Francisca Ladouch
@franladouch.bsky.social
analyst at @Joseph Rowntree Foundation
Posting about poverty, benefits and labour market in the UK.
Views my own.
Posting about poverty, benefits and labour market in the UK.
Views my own.
8/ The big picture
Rising unemployment, falling vacancies, low earnings growth and persistent inflation
The labour market is under real strain and no longer shielding people from poverty.
We need joined-up action: government + employers removing structural barriers and creating paths back to work.
Rising unemployment, falling vacancies, low earnings growth and persistent inflation
The labour market is under real strain and no longer shielding people from poverty.
We need joined-up action: government + employers removing structural barriers and creating paths back to work.
November 11, 2025 at 11:56 AM
8/ The big picture
Rising unemployment, falling vacancies, low earnings growth and persistent inflation
The labour market is under real strain and no longer shielding people from poverty.
We need joined-up action: government + employers removing structural barriers and creating paths back to work.
Rising unemployment, falling vacancies, low earnings growth and persistent inflation
The labour market is under real strain and no longer shielding people from poverty.
We need joined-up action: government + employers removing structural barriers and creating paths back to work.
7/ But jobs are disappearing.
Vacancies (Oct 2025) fell 100 k (-12%) on the year and remain 90 k (-11%) below pre-pandemic.
and..
📉 Payroll employment also falling.
-0.1% (-32 k) quarterly, -0.6% (-180 k) year-on-year.
Vacancies (Oct 2025) fell 100 k (-12%) on the year and remain 90 k (-11%) below pre-pandemic.
and..
📉 Payroll employment also falling.
-0.1% (-32 k) quarterly, -0.6% (-180 k) year-on-year.
November 11, 2025 at 11:56 AM
7/ But jobs are disappearing.
Vacancies (Oct 2025) fell 100 k (-12%) on the year and remain 90 k (-11%) below pre-pandemic.
and..
📉 Payroll employment also falling.
-0.1% (-32 k) quarterly, -0.6% (-180 k) year-on-year.
Vacancies (Oct 2025) fell 100 k (-12%) on the year and remain 90 k (-11%) below pre-pandemic.
and..
📉 Payroll employment also falling.
-0.1% (-32 k) quarterly, -0.6% (-180 k) year-on-year.
6/ Reasons for inactivity are shifting.
Those inactive due to long-term sickness rose 1.1pp this year and 7.3pp vs pre-pandemic.
Inactivity due to education fell 1.3pp.
Encouragingly, the share of inactive people wanting a job is up 2.5pp (over 180k people).
Those inactive due to long-term sickness rose 1.1pp this year and 7.3pp vs pre-pandemic.
Inactivity due to education fell 1.3pp.
Encouragingly, the share of inactive people wanting a job is up 2.5pp (over 180k people).
November 11, 2025 at 11:56 AM
6/ Reasons for inactivity are shifting.
Those inactive due to long-term sickness rose 1.1pp this year and 7.3pp vs pre-pandemic.
Inactivity due to education fell 1.3pp.
Encouragingly, the share of inactive people wanting a job is up 2.5pp (over 180k people).
Those inactive due to long-term sickness rose 1.1pp this year and 7.3pp vs pre-pandemic.
Inactivity due to education fell 1.3pp.
Encouragingly, the share of inactive people wanting a job is up 2.5pp (over 180k people).
5/ Inactivity is stable overall, but still high.
Flat this quarter, down 0.7 pp on the year, yet still 0.1 pp above pre-pandemic. With fewer inactive 16–24s, but more 35–49s.
Flat this quarter, down 0.7 pp on the year, yet still 0.1 pp above pre-pandemic. With fewer inactive 16–24s, but more 35–49s.
November 11, 2025 at 11:56 AM
5/ Inactivity is stable overall, but still high.
Flat this quarter, down 0.7 pp on the year, yet still 0.1 pp above pre-pandemic. With fewer inactive 16–24s, but more 35–49s.
Flat this quarter, down 0.7 pp on the year, yet still 0.1 pp above pre-pandemic. With fewer inactive 16–24s, but more 35–49s.
4/ And the labour market remains weak
Employment (16–64) fell 0.2 pp in Jul–Sept 2025.
Year-on-year it’s up slightly (+0.1 pp) but still 1 pp below pre-pandemic.
📈 Unemployment is rising.
Up 0.3 pp on the quarter and 0.7 pp on the year, now 1.1 pp above pre-pandemic.
Employment (16–64) fell 0.2 pp in Jul–Sept 2025.
Year-on-year it’s up slightly (+0.1 pp) but still 1 pp below pre-pandemic.
