Oliver Kim
@global-developments.org
Development economics and economic history. Research Fellow at Open Philanthropy. PhD Berkeley, AB Harvard. Views my own.
Blog: www.global-developments.org
Personal: www.oliverwkim.com
Blog: www.global-developments.org
Personal: www.oliverwkim.com
Q: Was this just the Korean government picking future winners?
Our data lets us test this: we see the state's firm-level export targets, set before contracts were awarded.
Targets didn't rise before the contract, but realized exports did—ruling out selection on expected growth.
Our data lets us test this: we see the state's firm-level export targets, set before contracts were awarded.
Targets didn't rise before the contract, but realized exports did—ruling out selection on expected growth.
November 3, 2025 at 9:57 PM
Q: Was this just the Korean government picking future winners?
Our data lets us test this: we see the state's firm-level export targets, set before contracts were awarded.
Targets didn't rise before the contract, but realized exports did—ruling out selection on expected growth.
Our data lets us test this: we see the state's firm-level export targets, set before contracts were awarded.
Targets didn't rise before the contract, but realized exports did—ruling out selection on expected growth.
Effects weren't just U.S. sales. Winning a contract led to a lasting expansion into third-country markets, suggesting firms gained new capabilities & reputation.
Contracting firms also responded more strongly to 🇰🇷's 1970s HCI drive, showing contracts + industrial policy were complementary.
Contracting firms also responded more strongly to 🇰🇷's 1970s HCI drive, showing contracts + industrial policy were complementary.
November 3, 2025 at 9:57 PM
Effects weren't just U.S. sales. Winning a contract led to a lasting expansion into third-country markets, suggesting firms gained new capabilities & reputation.
Contracting firms also responded more strongly to 🇰🇷's 1970s HCI drive, showing contracts + industrial policy were complementary.
Contracting firms also responded more strongly to 🇰🇷's 1970s HCI drive, showing contracts + industrial policy were complementary.
To study this, we built a new firm-level dataset linking U.S. DoD procurement contracts to Korean export records.
The causal impact of winning a contract? Massive.
We find it caused a 46 pct point jump in the firm's likelihood of exporting, and a tripling of export value.
The causal impact of winning a contract? Massive.
We find it caused a 46 pct point jump in the firm's likelihood of exporting, and a tripling of export value.
November 3, 2025 at 9:57 PM
To study this, we built a new firm-level dataset linking U.S. DoD procurement contracts to Korean export records.
The causal impact of winning a contract? Massive.
We find it caused a 46 pct point jump in the firm's likelihood of exporting, and a tripling of export value.
The causal impact of winning a contract? Massive.
We find it caused a 46 pct point jump in the firm's likelihood of exporting, and a tripling of export value.
In 1966, Park Chung-hee and the US struck a deal: in exchange for 🇰🇷 sending troops to South Vietnam, the US agreed to procure equipment and services from South Korean firms.
These contracts summed to $766m, peaking at 2.9% of Korea's GDP in 1968—rivaling the Marshall Plan.
These contracts summed to $766m, peaking at 2.9% of Korea's GDP in 1968—rivaling the Marshall Plan.
November 3, 2025 at 9:57 PM
In 1966, Park Chung-hee and the US struck a deal: in exchange for 🇰🇷 sending troops to South Vietnam, the US agreed to procure equipment and services from South Korean firms.
These contracts summed to $766m, peaking at 2.9% of Korea's GDP in 1968—rivaling the Marshall Plan.
These contracts summed to $766m, peaking at 2.9% of Korea's GDP in 1968—rivaling the Marshall Plan.
What were the causes of South Korea's export miracle?
My new paper w @philippbarteska, @straightedge, @seung_econ explores a major overlooked factor: U.S. military procurement during the Vietnam War.
We bring new evidence to the Q of how geopolitics shapes development. 🧵:
My new paper w @philippbarteska, @straightedge, @seung_econ explores a major overlooked factor: U.S. military procurement during the Vietnam War.
