Oliver Kim
@global-developments.org
Development economics and economic history. Research Fellow at Open Philanthropy. PhD Berkeley, AB Harvard. Views my own.
Blog: www.global-developments.org
Personal: www.oliverwkim.com
Blog: www.global-developments.org
Personal: www.oliverwkim.com
November 3, 2025 at 9:57 PM
Our paper shows East Asia's miracle wasn't just domestic policy; it was catalyzed by geopolitical demand shocks that built long-term export capacity. A similar shock caused by the Korean War helped lift Japan in the 1950s, making firms like Toyota global brands.
November 3, 2025 at 9:57 PM
Our paper shows East Asia's miracle wasn't just domestic policy; it was catalyzed by geopolitical demand shocks that built long-term export capacity. A similar shock caused by the Korean War helped lift Japan in the 1950s, making firms like Toyota global brands.
War procurement had huge aggregate effects. By 1973, we estimate that contracting firms accounted for 20% of South Korea's total exports.
November 3, 2025 at 9:57 PM
War procurement had huge aggregate effects. By 1973, we estimate that contracting firms accounted for 20% of South Korea's total exports.
Q: Was this just the Korean government picking future winners?
Our data lets us test this: we see the state's firm-level export targets, set before contracts were awarded.
Targets didn't rise before the contract, but realized exports did—ruling out selection on expected growth.
Our data lets us test this: we see the state's firm-level export targets, set before contracts were awarded.
Targets didn't rise before the contract, but realized exports did—ruling out selection on expected growth.
November 3, 2025 at 9:57 PM
Q: Was this just the Korean government picking future winners?
Our data lets us test this: we see the state's firm-level export targets, set before contracts were awarded.
Targets didn't rise before the contract, but realized exports did—ruling out selection on expected growth.
Our data lets us test this: we see the state's firm-level export targets, set before contracts were awarded.
Targets didn't rise before the contract, but realized exports did—ruling out selection on expected growth.
Effects weren't just U.S. sales. Winning a contract led to a lasting expansion into third-country markets, suggesting firms gained new capabilities & reputation.
Contracting firms also responded more strongly to 🇰🇷's 1970s HCI drive, showing contracts + industrial policy were complementary.
Contracting firms also responded more strongly to 🇰🇷's 1970s HCI drive, showing contracts + industrial policy were complementary.
November 3, 2025 at 9:57 PM
Effects weren't just U.S. sales. Winning a contract led to a lasting expansion into third-country markets, suggesting firms gained new capabilities & reputation.
Contracting firms also responded more strongly to 🇰🇷's 1970s HCI drive, showing contracts + industrial policy were complementary.
Contracting firms also responded more strongly to 🇰🇷's 1970s HCI drive, showing contracts + industrial policy were complementary.
To study this, we built a new firm-level dataset linking U.S. DoD procurement contracts to Korean export records.
The causal impact of winning a contract? Massive.
We find it caused a 46 pct point jump in the firm's likelihood of exporting, and a tripling of export value.
The causal impact of winning a contract? Massive.
We find it caused a 46 pct point jump in the firm's likelihood of exporting, and a tripling of export value.
November 3, 2025 at 9:57 PM
To study this, we built a new firm-level dataset linking U.S. DoD procurement contracts to Korean export records.
The causal impact of winning a contract? Massive.
We find it caused a 46 pct point jump in the firm's likelihood of exporting, and a tripling of export value.
The causal impact of winning a contract? Massive.
We find it caused a 46 pct point jump in the firm's likelihood of exporting, and a tripling of export value.
In 1966, Park Chung-hee and the US struck a deal: in exchange for 🇰🇷 sending troops to South Vietnam, the US agreed to procure equipment and services from South Korean firms.
These contracts summed to $766m, peaking at 2.9% of Korea's GDP in 1968—rivaling the Marshall Plan.
These contracts summed to $766m, peaking at 2.9% of Korea's GDP in 1968—rivaling the Marshall Plan.
November 3, 2025 at 9:57 PM
In 1966, Park Chung-hee and the US struck a deal: in exchange for 🇰🇷 sending troops to South Vietnam, the US agreed to procure equipment and services from South Korean firms.
These contracts summed to $766m, peaking at 2.9% of Korea's GDP in 1968—rivaling the Marshall Plan.
These contracts summed to $766m, peaking at 2.9% of Korea's GDP in 1968—rivaling the Marshall Plan.
These charts come from my new 🌐 Global Developments 🌐 blog post, "A World Without Aid". Check it out below:
www.global-developments.org/p/a-world-w...
www.global-developments.org/p/a-world-w...
February 12, 2025 at 6:00 PM
These charts come from my new 🌐 Global Developments 🌐 blog post, "A World Without Aid". Check it out below:
www.global-developments.org/p/a-world-w...
www.global-developments.org/p/a-world-w...
By comparison, US aid to Sub-Saharan Africa has remained relatively low—it has never exceeded $15 per person since 1960.
Roughly $5 of that goes to PEPFAR, one of the most effective public health interventions we know of.
Roughly $5 of that goes to PEPFAR, one of the most effective public health interventions we know of.
February 12, 2025 at 6:00 PM
By comparison, US aid to Sub-Saharan Africa has remained relatively low—it has never exceeded $15 per person since 1960.
Roughly $5 of that goes to PEPFAR, one of the most effective public health interventions we know of.
Roughly $5 of that goes to PEPFAR, one of the most effective public health interventions we know of.
Similarly, Taiwan received as much aid as all of Africa, into the early 1960s.
Some of this aid supported the Joint Committee on Rural Reconstruction, which oversaw the famous 1950s land reform, and also crucial work on ag extension.
Some of this aid supported the Joint Committee on Rural Reconstruction, which oversaw the famous 1950s land reform, and also crucial work on ag extension.
February 12, 2025 at 6:00 PM
Similarly, Taiwan received as much aid as all of Africa, into the early 1960s.
Some of this aid supported the Joint Committee on Rural Reconstruction, which oversaw the famous 1950s land reform, and also crucial work on ag extension.
Some of this aid supported the Joint Committee on Rural Reconstruction, which oversaw the famous 1950s land reform, and also crucial work on ag extension.
The geography of aid has shifted enormously over time.
One crazy fact is that South Korea received more aid than all of Sub-Saharan Africa combined, well into the 1970s. An under-appreciated feature of the East Asian Miracle!
One crazy fact is that South Korea received more aid than all of Sub-Saharan Africa combined, well into the 1970s. An under-appreciated feature of the East Asian Miracle!
February 12, 2025 at 6:00 PM
The geography of aid has shifted enormously over time.
One crazy fact is that South Korea received more aid than all of Sub-Saharan Africa combined, well into the 1970s. An under-appreciated feature of the East Asian Miracle!
One crazy fact is that South Korea received more aid than all of Sub-Saharan Africa combined, well into the 1970s. An under-appreciated feature of the East Asian Miracle!
Thanks! In at least the standard neoclassical model, the price of land isn't the main channel, it's more changing demand for goods in sectors that do exist. My advisor Jon Steinsson's recent paper on England documents only modest increases in land rents after 1760:
eml.berkeley.edu/~enakamura/p...
eml.berkeley.edu/~enakamura/p...
eml.berkeley.edu
December 29, 2024 at 5:11 AM
Thanks! In at least the standard neoclassical model, the price of land isn't the main channel, it's more changing demand for goods in sectors that do exist. My advisor Jon Steinsson's recent paper on England documents only modest increases in land rents after 1760:
eml.berkeley.edu/~enakamura/p...
eml.berkeley.edu/~enakamura/p...