📈 Unemployment is rising.
Up 0.3 pp on the quarter and 0.7 pp on the year, now 1.1 pp above pre-pandemic.
November 11, 2025 at 11:56 AM
4/ And the labour market remains weak
Employment (16–64) fell 0.2 pp in Jul–Sept 2025.
Year-on-year it’s up slightly (+0.1 pp) but still 1 pp below pre-pandemic.
📈 Unemployment is rising.
Up 0.3 pp on the quarter and 0.7 pp on the year, now 1.1 pp above pre-pandemic.
Employment (16–64) fell 0.2 pp in Jul–Sept 2025.
Year-on-year it’s up slightly (+0.1 pp) but still 1 pp below pre-pandemic.
📈 Unemployment is rising.
Up 0.3 pp on the quarter and 0.7 pp on the year, now 1.1 pp above pre-pandemic.
3/ Why this matters?
Weak pay hits low-income households hardest.
Inflation is still above target.
Food & housing prices are rising faster than most others.
With little real pay growth, families are struggling to keep up.
Weak pay hits low-income households hardest.
Inflation is still above target.
Food & housing prices are rising faster than most others.
With little real pay growth, families are struggling to keep up.
November 11, 2025 at 11:56 AM
3/ Why this matters?
Weak pay hits low-income households hardest.
Inflation is still above target.
Food & housing prices are rising faster than most others.
With little real pay growth, families are struggling to keep up.
Weak pay hits low-income households hardest.
Inflation is still above target.
Food & housing prices are rising faster than most others.
With little real pay growth, families are struggling to keep up.
2/ 📉 Real earnings have grown slower since Sept 2024.
From Sept 2023–24, real earnings grew 2.4% (£11.70).
A year later: just 0.4% (£2.10).
That’s a big year-on-year deceleration- a trend we’ve been warning about for months, now reflected in the published data.
From Sept 2023–24, real earnings grew 2.4% (£11.70).
A year later: just 0.4% (£2.10).
That’s a big year-on-year deceleration- a trend we’ve been warning about for months, now reflected in the published data.
November 11, 2025 at 11:56 AM
2/ 📉 Real earnings have grown slower since Sept 2024.
From Sept 2023–24, real earnings grew 2.4% (£11.70).
A year later: just 0.4% (£2.10).
That’s a big year-on-year deceleration- a trend we’ve been warning about for months, now reflected in the published data.
From Sept 2023–24, real earnings grew 2.4% (£11.70).
A year later: just 0.4% (£2.10).
That’s a big year-on-year deceleration- a trend we’ve been warning about for months, now reflected in the published data.
So, what’s needed?
✅ More genuinely inclusive roles
✅ Better regional distribution of accessible jobs
✅ Government and employers working together to create conditions where disabled people cannot just find work but thrive in it.
✅ More genuinely inclusive roles
✅ Better regional distribution of accessible jobs
✅ Government and employers working together to create conditions where disabled people cannot just find work but thrive in it.
November 5, 2025 at 3:51 PM
So, what’s needed?
✅ More genuinely inclusive roles
✅ Better regional distribution of accessible jobs
✅ Government and employers working together to create conditions where disabled people cannot just find work but thrive in it.
✅ More genuinely inclusive roles
✅ Better regional distribution of accessible jobs
✅ Government and employers working together to create conditions where disabled people cannot just find work but thrive in it.
The shortage of suitable jobs pushes disabled people into precarious work, often self-employed or part-time, with lower pay and weaker protections. This is not just a labour market issue but an inclusion one. Barriers at every stage for willing disabled workers reflect policy and design failures.
November 5, 2025 at 3:51 PM
The shortage of suitable jobs pushes disabled people into precarious work, often self-employed or part-time, with lower pay and weaker protections. This is not just a labour market issue but an inclusion one. Barriers at every stage for willing disabled workers reflect policy and design failures.
Geography matters too.
Access to “Disability Confident” jobs is far from equal:
- Industrial legacy: 1:354 (1 job per 354 UC-H claimants )
- Industrial retirement: 1:242
- Affluent commuter belt: 1:47
- Remote rural areas: 1:72
- Affluent towns: 1: 73
- Semi-rural Britain: 1:77
Access to “Disability Confident” jobs is far from equal:
- Industrial legacy: 1:354 (1 job per 354 UC-H claimants )
- Industrial retirement: 1:242
- Affluent commuter belt: 1:47
- Remote rural areas: 1:72
- Affluent towns: 1: 73
- Semi-rural Britain: 1:77
November 5, 2025 at 3:51 PM
Geography matters too.
