We think a broader version of the hypothesis - that people avoid scaling down outrage from relevant reference points - is a big part of it. We are currently working on follow-ups that explore a preference for escalation from *others’* judgments and finding evidence for that prediction!

The paper contains a number of cool extensions that explore conditions under which people become more or less sensitive to harm and severity when making moral comparisons. Check it out (open access) here:

journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/...

Direction of comparison matters because scaling down condemnation (saying B is less bad than A) leaves ambiguity as to whether one is “downplaying.” Does scaling down mean I am not taking this seriously enough? This moral character threat is not present when scaling up (saying A is worse than B).

While people readily say that bad act A is worse and deserves more punishment than bad act B, they are reluctant to say that B is less bad and deserves less punishment than A. When asked which of two acts is less bad, many opt to say both are equally bad (even when one is quite transparently worse!)

@cusimano.bsky.social

Ah this is so cool!

Thank you!!!