Griffin Pion
@griffinpion.bsky.social
Philosophy Ph.D. student at CUNY. Philosophy of CogSci, Mind, and Language.
griffinpion.com
griffinpion.com
philosophy of ai competence should require mandatory “date added” field
September 11, 2025 at 10:07 PM
philosophy of ai competence should require mandatory “date added” field
In another sense, it is actually extremely fitting to describe it as "feeling like" talking to a Ph.D., because if ChatGPT is good at anything, it's generating text that *sounds* very convincing to someone with no knowledge. The danger is *seeming* knowledgable without any understanding!
August 7, 2025 at 8:48 PM
In another sense, it is actually extremely fitting to describe it as "feeling like" talking to a Ph.D., because if ChatGPT is good at anything, it's generating text that *sounds* very convincing to someone with no knowledge. The danger is *seeming* knowledgable without any understanding!
it’s not a nous paper, but it’s honest work
June 22, 2025 at 12:20 AM
it’s not a nous paper, but it’s honest work
seconded. this one is especially great if you have any interest in P → Q
June 5, 2025 at 3:42 PM
seconded. this one is especially great if you have any interest in P → Q
this rationale seems to miss the fact that reviewing can actually be a valuable experience for the reviewer, not just some thankless service work. i’ve enjoyed my handful of reviewing experiences!
May 24, 2025 at 10:28 PM
this rationale seems to miss the fact that reviewing can actually be a valuable experience for the reviewer, not just some thankless service work. i’ve enjoyed my handful of reviewing experiences!
Thanks also to the editors of the volume, Neil Van Leeuwen and Tania Lombrozo (@tanialombrozo.bsky.social), as well as everyone who has given us comments.
We are excited to post this work and see what people think (and, therefore, believe…).
philpapers.org/rec/PIOBWW
(10/10)
We are excited to post this work and see what people think (and, therefore, believe…).
philpapers.org/rec/PIOBWW
(10/10)
April 26, 2025 at 3:05 PM
Thanks also to the editors of the volume, Neil Van Leeuwen and Tania Lombrozo (@tanialombrozo.bsky.social), as well as everyone who has given us comments.
We are excited to post this work and see what people think (and, therefore, believe…).
philpapers.org/rec/PIOBWW
(10/10)
We are excited to post this work and see what people think (and, therefore, believe…).
philpapers.org/rec/PIOBWW
(10/10)
And Eric is an endless well of arguments, knowledge and patience. (I can’t imagine what it’s like to have two grad students nitpick details from my more than 10-year-old dissertation!)
(9/10)
(9/10)
April 26, 2025 at 3:05 PM
And Eric is an endless well of arguments, knowledge and patience. (I can’t imagine what it’s like to have two grad students nitpick details from my more than 10-year-old dissertation!)
(9/10)
(9/10)
Many thanks to my co-authors! Elliot is largely responsible for clarifying the possible underlying mechanisms for Spinozanism (and now has awesome single-author work on the interaction between negation and belief acquisition).
(8/10)
(8/10)
April 26, 2025 at 3:05 PM
Many thanks to my co-authors! Elliot is largely responsible for clarifying the possible underlying mechanisms for Spinozanism (and now has awesome single-author work on the interaction between negation and belief acquisition).
(8/10)
(8/10)
4. We extend the model from its traditional domain, belief acquisition, to belief updating and action.
(7/10)
(7/10)
April 26, 2025 at 3:05 PM
4. We extend the model from its traditional domain, belief acquisition, to belief updating and action.
(7/10)
(7/10)
3. We draw out some sociopolitical implications of having a Spinozan mind, particularly for fake news and misinformation.
(6/10)
(6/10)
April 26, 2025 at 3:05 PM
3. We draw out some sociopolitical implications of having a Spinozan mind, particularly for fake news and misinformation.
(6/10)
(6/10)
2. In addition to presenting classic evidence, we bolster the model with recent developmental work from Vikram Jaswal and theoretical work from Henry Schiller and Shaun Nichols.
(5/10)
(5/10)
April 26, 2025 at 3:05 PM
2. In addition to presenting classic evidence, we bolster the model with recent developmental work from Vikram Jaswal and theoretical work from Henry Schiller and Shaun Nichols.
(5/10)
(5/10)
Our paper goes beyond previous work on the Spinozan view – e.g., by Dan Gilbert and Eric Mandelbaum – in four ways:
1. We survey multiple possible mechanisms that could underlie the Spinozan model, characterizing the interactions of acceptance, rejection, and endorsement.