Access to “Disability Confident” jobs is far from equal:
- Industrial legacy: 1:354 (1 job per 354 UC-H claimants )
- Industrial retirement: 1:242
- Affluent commuter belt: 1:47
- Remote rural areas: 1:72
- Affluent towns: 1: 73
- Semi-rural Britain: 1:77
Access to “Disability Confident” jobs is far from equal:
- Industrial legacy: 1:354 (1 job per 354 UC-H claimants )
- Industrial retirement: 1:242
- Affluent commuter belt: 1:47
- Remote rural areas: 1:72
- Affluent towns: 1: 73
- Semi-rural Britain: 1:77
A useful lens is the Disability Confident Employer Scheme. There’s a stark mismatch between disabled jobseekers and available roles. In 2024/25, for every “Disability Confident” role advertised, 100 people received health-related Universal Credit (UC-H).
www.jrf.org.uk/social-secur...
www.jrf.org.uk/social-secur...
November 5, 2025 at 3:51 PM
A useful lens is the Disability Confident Employer Scheme. There’s a stark mismatch between disabled jobseekers and available roles. In 2024/25, for every “Disability Confident” role advertised, 100 people received health-related Universal Credit (UC-H).
www.jrf.org.uk/social-secur...
www.jrf.org.uk/social-secur...
Behind these numbers lies a deeper story about opportunity.
The share of economically inactive disabled people who want a job has risen from 20.6% in 2023/24 to 21.7% in 2024/25, and remains above non-disabled levels, showing that many disabled people want to work, but the jobs aren’t there.
The share of economically inactive disabled people who want a job has risen from 20.6% in 2023/24 to 21.7% in 2024/25, and remains above non-disabled levels, showing that many disabled people want to work, but the jobs aren’t there.
November 5, 2025 at 3:51 PM
Behind these numbers lies a deeper story about opportunity.
The share of economically inactive disabled people who want a job has risen from 20.6% in 2023/24 to 21.7% in 2024/25, and remains above non-disabled levels, showing that many disabled people want to work, but the jobs aren’t there.
The share of economically inactive disabled people who want a job has risen from 20.6% in 2023/24 to 21.7% in 2024/25, and remains above non-disabled levels, showing that many disabled people want to work, but the jobs aren’t there.
Meanwhile, the employment gap between disabled and non-disabled people has widened, up 1.1 percentage points in the past year.
That’s the largest increase since COVID hit, driven mainly by a stronger rise in employment for non-disabled people (+0.9pp).
That’s the largest increase since COVID hit, driven mainly by a stronger rise in employment for non-disabled people (+0.9pp).
November 5, 2025 at 3:51 PM
Meanwhile, the employment gap between disabled and non-disabled people has widened, up 1.1 percentage points in the past year.
That’s the largest increase since COVID hit, driven mainly by a stronger rise in employment for non-disabled people (+0.9pp).
That’s the largest increase since COVID hit, driven mainly by a stronger rise in employment for non-disabled people (+0.9pp).
After steady gains post-pandemic, the disability employment rate has slipped slightly, from 53.1% in 2024 to 52.8% in 2025 (-0.2pp). This reverses years of slow growth from a drop in the disabled employment rate after the pandemic.
November 5, 2025 at 3:51 PM
After steady gains post-pandemic, the disability employment rate has slipped slightly, from 53.1% in 2024 to 52.8% in 2025 (-0.2pp). This reverses years of slow growth from a drop in the disabled employment rate after the pandemic.
5/ There is one bright spot.
Between 2019–2025, the gender pay gap for full-time employees narrowed from 17.4% to 12.8% and at the lower end, it’s nearly closed to 1.6% at the 10th percentile.
Still, progress is uneven: at the top, the gap remains stubborn at around 19% for high earners.
Between 2019–2025, the gender pay gap for full-time employees narrowed from 17.4% to 12.8% and at the lower end, it’s nearly closed to 1.6% at the 10th percentile.
Still, progress is uneven: at the top, the gap remains stubborn at around 19% for high earners.
October 28, 2025 at 9:56 AM
5/ There is one bright spot.
Between 2019–2025, the gender pay gap for full-time employees narrowed from 17.4% to 12.8% and at the lower end, it’s nearly closed to 1.6% at the 10th percentile.
Still, progress is uneven: at the top, the gap remains stubborn at around 19% for high earners.
Between 2019–2025, the gender pay gap for full-time employees narrowed from 17.4% to 12.8% and at the lower end, it’s nearly closed to 1.6% at the 10th percentile.
