But ask me about universal pharmacare at your own risk, because I will absolutely get into the weeds on that topic and talk your ear off.

This got long and rambley. My ultimate point, though, is that I see echoes of bad 2003 American foreign policy in what Canada is asking from Palestine. It feels like we're setting them up for failure. I don't see how this will bring peace to the region. We need to do better.

When there is, inevitably, a return to violence, will Canada do anything to ensure that Israel doesn't annex everything, as their current government has always wanted to do? Or will we be supplying Israel with the tools to do so, while insisting to Canadians that we're not?

But say that, somehow, Palestine pulls it off. What is Canada prepared to do to ensure the success of a Palestinian state? Because it's going to be rough, and Israel will do everything they can to see that it fails.

Canada has given Palestine less than two months to do the impossible. Cynically, this might be so that we have an out; the conditions were not met, so we won't recognise statehood, even if we knew we were asking for too much from the start.

That failure was the result of Israeli interference, and there is no reason to believe that won't happen again. How will a demilitarized Palestine resist? Violence and terrorism are what happens when people see no other option and feel like they have nothing left to lose.

In order to avoid any power vacuum, Gazans will have to see the government actually working for them. This failure was the reason why Hamas was elected to begin with, back in 2006. The existing Palestinian Authority wasn't working for them, and Hamas offered change.

After two years of bombings, starvation, and genocide in Gaza, I don't know what's left of Gaza's civil service. My hope, though, is that at least some are able to remain in order to ensure that the new Palestinian government is able to actually govern the region, not just in name but in practice.

Part of the problem with de-Ba'athifaction was the removal of many members of the Iraqi civil service. These are the people who *do* government. Their experience is invaluable, especially during a government transition. In Gaza, that's Hamas.

Hamas has controlled Gaza for nearly 20 years. What will a transfer of power look like in Gaza if they see the results as illegitimate? They could be ousted by force, but how would that be viewed by the citizens? How would that impact the transition from a Hamas government to whoever comes next?

Democracies are fragile. Part of what makes them work are the committment to certain norms. We saw what happens when those norms are challenged on January 6, 2020. One norm is the acceptance of the results of an election, another is the peaceful transfer of power.

Even if there's a way logistically to hold an election in Gaza given the situation on the ground, and even if Israel doesn't interfere in the election, the mere fact that Hamas cannot run means that there will be some who will see the results of the election as illegitimate.

Canada is insisting on democratic elections in 2026, and one of the principles of a free and fair democracy is that anyone can run. We're saying that Hamas cannot participate, meaning that the election will be flawed from the start.

Which brings me to my next point: there can be no role for Hamas. This means no military, yes, but who else will be barred from prevented from participating in government?

In order for Palestine to meet the conditions Canada is imposing, at a minimum, Hamas' military must disarm, or disband. What will happen to those soldiers? Is the September deadline enough time to make a plan for them?

There was no plan for what those highly-trained former soldiers would do when the military was disbanded. They formed part of the insurgency and civil war that followed the American- lead invasion, and you can draw a direct line between this action and the rise and success of the Islamic State.

These two things in combination remind me of the disastrous de-Ba'athifaction policy perused in Iraq in the aftermath of the 2003 invasion. This policy lead to the firing of anyone affiliated with Saddam Hussein's Ba'ath party, including members of the military.

First, demilitarization. This leaves Palestine more vulnerable to Israeli aggression, especially given the Israeli government's opposition to a two-state solution. I think it's also worth considering what will happen to those individuals, especially given the second condition: no role for Hamas.

Not good enough. Recognize Palestinian statehood unconditionally, acknowledge the genocide committed against them, sanction Israel, and truly stop sending *all* weapons to them. Do better.