We bring new evidence to the Q of how geopolitics shapes development. 🧵:
November 3, 2025 at 9:57 PM
What were the causes of South Korea's export miracle?
My new paper w @philippbarteska, @straightedge, @seung_econ explores a major overlooked factor: U.S. military procurement during the Vietnam War.
We bring new evidence to the Q of how geopolitics shapes development. 🧵:
My new paper w @philippbarteska, @straightedge, @seung_econ explores a major overlooked factor: U.S. military procurement during the Vietnam War.
We bring new evidence to the Q of how geopolitics shapes development. 🧵:
These charts come from my new 🌐 Global Developments 🌐 blog post, "A World Without Aid". Check it out below:
www.global-developments.org/p/a-world-w...
www.global-developments.org/p/a-world-w...
February 12, 2025 at 6:00 PM
These charts come from my new 🌐 Global Developments 🌐 blog post, "A World Without Aid". Check it out below:
www.global-developments.org/p/a-world-w...
www.global-developments.org/p/a-world-w...
By comparison, US aid to Sub-Saharan Africa has remained relatively low—it has never exceeded $15 per person since 1960.
Roughly $5 of that goes to PEPFAR, one of the most effective public health interventions we know of.
Roughly $5 of that goes to PEPFAR, one of the most effective public health interventions we know of.
February 12, 2025 at 6:00 PM
By comparison, US aid to Sub-Saharan Africa has remained relatively low—it has never exceeded $15 per person since 1960.
Roughly $5 of that goes to PEPFAR, one of the most effective public health interventions we know of.
Roughly $5 of that goes to PEPFAR, one of the most effective public health interventions we know of.
Similarly, Taiwan received as much aid as all of Africa, into the early 1960s.
Some of this aid supported the Joint Committee on Rural Reconstruction, which oversaw the famous 1950s land reform, and also crucial work on ag extension.
Some of this aid supported the Joint Committee on Rural Reconstruction, which oversaw the famous 1950s land reform, and also crucial work on ag extension.
February 12, 2025 at 6:00 PM
Similarly, Taiwan received as much aid as all of Africa, into the early 1960s.
Some of this aid supported the Joint Committee on Rural Reconstruction, which oversaw the famous 1950s land reform, and also crucial work on ag extension.
Some of this aid supported the Joint Committee on Rural Reconstruction, which oversaw the famous 1950s land reform, and also crucial work on ag extension.
The geography of aid has shifted enormously over time.
One crazy fact is that South Korea received more aid than all of Sub-Saharan Africa combined, well into the 1970s. An under-appreciated feature of the East Asian Miracle!
One crazy fact is that South Korea received more aid than all of Sub-Saharan Africa combined, well into the 1970s. An under-appreciated feature of the East Asian Miracle!
February 12, 2025 at 6:00 PM
The geography of aid has shifted enormously over time.
One crazy fact is that South Korea received more aid than all of Sub-Saharan Africa combined, well into the 1970s. An under-appreciated feature of the East Asian Miracle!
One crazy fact is that South Korea received more aid than all of Sub-Saharan Africa combined, well into the 1970s. An under-appreciated feature of the East Asian Miracle!
Quick 🧵 on American aid spending, to accompany my new Substack (link below)
US aid obligations have remained remarkably steady in real terms since WWII, rarely exiting a band of $20-60 billion in 2023 dollars. Surprisingly, the year with the most aid obligations was... 1948!
US aid obligations have remained remarkably steady in real terms since WWII, rarely exiting a band of $20-60 billion in 2023 dollars. Surprisingly, the year with the most aid obligations was... 1948!
February 12, 2025 at 6:00 PM
Quick 🧵 on American aid spending, to accompany my new Substack (link below)
US aid obligations have remained remarkably steady in real terms since WWII, rarely exiting a band of $20-60 billion in 2023 dollars. Surprisingly, the year with the most aid obligations was... 1948!