(4/10)
1. We survey multiple possible mechanisms that could underlie the Spinozan model, characterizing the interactions of acceptance, rejection, and endorsement.
(4/10)
April 26, 2025 at 3:05 PM
Our paper goes beyond previous work on the Spinozan view – e.g., by Dan Gilbert and Eric Mandelbaum – in four ways:
1. We survey multiple possible mechanisms that could underlie the Spinozan model, characterizing the interactions of acceptance, rejection, and endorsement.
(4/10)
1. We survey multiple possible mechanisms that could underlie the Spinozan model, characterizing the interactions of acceptance, rejection, and endorsement.
(4/10)
In a new paper forthcoming in The Oxford Handbook of the Cognitive Science of Belief, Elliot Schwartz (@elliotschwartz.bsky.social), Eric Mandelbaum (@ericman.bsky.social), and I present an updated defense and extension of the Spinozan model.
(3/10)
(3/10)
April 26, 2025 at 3:05 PM
In a new paper forthcoming in The Oxford Handbook of the Cognitive Science of Belief, Elliot Schwartz (@elliotschwartz.bsky.social), Eric Mandelbaum (@ericman.bsky.social), and I present an updated defense and extension of the Spinozan model.
(3/10)
(3/10)
However, according to the Spinozan model, merely tokening a thought entails believing it. In other words, you believe everything you think. Only through a further, effortful process can one reject these automatically-accepted beliefs.
(2/10)
(2/10)
April 26, 2025 at 3:05 PM
However, according to the Spinozan model, merely tokening a thought entails believing it. In other words, you believe everything you think. Only through a further, effortful process can one reject these automatically-accepted beliefs.
(2/10)
(2/10)
Happy to discuss this more! DM or email me if you'd like.
April 15, 2025 at 2:53 PM
Happy to discuss this more! DM or email me if you'd like.
In this load condition, we also do not see your prediction borne out.
April 15, 2025 at 2:53 PM
In this load condition, we also do not see your prediction borne out.
In this condition, we still see the "Uncommon Sense Effect" (compare the 2 figures below). The advantage of looking at this condition is that since we are holding premise/conclusion reading time constant, the RTs are a better indicator of how long responding alone takes.
April 15, 2025 at 2:53 PM
In this condition, we still see the "Uncommon Sense Effect" (compare the 2 figures below). The advantage of looking at this condition is that since we are holding premise/conclusion reading time constant, the RTs are a better indicator of how long responding alone takes.
We also ran load conditions (not reported in CogSci) that might give us cleaner results. One of these load conditions involved time-pressure: participants were shown each premise/conclusion for 1500ms.
April 15, 2025 at 2:53 PM
We also ran load conditions (not reported in CogSci) that might give us cleaner results. One of these load conditions involved time-pressure: participants were shown each premise/conclusion for 1500ms.
One complication here is that this RT data is for a self-paced condition, where the RT value is the total time (a) reading each premise and conclusion and (b) responding.
April 15, 2025 at 2:53 PM
One complication here is that this RT data is for a self-paced condition, where the RT value is the total time (a) reading each premise and conclusion and (b) responding.
A simple t-test shows that the difference between the polysemy and valid filler RTs on "valid" response trials is not significant (p-value = 0.3847).
April 15, 2025 at 2:53 PM
A simple t-test shows that the difference between the polysemy and valid filler RTs on "valid" response trials is not significant (p-value = 0.3847).
So, restated, the prediction is that P RT > valid filler RT for trials on which participants respond “valid”. Here’s the figure. The left ("0") side are those on which participants respond "invalid"; the right ("1") side are "valid". y-axis is RT.
April 15, 2025 at 2:53 PM
So, restated, the prediction is that P RT > valid filler RT for trials on which participants respond “valid”. Here’s the figure. The left ("0") side are those on which participants respond "invalid"; the right ("1") side are "valid". y-axis is RT.
Instead, the relevant comparison is between P RTs and valid RTs for trials on which participants answered positively (i.e., "valid").
April 15, 2025 at 2:53 PM
Instead, the relevant comparison is between P RTs and valid RTs for trials on which participants answered positively (i.e., "valid").
If we consider this in conjunction with the fact that there's a difference in how often people judge each sort of target word as valid (our "Uncommon Sense Effect"), we can’t simply compare the RTs for Ps vs. valid fillers across all trials.
April 15, 2025 at 2:53 PM
If we consider this in conjunction with the fact that there's a difference in how often people judge each sort of target word as valid (our "Uncommon Sense Effect"), we can’t simply compare the RTs for Ps vs. valid fillers across all trials.