor and breach natural and manmade (fortifications) restricted terrain. Stop this lead with IN shit
(R): 1-8 CAV, 2/1 CD literally at the same time. We should consider using IN to pull armor forward in restricted terrain
(R): 1-8 CAV, 2/1 CD literally at the same time. We should consider using IN to pull armor forward in restricted terrain
April 13, 2025 at 4:04 PM