Still, progress is uneven: at the top, the gap remains stubborn at around 19% for high earners.
4/ Why it matters?: food and housing inflation remain above target and with limited real income growth, low income households are likely to face increasing financial strain and struggle to stay afloat.
October 28, 2025 at 9:56 AM
4/ Why it matters?: food and housing inflation remain above target and with limited real income growth, low income households are likely to face increasing financial strain and struggle to stay afloat.
3/ The hit was worst at the bottom of income distribution.
At the 10th percentile, hourly earnings growth fell from 5.1% in 2023/24 to 1.8% in 2024/25.
Higher earners fared slightly better, with the 90th percentile down from 3.5% to 2.6%.
At the 10th percentile, hourly earnings growth fell from 5.1% in 2023/24 to 1.8% in 2024/25.
Higher earners fared slightly better, with the 90th percentile down from 3.5% to 2.6%.
October 28, 2025 at 9:56 AM
3/ The hit was worst at the bottom of income distribution.
At the 10th percentile, hourly earnings growth fell from 5.1% in 2023/24 to 1.8% in 2024/25.
Higher earners fared slightly better, with the 90th percentile down from 3.5% to 2.6%.
At the 10th percentile, hourly earnings growth fell from 5.1% in 2023/24 to 1.8% in 2024/25.
Higher earners fared slightly better, with the 90th percentile down from 3.5% to 2.6%.
2/ As @statspeter.bsky.social has shown, AWE data indicate that real earnings have stagnated since Sept 2024, growth has been near zero for 11 straight months.
The latest ASHE figures confirm the trend: real pay growth slowed sharply, from 2.9% in 2023/24 to 1.1% in 2024/25.
The latest ASHE figures confirm the trend: real pay growth slowed sharply, from 2.9% in 2023/24 to 1.1% in 2024/25.
October 28, 2025 at 9:56 AM
2/ As @statspeter.bsky.social has shown, AWE data indicate that real earnings have stagnated since Sept 2024, growth has been near zero for 11 straight months.
The latest ASHE figures confirm the trend: real pay growth slowed sharply, from 2.9% in 2023/24 to 1.1% in 2024/25.
The latest ASHE figures confirm the trend: real pay growth slowed sharply, from 2.9% in 2023/24 to 1.1% in 2024/25.
There is one bright spot.
Between 2019-2025, the gender pay gap for full-time employees narrowed from 17.4% to 12.8% and at the lower end, it’s nearly closed to 1.6%.
Still, progress is uneven: at the top, the gap remains stubborn at around 19% for high earners.
Between 2019-2025, the gender pay gap for full-time employees narrowed from 17.4% to 12.8% and at the lower end, it’s nearly closed to 1.6%.
Still, progress is uneven: at the top, the gap remains stubborn at around 19% for high earners.
October 28, 2025 at 9:49 AM
There is one bright spot.
Between 2019-2025, the gender pay gap for full-time employees narrowed from 17.4% to 12.8% and at the lower end, it’s nearly closed to 1.6%.
Still, progress is uneven: at the top, the gap remains stubborn at around 19% for high earners.
Between 2019-2025, the gender pay gap for full-time employees narrowed from 17.4% to 12.8% and at the lower end, it’s nearly closed to 1.6%.
Still, progress is uneven: at the top, the gap remains stubborn at around 19% for high earners.
Why it matters: food and housing inflation remain above target and with limited real income growth, low income households are likely to face increasing financial strain and struggle to stay afloat.
October 28, 2025 at 9:49 AM
Why it matters: food and housing inflation remain above target and with limited real income growth, low income households are likely to face increasing financial strain and struggle to stay afloat.
The slowdown hit the bottom of the income distribution hardest.
At the 10th percentile, hourly earnings growth fell from 5.1% in 2023/24 to 1.8% in 2024/25. Higher earners fared slightly better, with the 90th percentile down from 3.5% to 2.6%.
At the 10th percentile, hourly earnings growth fell from 5.1% in 2023/24 to 1.8% in 2024/25. Higher earners fared slightly better, with the 90th percentile down from 3.5% to 2.6%.
October 28, 2025 at 9:49 AM
The slowdown hit the bottom of the income distribution hardest.
At the 10th percentile, hourly earnings growth fell from 5.1% in 2023/24 to 1.8% in 2024/25. Higher earners fared slightly better, with the 90th percentile down from 3.5% to 2.6%.
At the 10th percentile, hourly earnings growth fell from 5.1% in 2023/24 to 1.8% in 2024/25. Higher earners fared slightly better, with the 90th percentile down from 3.5% to 2.6%.