https://jamesbreckwoldt.substack.com
https://scholar.google.co.uk/citations?user=lMLT7b8AAAAJ&hl=en&oi=ao
In reality, the anti-growth coalition looks like this:
In reality, the anti-growth coalition looks like this:
Non-voters stand out as consistently most anti-growth across nearly every question.
Next most anti-growth groups are either Green or Reform UK supporters, depending on the specific question.
Non-voters stand out as consistently most anti-growth across nearly every question.
Next most anti-growth groups are either Green or Reform UK supporters, depending on the specific question.
At other end, non-voters, Reform and Green voters show most anti-growth attitudes.
This gives further evidence of how growth beliefs do not map neatly onto traditional divides.
At other end, non-voters, Reform and Green voters show most anti-growth attitudes.
This gives further evidence of how growth beliefs do not map neatly onto traditional divides.
People in most elite jobs much more likely to hold pro-growth views
Skilled manual workers (rather than semi-skilled or unskilled) are the most anti-growth.
This relates to how exposed these jobs have been to automation in the past
People in most elite jobs much more likely to hold pro-growth views
Skilled manual workers (rather than semi-skilled or unskilled) are the most anti-growth.
This relates to how exposed these jobs have been to automation in the past
Views about the benefits/downsides of growth form both internally coherent belief system but also a separate dimension of thinking that cuts across the usual boundaries.
Views about the benefits/downsides of growth form both internally coherent belief system but also a separate dimension of thinking that cuts across the usual boundaries.
There are 3 distinct dimensions of political beliefs. Each is consistent within its own group but clearly different from others.
There are 3 distinct dimensions of political beliefs. Each is consistent within its own group but clearly different from others.
All the statements loaded in the same direction, which means that people who agreed with one statement were also likely to agree with the others. People don’t just support/oppose one aspect of growth, they tend to support/oppose the rest too.
All the statements loaded in the same direction, which means that people who agreed with one statement were also likely to agree with the others. People don’t just support/oppose one aspect of growth, they tend to support/oppose the rest too.
politicians mean?
Respondents given chance to type whatever they wanted and nine common topics raised.
Most frequent: something about national prosperity, but without a specific indicator mentioned.
politicians mean?
Respondents given chance to type whatever they wanted and nine common topics raised.
Most frequent: something about national prosperity, but without a specific indicator mentioned.
Reality: Oh it's mostly similar to her previous 2 albums
Luckily, someone used AI to make songs using quotes from politicians set to styles/artists big during time in office: jamesbreckwoldt.substack.com/p/what-happe...
Including Swiftie Sunak one
Full songs in article
Reality: Oh it's mostly similar to her previous 2 albums
Luckily, someone used AI to make songs using quotes from politicians set to styles/artists big during time in office: jamesbreckwoldt.substack.com/p/what-happe...
Including Swiftie Sunak one
Full songs in article
In article, I discuss power of immigration as electoral issue using analogies of:
- hype for Oasis's Be Here Now
- hype for Avengers: Endgame
- Di Maria and De Bruyne's transfer fees
- Comical Ali
- Paraphrasing something Sigmund Freud didn’t say
- Simpsons memes
In article, I discuss power of immigration as electoral issue using analogies of:
- hype for Oasis's Be Here Now
- hype for Avengers: Endgame
- Di Maria and De Bruyne's transfer fees
- Comical Ali
- Paraphrasing something Sigmund Freud didn’t say
- Simpsons memes
- Former Conservatives: 5.6 to 8.7
- Former non-voters: 4.0 to 8.1
- Former Labour voters: 3.6 to 7.9
- Former other party voters: 4.6 to 8.2
- Former Conservatives: 5.6 to 8.7
- Former non-voters: 4.0 to 8.1
- Former Labour voters: 3.6 to 7.9
- Former other party voters: 4.6 to 8.2
For most groups, no other party comes close. The only exception is the ex-Conservatives (but Reform still ahead)
For most groups, no other party comes close. The only exception is the ex-Conservatives (but Reform still ahead)
Reform voters are deeply unhappy with the direction of the country’s economy (and are less unhappy - but still unhappy - about their own financial situation)
Reform voters are deeply unhappy with the direction of the country’s economy (and are less unhappy - but still unhappy - about their own financial situation)
I don’t think this matters because Brexit is low salience. What unites these voters today is desire to see immigration reduced
I don’t think this matters because Brexit is low salience. What unites these voters today is desire to see immigration reduced
In 2025, Reform now dominates (74%), compared with only 16% for the Conservatives.
Reform has monopolised the anti-immigration vote!
In 2025, Reform now dominates (74%), compared with only 16% for the Conservatives.
Reform has monopolised the anti-immigration vote!
Among Reform voters, immigration is now back to being as salient as it was in 2016.
Among Reform voters, immigration is now back to being as salient as it was in 2016.
Importantly, the differences between self-placement and party placement are tiny in every case. For immigration, Reform’s voters and Reform’s perceived policies are almost identical.
Importantly, the differences between self-placement and party placement are tiny in every case. For immigration, Reform’s voters and Reform’s perceived policies are almost identical.
Reform are way ahead. Their voters are not just holding their nose and choosing least bad option, but believe Reform is best placed to deal with what they care about.
Reform are way ahead. Their voters are not just holding their nose and choosing least bad option, but believe Reform is best placed to deal with what they care about.
Economy is second most common. It comes up for between 14% of Reform loyalists and ex-Conservatives and 25% of ex-Labour voters
Economy is second most common. It comes up for between 14% of Reform loyalists and ex-Conservatives and 25% of ex-Labour voters
Diverge on economics. Former Labour voters are to left and former Tories sit to right
All groups are more populist. Former non-voters and Labour voters more likely to feel disengaged
Diverge on economics. Former Labour voters are to left and former Tories sit to right
All groups are more populist. Former non-voters and Labour voters more likely to feel disengaged