US aid obligations have remained remarkably steady in real terms since WWII, rarely exiting a band of $20-60 billion in 2023 dollars. Surprisingly, the year with the most aid obligations was... 1948!
I always loved Lee Kuan Yew's description of Korean protest:
"The Koreans are a fearsome people. When they riot, they are as organized and nearly as disciplined as the riot police who confront them... When their workers and students fight in the streets... they look like soldiers at war."
"The Koreans are a fearsome people. When they riot, they are as organized and nearly as disciplined as the riot police who confront them... When their workers and students fight in the streets... they look like soldiers at war."
December 6, 2024 at 5:40 AM
I always loved Lee Kuan Yew's description of Korean protest:
"The Koreans are a fearsome people. When they riot, they are as organized and nearly as disciplined as the riot police who confront them... When their workers and students fight in the streets... they look like soldiers at war."
"The Koreans are a fearsome people. When they riot, they are as organized and nearly as disciplined as the riot police who confront them... When their workers and students fight in the streets... they look like soldiers at war."
"Asian values are incompatible with democracy"
December 3, 2024 at 8:53 PM
"Asian values are incompatible with democracy"
These terms, sadly, have also become pejoratives—useful metaphors for rich countries to describe when things don't work.
Joe Biden once quipped in 2014 that LaGuardia was like a "Third World country"; the MSA served by LaGuardia has a higher GDP than all of Sub Saharan Africa.
Joe Biden once quipped in 2014 that LaGuardia was like a "Third World country"; the MSA served by LaGuardia has a higher GDP than all of Sub Saharan Africa.
December 3, 2024 at 4:46 PM
These terms, sadly, have also become pejoratives—useful metaphors for rich countries to describe when things don't work.
Joe Biden once quipped in 2014 that LaGuardia was like a "Third World country"; the MSA served by LaGuardia has a higher GDP than all of Sub Saharan Africa.
Joe Biden once quipped in 2014 that LaGuardia was like a "Third World country"; the MSA served by LaGuardia has a higher GDP than all of Sub Saharan Africa.
What do we call poor countries as a group?
"Third World", invented by French demographer Alfred Sauvy, was dominant for most of the century. "Global South"—coined by SDS President Carl Oglesby—and "BRICS"—derived from a Goldman Sachs research report—are its two new competitors.
"Third World", invented by French demographer Alfred Sauvy, was dominant for most of the century. "Global South"—coined by SDS President Carl Oglesby—and "BRICS"—derived from a Goldman Sachs research report—are its two new competitors.
December 3, 2024 at 4:45 PM
What do we call poor countries as a group?
"Third World", invented by French demographer Alfred Sauvy, was dominant for most of the century. "Global South"—coined by SDS President Carl Oglesby—and "BRICS"—derived from a Goldman Sachs research report—are its two new competitors.
"Third World", invented by French demographer Alfred Sauvy, was dominant for most of the century. "Global South"—coined by SDS President Carl Oglesby—and "BRICS"—derived from a Goldman Sachs research report—are its two new competitors.
After decolonization, "underdeveloped country" was briefly dominant.
In the optimistic 60s, "developing country" took over—even as development in Africa + LatAm stalled in the 70s-80s.
China's rise in the 90s saw the emergence of "emerging markets"—before those disappointed too
In the optimistic 60s, "developing country" took over—even as development in Africa + LatAm stalled in the 70s-80s.
China's rise in the 90s saw the emergence of "emerging markets"—before those disappointed too
December 3, 2024 at 4:45 PM
After decolonization, "underdeveloped country" was briefly dominant.
In the optimistic 60s, "developing country" took over—even as development in Africa + LatAm stalled in the 70s-80s.
China's rise in the 90s saw the emergence of "emerging markets"—before those disappointed too
In the optimistic 60s, "developing country" took over—even as development in Africa + LatAm stalled in the 70s-80s.
