it’s not a nous paper, but it’s honest work

However, according to the Spinozan model, merely tokening a thought entails believing it. In other words, you believe everything you think. Only through a further, effortful process can one reject these automatically-accepted beliefs.
(2/10)

In this load condition, we also do not see your prediction borne out.

In this condition, we still see the "Uncommon Sense Effect" (compare the 2 figures below). The advantage of looking at this condition is that since we are holding premise/conclusion reading time constant, the RTs are a better indicator of how long responding alone takes.

So, restated, the prediction is that P RT > valid filler RT for trials on which participants respond “valid”. Here’s the figure. The left ("0") side are those on which participants respond "invalid"; the right ("1") side are "valid". y-axis is RT.

📊 THE RESULTS! 📊
We found that prediction (2) was clearly borne out, supporting the view that polysemes are not represented like homonyms, and polysemes’ underspecified representations can be used in reasoning. (8/9)

In critical trials, we replaced the middle terms with either polysemes or homonyms used with different meanings in the two premises. In controls, we put words used with one unambiguous meaning in either deductively valid or invalid argument forms. (5/9)

We used standard Aristotelian syllogism forms and manipulated what type of word was placed in the middle term (“M”). (4/9)

In this new paper upcoming at CogSci, Elliot Schwartz, @quiltydunn.bsky.social, @ericman.bsky.social, Spencer Caplan, and I develop a novel paradigm to show that polysemes are represented differently than homonyms, and humans can reason with polysemes without committing to a particular sense. (3/9)