(Pete Souza via theguardian.com/world/galler...)

(Siehe zum Urteil auch Heiko Sauer hier, ab Min. 17:47, podcasts.apple.com/cd/podcast/3...) 9/

Genau. Ich glaube auch ehrlich, dass es zumindest für absehbare Zeit dabei bleibt. Das wären schon sehr spezielle Konstellationen in denen sich die beiden Vertretbarkeitsprüfungen inhaltlich unterscheiden würden. Aber vorstellbar, zB bei unterschiedlichen völkerr. Verpflichtungen BRD/Drittstaat

And I will repeat this: There was an agreement last Monday that even Hijri agreed to (under pressure from mainstream Druze factions). It was the IDF bombing and then “backing” Hijri in hope of the chaos of ensuring a fragmented south Syria that led to this.

Playing on old grievances and no central

There is some degree of less-than-angelic legal maneuvering involved. But I think there's a good case to argue that since Art. 20 (4) allows withdrawal of reservations to Art. 20 (2) "at any time", it is - although "ungentlemanly" - admissible to withdraw and then sue. (5/5)

IMHO: Belarus has a point vis-a-vis the EU/Polish/Austrian objections. The declaration only stipulates what Belarus considers "good faith interpretation" of Art. 20 (2)-(4).
Now, whether that is true, i.e., whether 'retroactive withdrawals' are effectual, is debatable. (4/5)

in which they argue that the Belarusian declaration amounts to a reservation that was inadmissible, since reservations could only be issued upon signing/ratification of the Protocol, and only regarding Art. 20 (2), not (4). (3/5)

it considers itself not bound to Art. 20 (2) in such a case of 'retroactive' withdrawal of a jurisdictional reservation.(treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDe...)
The EU, Poland, and Austria issued communications (treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDe.... (2/5)