China's rise in the 90s saw the emergence of "emerging markets"—before those disappointed too
What do we call a poor country—"underdeveloped", "developing", an "emerging market"?
A potted history (and Global Dev post) on our changing words for poverty—the rhetoric of underdevelopment:
A potted history (and Global Dev post) on our changing words for poverty—the rhetoric of underdevelopment:
December 3, 2024 at 4:45 PM
What do we call a poor country—"underdeveloped", "developing", an "emerging market"?
A potted history (and Global Dev post) on our changing words for poverty—the rhetoric of underdevelopment:
A potted history (and Global Dev post) on our changing words for poverty—the rhetoric of underdevelopment:
Earlier in November we all got a big lesson in the power of sampling error. Similarly, we should start treating GDP more as a statistical estimate, less as a certainty.
One good step would be publishing margins of error—thought to be at least 3%!!—alongside GDP growth estimates.
One good step would be publishing margins of error—thought to be at least 3%!!—alongside GDP growth estimates.
November 27, 2024 at 7:46 PM
Earlier in November we all got a big lesson in the power of sampling error. Similarly, we should start treating GDP more as a statistical estimate, less as a certainty.
One good step would be publishing margins of error—thought to be at least 3%!!—alongside GDP growth estimates.
One good step would be publishing margins of error—thought to be at least 3%!!—alongside GDP growth estimates.
Nigeria—thought to be the 6th largest country in the world—has not had a census since 2006. The 5 censuses it has conducted have been marred by violence and political infighting.
We simply do not know how many people live in what we think is Africa's largest country.
We simply do not know how many people live in what we think is Africa's largest country.
November 27, 2024 at 7:46 PM
Nigeria—thought to be the 6th largest country in the world—has not had a census since 2006. The 5 censuses it has conducted have been marred by violence and political infighting.
We simply do not know how many people live in what we think is Africa's largest country.
We simply do not know how many people live in what we think is Africa's largest country.
African statistical agencies are understaffed and underfunded—and are often left guessing the size of the economy from population figures, which are themselves extrapolated from decades-old.
In Zambia in 2010, the national accounts were prepared by one (1!) person.
In Zambia in 2010, the national accounts were prepared by one (1!) person.
November 27, 2024 at 7:46 PM
African statistical agencies are understaffed and underfunded—and are often left guessing the size of the economy from population figures, which are themselves extrapolated from decades-old.
In Zambia in 2010, the national accounts were prepared by one (1!) person.
In Zambia in 2010, the national accounts were prepared by one (1!) person.
According to the Penn World Tables, Tanzania's GDP fell by 33% in 1986—worse than the Great Depression.
Only problem? It's likely a statistical artifact.
As state control receded in the 80s, the invisible informal economy grew—leading to underestimates of GDP by 30-200%!
Only problem? It's likely a statistical artifact.
As state control receded in the 80s, the invisible informal economy grew—leading to underestimates of GDP by 30-200%!
November 27, 2024 at 7:46 PM
According to the Penn World Tables, Tanzania's GDP fell by 33% in 1986—worse than the Great Depression.
Only problem? It's likely a statistical artifact.
As state control receded in the 80s, the invisible informal economy grew—leading to underestimates of GDP by 30-200%!
Only problem? It's likely a statistical artifact.
As state control receded in the 80s, the invisible informal economy grew—leading to underestimates of GDP by 30-200%!
Q: why does Gujarat have a higher industrial share than other Indian states? Is this a longstanding historical difference, the product of policy, something else?
(Chart from Data for India)
(Chart from Data for India)
November 19, 2024 at 7:08 PM
Q: why does Gujarat have a higher industrial share than other Indian states? Is this a longstanding historical difference, the product of policy, something else?
(Chart from Data for India)
(Chart from Data for India)
Post a picture you took (no description) to bring some zen to the timeline
November 18, 2024 at 12:12 AM
Post a picture you took (no description) to bring some zen to the timeline
