Fabian Hoffmann
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Fabian Hoffmann
@frhoffmann.bsky.social
Doctoral Research Fellow at the Oslo Nuclear Project, University of Oslo. Defense policy, missile technology, and nuclear strategy.

Weekly analysis of missile tech, nuclear strategy, and European deterrence 👇
https://missilematters.substack.com/subscribe
Depicting STRATCOM as hawkish, emotional hotshots is completely detached from reality.

3/3
November 2, 2025 at 9:55 AM
The other major issue is how they portray STRATCOM. If you’ve actually interacted with them, you know they’re the most professional bunch of people you will ever meet. They are also among the most cautious actors in the entire nuclear ecosystem, probably for good reason.

2/3
November 2, 2025 at 9:55 AM
This will make for 'interesting' crisis dynamics, as Russia's vulnerability to conventional counterstrike and countervalue strategies increases exponentially, year over year.

3/3
October 27, 2025 at 2:50 PM
While Russia currently holds a significant advantage in the missile domain, we are inevitably moving toward a future in which it will be surrounded by neighbors each fielding hundreds, if not thousands, of conventional missiles aimed at high-value Russian military and economic targets.

2/3
October 27, 2025 at 2:50 PM
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Subscribe to Missile Matters — with Fabian Hoffmann
Missile Matters is my personal blog, where I share insights on the latest developments in the nuclear and missile domains in Ukraine and beyond. If Putin decides to nuke us all, you will read about ...
missilematters.substack.com
October 23, 2025 at 12:11 PM
In my view, there is a strong case that instead of spending the $125–200 million European governments would likely need to pay to the US for 50 or so Tomahawks, they should invest that money directly into Ukraine’s missile industrial sector to scale up domestic production.

6/6
October 23, 2025 at 12:11 PM
The better alternative may be to go after the supply chains that support Russia’s drone and missile production, targeting critical inputs such as electronics, explosives, and composites.

Ukraine is already doing exactly that, including with its indigenous missile systems.

5/6
October 23, 2025 at 12:11 PM
This approach would also require Ukrainian planners to know exactly which parts of the plant to destroy; i.e., where expensive and hard-to-replace machinery is located, and what parts constitute break rooms and canteens.

It's unclear whether this data is available.

4/6
October 23, 2025 at 12:11 PM
The problem is that destroying production facilities is far from straightforward.

Destroying around 50% of the Alabuga plant, for example, would require 150 Tomahawks - more than Ukraine would likely receive, and much more than it could launch in a single salvo.

3/6
October 23, 2025 at 12:11 PM
Tomahawk’s 1,600 kilometer range puts both the Alabuga plant, where Geran-2 and Geran-3 long-range drones are produced, and the Votkinsk plant, which manufactures 9M723 short-range ballistic missiles, within striking distance, both of which would be attractive targets.

2/6
October 23, 2025 at 12:11 PM
Brave new world oder so
October 7, 2025 at 1:01 PM
Many thanks! I'm trying to hit that sweet spot between nerdy analysis and something that also average people not part of our field can follow.
October 7, 2025 at 11:43 AM